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ABSTRACT  
   
At present, the ideological bias in the human enhancement debate holds 
that opponents to human enhancement are primarily techno-conservatives who, 
lacking any reasonable, systematic account of why we ought to be so opposed, 
simply resort to a sort of fear-mongering and anti-meliorism. This dissertation 
means to counteract said bias by offering just such an account. Offered herein is a 
heuristic explanation of how, given a thorough understanding of enhancement 
both as a technology and as an attitude, we can predict a likely future of rampant 
commodification and dehumanization of man, and a veritable assault on human 
flourishing. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION AND AN ETHICS FOR THE FUTURE 
 
Introduction 
 
“Why worry about enhancement?” Hasting Center senior research scholar Erik 
Parens (1998) asks us, “Why not worry instead about apple pie?” (p. 1) He says, 
“Enhancement, after all, is something we seek for ourselves and think others 
should too.” For example, “[w]e praise individuals who exercise so that they will 
live longer”; “[w]e applaud individuals who seek excellent schools to enhance 
their intellectual development”; and “[w]e praise parents who do everything they 
can to enhance their children’s moral development.” And, given all this praise and 
applause, Parens wonders, “why would anyone worry about a new cosmetic 
surgery technique that promised to make us thinner,” or “a new 
psychopharmacological agent that promised to enhance concentration and 
performance in school,” or “a new psychopharmacological or genetic technology 
that promised to make us kinder and gentler?” (Parens, 1998, p. 1) The 
implication, it seems, is that our natural, default position with respect to human 
enhancement is, and should be, a positive one: we seek it for ourselves; we laud 
others for seeking it for themselves; and we believe individuals should seek it for 
others about whom they care. Some proponents of human enhancement will even 
go so far as to say that it is an inherent part of our “human” nature – if indeed they 
suppose we have one – to seek out and engage in various forms of enhancement 
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(see, e.g., Naam 2005; Bostrom 2007); man, they believe, is necessarily an 
enhancing, enhanceable being. And if this is true with exercise, schools and moral 
education, why should it not be so with cosmetic surgery, psychopharmacology, 
and genetic intervention?  
 The reason I will argue that we can reasonably laud the former but 
condemn – and indeed abhor – the latter is because with the latter we have more 
cause for concern that widespread, devastating consequences will be reaped, 
regardless of how seemingly innocent the initial sowing. More specifically, over 
the course of this dissertation I will argue the following: 
1. First, I argue that as in the case of many modern technologies 
enhancement technologies bear the mark of being inherently political in 
nature and Promethean in scope. Contra the more conventional idea of 
technology as being a sort of  “mere use” object with which our 
interactions are fairly limited, brief, and innocent – a view which stands as 
a likely carryover from our pre-modern technological age – the reality of 
said technologies is that they promise to be of a powerfully structuring sort 
that upon entering the mainstream and the market will inevitably reshape 
our lives and our sense of humanity in order that we cater to their 
domineering artifactual reality. Moreover, once having entered they 
cannot be dismissed – whether casually or by force; once Pandora’s box 
has been opened its evils are permanently and perpetually reaped, and so 
too with enhancement technologies. 
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2. Second, I argue that enhancement as an ideology – whether existing ante 
hoc or post hoc of the technology – is fundamentally an ideology of 
commodification. Drawing from philosophers, anthropologists and 
psychologists, I present the more established theories and perspectives of 
commodification and then expand in greater depth on the sort of attitudes 
and human effects that surround the commodification of individuals from 
a number of perspectives: the individual who is subject to 
commodification; the individual who is commodifying others; the 
individual who is commodifying themselves; and the individual who is not 
(obviously) actively involved in commodification, but nonetheless 
affected by it by existing in an environment in which such 
commodification is actively taking place. This, in the end, will represent 
the bulk of this dissertation. 
3. Third, I offer a heuristic account of the sort of future we can expect will 
result from these collective images of man v commodification. I use what 
will by then be my previously stated philosophy of technology combined 
with the overall philo-anthro-psycho-logical understanding of the human 
consequences to active and intrepid encroachment by ‘commodifying’ 
technologies in order to project the realistic (and to my mind likely) 
consequences of our (post)enhancement – and, to some posthuman – 
future. While admittedly speculative in nature, what I will proffer is based 
on a series of eminently reasonable steps; hence any apparent 
unreasonableness of my conclusions viz a viz man’s final destination of 
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depredation and degradation – his deterioration, debasement and demise – 
is reflective simply of horror’s last port of call before accepting this as 
reality. 
Thus, from the socially transformative, self-perpetuating power of enhancement 
technologies and the underlying attitude inherent with the current enhancement 
program (that is, its estimation of man as essentially an enhancing, enhanceable 
being), I maintain that we can plausibly predict just what sort of social 
transformation will occur as a result of our powers, and I will ultimately motivate 
the conclusion that this particular coupling of technology and attitude – when 
actively acted upon and extended to its future consequences – results in a 
diminished conception of humanity and human flourishing.  
 More concisely – if perhaps more opaquely – what I will argue in the 
following pages is little more than an expansion on my own intuition that the root 
problem of whole-heartedly endorsing enhancement (both as technology and as 
attitude) is that it results in people being treated like pots. This is an intuition I 
have, and it seems have had for some time; but I have only recently begun to find 
words to articulate it. The articulation began during my comprehensive exams, 
where one of the posed questions asked, among other things, what I took to be 
“the main objectionable effect of manipulating the genetic makeup of a person 
before birth.” My response was a brief, but (to my mind) eloquent, discussion of 
Adam’s lamentation – “Did I request thee, Maker, from my clay to mold me man, 
did I solicit thee from darkness to promote me…?” (Book X lines 743-745) – in 
Paradise Lost, echoed equally mournfully by Shelley’s Monster, and the proposed 
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“correct” answer (a la Milton, and drawn biblically from Isaiah 45:9): “Woe to 
you who strive with your Maker, earthen vessels with the potter! Does the clay 
say to the one who fashions it, “What are you making”? or “Your work has no 
handles”?” (NRSV) It was – and is – my contention that this seemingly callous 
response – namely, “Who are you (the pot) to question me (the potter)?” – 
coupled with its associated beliefs and attitudes (e.g., the inherent righteousness 
of the potter and the inherent unrighteousness of the pot (Job 4:17); the inherent 
fear and trembling entailed by a pot in face of the potter’s “rod of iron” (Psalm 
2:9-11); the inherent beholdenness and openness of the pot to the potter (Wisdom 
15:7, Sirach 33:13); and the inherent right of the potter over the pot (Romans 
9:20-22); and so on) are not reflective of the sort of humanity and human 
flourishing we should choose for ourselves and for our future descendents. And, 
the attitude underpinning this unsentimental sentiment is precisely what follows 
from active, widespread adoption of the enhancement mentality. 
With this more general account of my overall argument in mind, the final 
breakdown of chapters in this dissertation will be the following: In this first 
chapter, I will explain the theoretical underpinnings and general design structure 
for what philosopher Hans Jonas called an “ethics for the future.” I will not offer 
expansive description of his original arguments based upon ontology – the 
assumed metaphysics of man – and its related grounding of a binding theory of 
human responsibility (for a more thorough account, see Jonas 1984, Jonas 1996). 
I will, however, endeavor to provide an adequate sketch of the main aspects of his 
theory as they pertain to the project at hand. I begin with a discussion of how an 
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ethics for the future functions as a sort of futurology – primarily of a dystopian 
sort. I then describe how one goes about an ethics for the future by explaining the 
kinds of knowledge that are necessary to adequately engage in such an ethics 
(namely, “objective” and “subjective”), as well as their corresponding “tasks” or 
“duties” (which are, in brief, to visualize the long-term consequences of our 
current actions and to elicit the appropriate emotional response to said 
visualization). I furthermore explain the basic methodology of an ethics for the 
future and for much of this dissertation – heuristic casuistry – distinguishing our 
version from Jonas’ original proposal and motivating its adequacy as a theoretical 
approach to technology assessment. I then end with a brief account of the “image” 
or “idea” of man, how we derive it, and I suggest how it might be action-guiding 
once we reach chapter 6. 
The focus of the second chapter is to explore in greater depth what is 
meant by the notion of ‘enhancement technologies’. I begin by setting up some 
basic background information about enhancement, including: how the term 
‘enhancement’ is used by individuals within the enhancement debate (hint: my 
findings are that it is used rather poorly); what the main technologies of 
enhancement are (nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and 
cognitive science); and what the main human targets of enhancement are 
(choosing our bodies; choosing our minds; choosing our life spans; improving 
performance; choosing our children; and choosing our species). I then present the 
key findings we get from philosophy of technology from political theorist 
Langdon Winner that relate to enhancement technologies, including: the 
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limitations of the “default” or “conventional” view of technology as being of 
“mere use” – occasional, limited, innocuous, and nonstructuring; the, in reality, 
powerful structuring power inherent in modern technologies, such as 
enhancement technologies and the consequences of said structuring; and the 
necessity of incorporating a deeply political perspective into the philosophy of 
technology, especially when what we are faced with are not merely “inventively” 
political technologies but rather “inherently” political technologies. I then 
continue with the key findings we get from philosophy of technology from 
bioethicist and philosopher of technology Hans Jonas that relate to enhancement 
technologies, including: the pivotal distinction between “new” or “modern” 
technologies and “old” or “traditional” technologies with respect to their 
respective formal dynamics (namely the tendency towards ever-increasing 
expansion and improvement; the quick spreading speed of technological 
knowledge and practice; the circular, rather than unilinear, relationship between 
means and ends; and the inherent idolization of technological “progress”; and the 
inherent Prometheanism we find with modern technology, both for the technology 
itself and for the actors using it. I conclude with a brief discussion of the overall 
perspective of enhancement technologies that results from these collective 
understandings of both enhancement and technology. 
The third chapter functions somewhat as a bridge between the second and 
fourth chapters. Since it is my contention that part of the ethically problematic 
nature of the image of man as put forth by the proponents of human enhancement 
writ large is its view of man as a commodifying, commodifiable being, I believe 
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that it is therefore necessary to present a more detailed analysis on 
commodification generally. Hence, in this chapter I will offer what is essentially a 
primer in commodification, based on key analyses of commodification available 
in both anthropology and bioethics. I will also illustrate how the characteristics 
that reflect the image of man held by human enhancement advocates as explored 
in chapter 2 are the same characteristics we find in commodification. 
In the fourth chapter I offer a more detailed analysis – based on previous 
observations in analogous areas – of what is arguably the effect of being a 
commodified individual. I begin with the classical analysis by Joel Feinberg on a 
child’s right to an open future. Next, I present Habermas’ extension of this 
analysis and his arguments about the felt invasion for the individual subject to 
enhancement. Following that, I offer in turn illustrations for the following felt 
traits of man commodified: fragmentation, alienation, and objectification. I 
conclude the chapter with general remarks on what I take to be the defining 
feature of man commodified – that he is, for all intensive purposes, a pot subject 
to the whims of a potter. 
The fifth chapter goes into detail as to what I believe are the more likely 
attitudes and features of an individual engaging in human commodification. Here, 
I explore both the attitudes of someone engaging in the commodification of 
another individual, as well as of someone engaging in the commodification of 
himself or herself. In particular, I explain how the man commodifying acts as 
manufacturer, master, and sadist (or masochist). 
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While the previous two chapters describe what happens to those 
individuals directly involved in the act of commodification, whether by 
commodifying or by being commodified, in the sixth chapter I take on what 
logical repercussions would follow from human commodification even for those 
individuals who are not directly involved. Partly speculative – since there do not 
exist actual empirical studies on its potential plausibility – I offer theoretical 
rationale for presuming a sort of “commodification effect” on those individuals 
not involved in human commodification, as well as on a society at large that is 
aware of – even peripherally – the existence of a sub-population who engages in 
such commodification. I then offer a synthesized account of all these varying 
forms of man v commodification and explain the potential impact on human 
flourishing.  
In the end, much of my aim in this current project is to provide “freedom 
through insight” (Guston and Sarewitz, 2002, p. 100) by presenting the reader 
with a hypothetical, probable future, an “if…then” scenario developed from what 
we know about the group of technologies collectively referred to as ‘enhancement 
technologies’, what their associated attitudes and beliefs are, and what sort of 
predictions and projections we can make given this knowledge. Given this focus 
on a heuristic approach, what follows will not be an instance of what I recognize 
as the oft-revered – and to my mind fabled – case of a “knock-down argument”. 
There is no “necessary” or “sufficient” to my argument; but for it to succeed I 
need neither. My (limited) goal is to offer a reasoned, reasonable account of why 
a reasoning, reasonable person might be disinclined to rush head-on towards the 
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transhuman technotopia; why we should not be so quick to judge that all techno-
conservatism results from techno-fear or techno-ignorance; and why though the 
supporters of human enhancement are right that “The debate over human 
enhancement is at heart a debate over human freedom” (Naam 2005: 6-7), they 
are wrong about which freedom is fundamentally important.  
Given this goal, it is possible that I have just shown what will be 
considered by some to be my true colors – that of bioLudditism (for more on why 
I deny this charge, see chapter 2). In reality, however, I am not off smashing 
looms in the dead of night out of some (supposedly) misguided fear that my skills 
and humanity will henceforth be outmoded by the looming technocraft; I am 
simply explaining how these looms – here, technological vehicles for human 
enhancement and their corresponding attitudes – lead to the outmoding. The fear 
is real, and it is not misguided. Amidst the Kurzweilian taglines and the cyborgian 
shibboleths and the posthuman homiletics, a moment of paused, quiet reflection is 
to my mind beneficial. The questions, “What future does this have in hold for 
me?” and “Do I really want it?” are indeed sensible ones. Our choices on the 
matter do not live in a vacuum, and to the extent that the consequences for our 
choices are foreseeable – regardless of whether these consequences are 
unintentional, “mere” side-effects, or a far way down the causal road – we are 
responsible for them. Our true human freedom, then, lies in that choice. And we 
owe it to ourselves, to our progeny, and to our humanity to make the right one. 
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An Ethics for the Future  
 
This basic structure that I have outlined above is my own attempt at what 
bioethicist and philosopher of technology Hans Jonas (1996) denoted as an 
“ethics for the future” (or, variably, as an “ethics of the future” (Jonas 1984)), 
which is defined as “a contemporary ethics concerned with a future we seek to 
protect for our descendants from the consequences of our actions in the present.” 
(Jonas, 1996, p. 99) In practice, an ethics for the future is a sort of dystopian 
futurology. It opposes “[f]uturology as wish fulfillment” – aka utopianism – by 
acting “as warning…to bring our unleashed abilities under our control.” (Jonas, 
1996, p. 100) It is a futurology that is intended to “have a sobering effect on those 
drunk with their own abilities and protect them from themselves” by virtue of 
having us at present “[confront] our power with its future ramifications” (Jonas, 
1996, p. 104). As we will see in chapter 2, the “quasi-utopian vision” of our 
technological manifest destiny acts as a blinding force, and the dazzling 
possibility to fulfill the Faustian desire for the ultimate alchemy – man’s final 
control over man – overwhelms otherwise rational thought. In face of this, an 
ethics for the future acts as a fairly conservative safeguard (though a bit more 
robust than the standard precautionary principle). 
 In addition to being a safeguard, an ethics for the future is fundamentally 
an effort at foresight. More neutrally defined, Jonas (1996) states that futurology 
is “the scientifically informed projection of what our present acts can causally 
lead to – so that we do not face the future blindly, but with our eyes open.” (pp. 
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99-100) On this account, the future may be either good or bad, desirable or 
undesirable; beyond topolatry and topophobia, what we want is topognosis (or, 
rather, topoprognosis). To achieve said topoprognosis, what is necessary is a sort 
of twofold knowledge: “on an objective level, that of physical causes; on a 
subjective one, that of human goals.” (Jonas, 1996, p. 99) This means that in order 
to adequately engage in an ethics for the future, we need to, on the “objective 
level,” have some basic understanding of the current (technological) state of 
affairs; how the technologies and institutions that make up this state of affairs 
interact, develop, and alter the fabric of our world; and what sorts of causal 
connections and consequences are likely, given this state of affairs and its 
constituents. On the “subjective level,” what we need is some basic understanding 
of human (individual, societal, religious, political, etc.) values; what sort of basis 
there is for these values, how well-founded they are, how they interrelate, and so 
on; and how they can arguably be affected by an underlying state of affairs (as in 
the objective level of knowledge). 
This two-fold knowledge corresponds with what Jonas calls the two 
“tasks” (1996) or “duties” (1984) of an ethics for the future, the first of which is 
to “[visualize] the long-range effects of technological enterprise” (1984, p. 27) by 
“maximize[ing] our knowledge of the consequences of our actions in view of the 
way they are able to determine and imperil the future lot of mankind.” (1996, pp. 
103-4) According to Jonas (1984), the goal here is to “seek…out by an effort of 
reason and imagination” a potential future “where that which is to be feared has 
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never yet happened and has perhaps no analogies in past or present experience” in 
order that “it can instill in us the fear whose guidance we need” (p. 27). 
While clearly Jonas has a ‘negative’ interpretation of how an ethics for the 
future ought to function, as stated in the previous paragraph I do not take this 
negative outlook to be an inherent feature of an ethics for the future. I suspect that 
that what motivates Jonas’ position is an underlying assumption that man’s 
default vision of the future with respect to technology and technological 
‘advance’ is fundamentally utopian (see e.g. chapter 2). As such, he sees man as, 
in a sense, blinded to the possible ‘worst-case scenarios’ – or even the likely but 
pessimistic scenarios – of how this ‘advance’ will be played out. I am less 
convinced of the supposed lack of pessimism in the technological debate (indeed, 
even in enhancement discussion dystopian visions abound). I do, however, 
sympathize with a more modest (re)interpretation of Jonas’ claim, namely that the 
presence of “imagined malum” in futurology is perhaps less potent than we (ought 
to) desire, so we are duty bound to engage in more systematic efforts on this front. 
Such is the primary task set for the project at hand. 
Here, my wish is to paint a picture – contra the eager transhumanist’s wet 
dream (or fantasy) – of our possible, indeed probable, future should we pursue 
this fantasy as our own. To paint this picture, we will essentially be engaging in 
what Jonas calls heuristic casuistry, here utilizing an understanding of casuistry as 
a resolution of our duty or duties in a given instance through understanding and 
interpretation of some ethical principle or principles, rather than the less fortunate 
(for our purposes, at least) interpretation of casuistry as sophistry via specious 
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reasoning or fallacious principle application. On Jonas’ account, heuristic 
casuistry is a sort of experimental problem solving aimed at discovering our 
ethical principles and corresponding moral duties. In heuristic casuistry we 
primarily use thought experiments with hypothetical premises and conjectural 
inferences (Jonas, 1984, p. 29). For Jonas (1984), the degree of probability of 
these premises and inferences is of much less concern than the content of the 
conclusions; what we want is a possible (even if highly unlikely) future with 
strong visceral and emotional impact, so that in face of this “perceived 
possibility” we can gain “access to new moral truth” (p. 29). Such moral truth, 
Jonas (1984) claims, will not have its certainty be “dependent upon the degree of 
certainty of the factual, scientific projections which provided paradigmatic 
material for it” since “its pronouncements are apodictic” rather than merely 
probabilistic (pp. 29-30).  
While I mean neither to carp nor harp on the theoretical limitations of 
Jonas’ view, I personally do not wish to suppose (or require) logical or 
demonstrable certainty in the case of our heuristic conclusions. Moreover, I 
suspect that Jonas adopts such a position less because it seems the most 
reasonable and more so out of an exceedingly (or, perhaps in his case, warranted) 
pessimistic view of political motivation in face of “mere possibility.” (Jonas, 
1984, p. 30) Perhaps I am more (foolishly?) sanguine that a strong and 
thoroughgoing combination of probability and horror will be sufficient to act as a 
moral and political guide; but regardless, I am unwilling to stake my claim on 
apodicticity.  
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Besides, in my opinion (and the apparent opinion of others), this heuristic 
casuistry is a far cry from mere sophism and indeed quite capable of being action-
guiding. When understood as a sort of anticipatory ethics, Jonas’ ethics for the 
future is perhaps best viewed as an abridged or antecedent version of what is now 
referred to as “real-time technology assessment”. Proposed by political scholars 
Dave Guston and Daniel Sarewitz (2002) as a way of integrating social science 
and public policy outcomes into research and development programs for science 
and technology from the outset, real-time technology assessment uses in large part 
the same sort of basic methods that make up Jonas’ heuristic casuistry. For 
example, according to Guston and Sarewitz (2002), real-time technology 
assessment “makes use of more reflexive measures such as public opinion polling, 
focus groups, and scenario development to elicit values and explore alternative 
potential outcomes”; “uses content analysis, social judgment research, and survey 
research to investigate how knowledge, perceptions, and values are evolving over 
time, to enhance communication, and to identify emerging problems”; and 
“integrates socio-technical mapping and dialogue with retrospective (historical) as 
well as prospective (scenario) analysis” in an effort “to situate the innovation of 
concern in a historical context that will render it more amenable to understanding 
and, if necessary, to modification.” (p. 98) All of these features are meant to 
“inform and support natural science and engineering research, and…provide an 
explicit mechanism for observing, critiquing, and influencing social values as they 
become embedded in innovations.” (Guston and Sarewitz, 2002, p. 93)   
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While admittedly more complicated than the previous paragraph might let 
on - indeed, Guston and Sarewitz (2002) explicitly divide these methods of real-
time technology assessment into four separate, but linked components which are 
then expanded on in depth (pp. 100-101) – they do confess that their proposal can 
alternatively (and much more simplistically) be seen as version of ““muddling 
through”, “adaptive management”, and “sophisticated trial-and-error”” (p. 100), 
which are meant to achieve “not prediction with precision, [but] freedom through 
insight” (p. 100). This is the same achievement intended with Jonas’ heuristic 
casuistry (once we drop the apodictic component), where “the mere knowledge of 
possibilities, though certainly insufficient for cogent prediction, is fully adequate 
for [its] purposes” (1984, p. 29).  Moreover, without dragging it out into an 
extended discussion, it is worth noting that efforts towards more “deliberative” 
(Leib, 2005), “discursive” (Dryzek, 1990), "inclusive" (Brown, 2002), 
“participatory” (Pellizzoni, 2001), “pluralistic” (Bohmann, 1996), "reflexive" 
(Voss, et al, 2006), etc., approaches in technology assessment are becoming 
increasingly popular, each of which advocate in one relative form or another 
something similar to the heuristic prognostics that are to be found in an ethics for 
the future. By association, if there is thought to be something inherently flawed in 
our approach herein, it would seem to implicate many other theoretical attempts at 
analyzing potential futures resulting from current and emerging technologies. 
Thus, our goal should not so much be to proclaim causal certainty, but instead to 
present a thoroughly reasonable account of what the future may indeed hold given 
our respective knowledge – “objective” and “subjective”; motivate strongly the 
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future that best fits with known human goals and human values; and in the end 
allow a more fully informed mankind to freely choose the future that, as a whole, 
best fits their desires. 
In order to motivate the best fitting future, we will need to have a better 
understanding of the second duty of an ethics for the future (which for Jonas 
follows directly from the first duty). This second duty consists in “summonizing 
(sic) up a feeling appropriate to what has been visualized” as a result of the 
projections made from the first duty (Jonas, 1984, p. 28). According to Jonas 
(1984), after having determined some knowledgeable projection of the future 
consequences of our contemporary actions, the second task or duty is “in light of 
this knowledge of something unprecedentedly new that might come about, to 
develop a new knowledge of what is permissible and not permissible, of what to 
allow and what to avoid” (p. 28). Thus, while the first task was “an understanding 
of facts,” this second task is “an understanding of values”: “a knowledge of the 
Good, of what man ought to be.” (Jonas, 1996, p. 104) 
This understanding of values is grounded in what Jonas calls the “image” 
or “idea” of man. For Jonas (1996), our “[k]nowledge of the human Good must be 
derived from the essence of what is human” (p. 105): “a concept of the human 
being…what human beings should be, what we are all about, and what is 
advantageous for us” and also “what we must not be, what diminishes and distorts 
us” (p. 104). For him, this requires a sort of “ontological grounding” – much like 
an account of human nature – which according to his argument has specific 
metaphysical properties (see e.g. Jonas 1996). For our purposes here, this 
  18 
ontology of man will be left fairly neutral, since arguing about ontology and 
metaphysics takes us decidedly outside the desired scope of this dissertation. 
 However, it is entirely within our desired scope to consider, at least in 
broad strokes, what this notion of the “image of man” is and how it pertains to our 
argument. At its most rudimentary level, the image of man is the “core 
phenomenon of our humanity, which is to be preserved in its integrity at all costs” 
(Jonas, 1984, p. 34). According to Jonas (1984), “the idea of Man…is such that it 
demands the presence of its embodiment in the world [and] by telling us why 
there should be men, it tells us also how they should be” (p. 43). The idea here is 
that from our image of man we can derive certain conditions that must necessarily 
obtain in all future conditions in which “man” is to be present, and, moreover, for 
which no potential “good” warrants its sacrifice. For example, if we hold to an 
image of man in which man is necessarily mortal (as in the classic statement from 
Logic class: All men are mortal), then any potential future in which man is no 
longer mortal is barred from our choosing, because the image of man must be 
maintained; or, if we hold to a more Aristotelian notion, then a future in which 
men are no longer bipedal and/or featherless is also off limits; and so on. 
 For Jonas, it seems to be the case that, up front, we are unaware of the 
image of man we are obligated to protect, and we cannot in fact know this true 
image until having engaged in the two tasks of an ethics for the future. He says, 
“it is an anticipated distortion of man that helps us to detect that in the normative 
conception of man which is to be preserved from it” (Jonas, 1984, p. 26). Also, he 
claims that “we need the threat to the image of man – and rather specific kinds of 
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threat – to assure ourselves of his true image by the very recoil from these threats” 
(Jonas, 1984, pp. 26-7). Much like Kass’ (1997) notion of the wisdom of 
repugnance, it is the presence of this recoil that indicates to us that something 
important is at stake. On this account, then, we may suspect that the final image of 
man we will want to protect from encroaching enhancement technologies will not 
be made clear to us until we have completed the task at hand and seen, in the final 
count, what image of human flourishing – or lack thereof – crops up. 
 From this resultant image of man comes an “imperative of responsibility” 
that for Jonas is absolute, but for us may only be suggestive (there is, after all, that 
old world proverb about horses and water). However, having in mind the image or 
idea of man acting as an account of “genuine human life”, we can strongly advise 
the following maxims: negatively, “Act so that the effects of your action are not 
destructive of the future possibility of such life”; or, positively, “Act so that the 
effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life” 
(Jonas, 1984, p. 11). For our purposes, these maxims basically boil down to 
“Don’t undermine human flourishing by flying on the wings of posthuman (or 
post-enhancement) dreams.” It is my hope that this maxim may become action-
guiding – or at least desirably so – by the end of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 2 
ENHANCEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
The present chapter is essentially an exploration into the nature of ‘enhancement’ 
technologies. I will begin by briefly outlining the general concept of 
‘enhancement’ to which I will be responding throughout this dissertation, as well 
as the key relevant beliefs of enhancement proponents as they relate to my overall 
argument. My primary goal for that section is, by necessity of conciseness and 
overall project relevance, not a thorough exploration into the explicit 
methodologies of human enhancement (i.e. those means that are to be used in the 
quest for human enhancement) or the specific target or targets of human 
enhancement (i.e. that human feature at which enhancement is directed). I do not 
question the (eventual) efficacy of biology, neurotechnology, nanotechnology and 
so on to enable the sorts of enhancements that are being sought; nor do I 
challenge the potential ‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ of any of the variable human 
features – e.g. mind, body, performance, life span, and so on – that are said to be 
the primary areas of human enhancement. I do not even engage in the, albeit, 
meaningful discussion of whether allowing for human enhancement would 
fundamentally dissolve or enable a more just world citizenship. For the most part, 
I take it as a given that science and technology can ensure that the methods of 
enhancement are essentially safe and effective; that ethical arguments closing off 
certain human features from enhancement while at the same time promoting other 
features, based solely on the virtue or the nature of the given feature itself, will 
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ultimately be wrought with logical peril; and that with sufficient finagling and 
force democracy and governance can keep human enhancement technologies 
from becoming simply one more means of keeping the have-nots under the golden 
foot of the haves (note that I am only saying that science, democracy, and so on 
potentially can ensure these things, not that they will.). I also concede to human 
enhancement proponents that, when considered by itself – that is, divorced of any 
particular theory of ethics, a thorough engagement with the associated methods, 
and a complete exploration into the myriad of potential consequences that might 
result from the enhancement – human enhancement may in fact be, by default, a 
good thing, something that ought to be sought for the betterment of individual 
humans and mankind at large. (Although I am generally suspicious of the genuine 
possibility of just such a complete divorce of human enhancement from some 
broader context, as well as skeptical that any resulting concept of ‘enhancement’ 
will be of much use. But, it is a concession nonetheless.) 
I concede all of these things for three main reasons: First, in agreeing with 
human enhancement proponents on all these counts, I hope that I will absolve 
myself of the potential ad hominems that I am, in point of fact, simply a 
“bioLuddite,” “technopessimist,” “bioconservative,” and whatever other of the 
myriad of rhetorical attacks that have the habit of laying claim to anyone making 
arguments not entirely supportive of the enhancement program (see e.g. Hughes, 
2004 and Naam, 2005 for some of the more colorful examples). Second, I 
concede the aforementioned because I actually do believe in the power of science 
and democracy, the logical pitfalls of certain forms of argumentation, and the 
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potential prima facie good of enhancement, at least as narrowly described above. 
Third, I concede all these points because my goal for the overall project is to 
provide an argument about the potential future consequences that may result even 
when we do concede these things to the human enhancement proponents. Herein I 
am not interested in what might happen should the enhancement program fail; 
rather, I am interested in what sort of damage might irreversibly be done to our 
world and to our species should the enhancement program succeed. 
The remainder of the chapter will focus on setting up the sort of 
philosophy of technology that underpins my views. Drawn mainly from Langdon 
Winner (1986) and Hans Jonas (1979), this philosophy of technology holds that 
what we are faced with in the case of enhancement technologies are most 
arguably “inherently political”, “modern” technologies that carry with them a 
Promethean impulse to structure the technological world and those who are in it 
to cater to the continued growth and expansion of said technology. I contrast this 
understanding of technology with the more innocuous one that I suspect probably 
underpins the views of many an enhancement proponent – much to their 
ideological detriment, and conclude the chapter with my final, overall view of 
enhancement technologies that will be the basis for part of my critique that will be 
seen in the concluding chapters. 
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Enhancement 
 
With the prelude from the previous section in mind, the organization of this 
section is essentially as follows: First, I briefly describe – and critique – the 
notion of ‘enhancement’ as it is being used in the human enhancement debate. 
Next, I outline some of the main technologies and sciences utilized in the quest 
for human enhancement, namely nanotechnology, neuroscience, biology, and 
informatics. I then discuss some of the main targets of human enhancement: the 
human body, the human mind, the human life span, human performance, future 
children, and the nature of the human species. All three of these attempts at 
analyzing the notion of ‘enhancement’ with respect to human nature and human 
features will be fairly brief. It is my general hope (or perhaps merely assumption) 
that a number of my readers will already be sufficiently familiar with these 
aspects of the human enhancement debate that no more than a quick recap will be 
necessary; and for those readers who are not so familiar, I believe that they will be 
better served be reviewing the other sources I will highlight over the course of this 
section, since it is not my intention here to redo what others before me have 
already done so well. Moreover, I do not believe that extended discussion of any 
of these factors is necessary for the progression of my argument. In the end, the 
key relevant features of enhancement technologies as they pertain to my argument 
have little to do with the common-use definition, explicit technologies, or 
proposed targets; they have more to do with their political and Promethean nature, 
which will be discussed in greater depth later in this chapter. However, a brief 
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summary specific to the ‘enhancement’ part of ‘enhancement technologies’ may 
no doubt prove useful: 
One way we can try to understand what is meant by the term 
‘enhancement’ is to look at how that notion is used within the enhancement 
debate itself. However, this task is not as simple as it might first appear. As 
evidence of this disclaimer, consider the results of the Hastings Center two-year 
project aimed at articulating “A continuum of uses of ‘enhancement 
technologies,’ from those that promote shared values, to those that seem neither to 
promote nor threaten shared values, to those that threaten such values” (cited 
Parens, 1998, p. 1) to help guide policymakers, which showed that ‘enhancement 
technologies’ could not be defined so easily. During the study Parens discovered 
that in its common, colloquial usage, the role of the term ‘enhancement’ tended to 
serve one of two purposes. One purpose, he found, is a sort of polar place-holder 
that opposes ‘treatment’ in the “treatment/enhancement distinction” (Parens, 
1998, p. 2). Parens (1998) exclaims that this use of ‘enhancement’ most 
frequently occurs “in conversations by people attempting to say what doctors, as 
doctors, should and shouldn’t do or by people attempting to say what a just 
system of health insurance should and shouldn’t provide” (p. 2). Thus, it is 
typically the sort of conversation that is “conducted, explicitly or implicitly, in 
terms of the proper goals of medicine,” and is concerned “primarily that doctors 
might provide an intervention that would undermine the proper goals of the 
profession” (Parens, 1998, p. 2). 
  25 
 The second purpose – often by contrast, although occasionally in consort – 
is primarily concerned “that anyone who provided the intervention would be 
undermining extramedical, social goals or would be exacerbating already existing 
social problems” (Parens, 1998, p. 2). Although these two purposes can and 
sometimes do intertwine, the distinction itself is an important one to make. It is 
important because – more so at the time Parens was writing, but still to this day – 
a common understanding of what the ‘problem’ is with enhancement centers on 
the former interpretation of the purpose of ‘enhancement’. While I do not intend 
to disregard the merits of discussion on the treatment/enhancement distinction (I 
instead fully support efforts made to clarify our understanding of used 
terminology and a more dedicated awareness of how we ought to interpret and 
uphold medical goals) I find the continued attempts to find a clear and present 
division between ‘treatment’ and ‘enhancement’ rather tedious, most likely futile, 
and an unpleasant distraction from the fact that there are other, perhaps more 
pressing, matters we should look to when evaluating the issue of enhancement. 
 Unfortunately, while the debate has progressed in its recognition and 
understanding of extramedical concerns viz a viz enhancement, the definitions of 
enhancement continue to be plagued by a more-or-less medical underpinning. 
One prototypical definition we find comes from enhancement enthusiast David 
Degrazia (2005), who defined enhancements as “interventions to improve human 
form or function that do not respond to genuine medical needs,” where “medical 
needs” is defined: “in terms of disease, impairment, illness, or the life”; “as 
departures from normal (perhaps species-typical) functioning”; or “by reference 
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to prevailing medical ideology” (p. 263). For Degrazia (2005), the hallmark of 
this particular conception is that it “identifies enhancements by the goal of 
improvement in the absence of medical need” (p. 263). In a similar vein, 
contemporary transhumanists – the current leading cult of enhancement – Julian 
Savulescu and Nick Bostrom (2011) consider the hallmark to be that “[h]uman 
enhancement aims to increase human capacities above normal levels” (preface). 
Both of these definition, however, require some account of what ‘normal’ is – 
whether ‘medically’ normal or ‘species’ normal – which the current state of the 
enhancement debate would seem to suggest is a fairly fruitless endeavor, leading 
either to reduction infinitum or reduction ad absurdum. Either way, it is a fairly 
precarious place to set one’s Archimedean fulcrum.  
 Of course, the reduction problem aside, there seems to be need of 
something that distinguishes the fairly innocuous or uninteresting cases of 
enhancement (again, the exercise, the schools and the moral education) from 
those as wise to declare as (potentially) problematic. If , for example, Lin and 
Allhoff (2008) are correct in their understanding that, “Strictly speaking, “human 
enhancement” includes any activity by which we improve our bodies, minds, or 
abilities – things we do to enhance our welfare,” then we would fall in a trap 
whereby “reading a book, eating vegetables, doing homework, and exercising 
may count as enhancing ourselves” (pp. 252-3). Thus it appears that some form of 
demarcation or delineation would indeed be beneficial. 
 Other ways to approach the notion of enhancement that are not taken in 
this dissertation are to look to the technologies of enhancement, of which the four 
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main technologies of enhancement – clustered affectionately under the acronym 
NBIC – are nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and 
cognitive science; or to look at the targets of human enhancement, of which the 
key targets of the current enhancement include (in no particular order): choosing 
our bodies; choosing our minds; choosing our life spans; improving performance; 
choosing our children; and choosing our species.  
 
Technology: Political 
 
In his opus The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High 
Technology, Langdon Winner (1986) laments, “At this late date” – actually over 
twenty years ago! – “in the development of our industrial/technological 
civilization the most accurate observation to be made about the philosophy of 
technology is that there really isn’t one” (pp. 3-4). He points out that even though 
standard bibliographies chronicling philosophy of technology list “well over a 
thousand books and articles in several languages by nineteenth- and twentieth-
century authors… reading through the material listed shows…little of enduring 
substance” (Winner, 1984, p. 4). What Winner found true then – and what is 
largely (and unfortunately) true now – is that much of the so-called “philosophy 
of technology” talk was primarily lip-service: “airy pronouncements”, vague 
generalizations, and abbreviated commentary in footnotes or as discussion points. 
(We still see much of this trend in the talk of ethics with respect to emerging – 
and enhancement – technologies from works written by non-philosophers. And, 
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occasionally, from philosophers.) What he found lacking were more “ambitious 
investigations” “examin[ing] critically the nature and significance of artificial aids 
to human activity” that might indicate that technology has “joined epistemology, 
metaphysics, esthetics, law, science, and politics as a fully respectable topic for 
philosophical inquiry” (Winner, 1986, p. 4). 
 Philosopher Hans Jonas (1979) forged a similar complaint. In “Toward a 
Philosophy of Technology,” he wonders, “if there is a philosophy of science, 
language, history, and art; if there is social, political, and moral philosophy; 
philosophy of thought and of action, of reason and passion, of decision and value” 
then how is it possible that there is not a full-fledge philosophy of technology – 
“the focal fact of modern life?” (Jonas, 1979, p. 34). Since, as he sees it, “Modern 
technology touches on almost everything vital to man’s existence – material, 
mental, and spiritual” (Jonas, 1979, p. 34), it seems no small wonder that greater 
investigations have yet to take place, and that the questions it poses have not 
become central in the ethos of public conscience and public debate. 
One explanation for why technology has remained the homely atticked 
stepchild of our philosophic family has to do with the potent hold that the notion 
of “progress” has over the minds of men and over society more generally. In 
response to the question, “Why is it that the philosophy of technology has never 
really gotten under way?” – or, more directly, “Why has a culture so firmly based 
upon countless sophisticated instruments, techniques, and systems remained so 
steadfast in its reluctance to examine its own foundations?” – Winner (1986) 
proposes that “[m]uch of the answer can be found in the astonishing hold the idea 
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of “progress” has exercised on social thought during the industrial age.” (p. 5) 
Since the beginning of the twentieth-century, it has been all but “taken for granted 
that the only reliable sources for improving the human condition stem from new 
machines, techniques, and chemicals” – that is, new technologies. Time and again 
we “affirm that the next wave of innovations will surely be our salvation” 
(Winner, 1986, p. 5), and even in the face of “the recurring environmental and 
social ills that have accompanied technological advancement” (Winner, 1986, p. 
5), our collective faith has never truly wavered in our gilded kine, and the lore and 
allure of technological progress remains. 
 More so than this steadfast allure, however, Winner maintains that the 
main reason for the absence of thoroughgoing technological analyses has to do 
with our reliance on a faulty “default” view of technology. According to Winner 
(1986), the “conventional idea of what technology is and what it means” (p. 6) 
supports the social snubbing of any in-depth examination into the philosophical 
nature of technology by supposing that “the human relationship to technical 
things is too obvious to merit serious reflection” (p. 5). According to 
“conventional views,” this human-technology relationship is fairly basic: 
scientists and engineers and inventors create certain technical artifacts, and the 
general public uses said technical artifacts as they are deemed relevant. The 
public is only peripherally concerned with the matter of technical making (such 
as, e.g., by watching The Science Channel’s “How Its Made”). As Winner (1986) 
puts it, “How things work” is the domain of inventors, technicians, engineers, 
repairmen, and the like who prepare artificial aids to human activity and keep 
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them in good working order” (p.5). As a result, “Those not directly involved in 
the various spheres of “making” are thought to have little interest in or need to 
know about the materials, principles, or procedures found in those spheres” 
(Winner, 1986, p. 5). This means that what matters, then, is not “How things 
work” but “Do they work” (and, I might add, “How cheaply can I/we get them?”), 
since in the end the public is primarily concerned with use (and price). 
 This “mere use” assumption is the driving force behind the “conventional 
idea” of technology. It is “understood to be a straightforward matter” that 
technology and its artifacts function essentially as tools to be used at our disposal: 
“One picks up a tool, uses it, and puts it down. One picks up a telephone, talks on 
it, and then does not use it for a time. A person gets on an airplane, flies from 
point A to point B, and then gets off” (Winner, 1986, p. 6) The idea here is that 
“[o]nce things have been made, we interact with them on occasion to achieve 
specific purposes” (Winner, 1986, p. 6). And, because of this sort of 
commonplace human-techno-artifact relation, Winner (1986) says, “The proper 
interpretation of the meaning of technology in the mode of use seems to be 
nothing more complicated than an occasional, limited, and nonproblematic 
interaction” (p. 6). 
 The descriptions of “occasional” and “limited” should be pretty 
straightforward. For “occasional,” Winner has in mind that our conventional 
understanding of technology is such that we see its use as being typically 
infrequent, occurring only at a particular time when such use is needed. For 
example, I only interact with planes at such time as I am flying; I only interact 
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with phones at such time as I am conversing with someone on it; and I only 
interact with tools at such time as I am building, fixing, and so on in such a way 
that that tool is required. In most cases, these interactions are not seen as habitual, 
except with individuals who have careers that explicitly require more regular 
interaction. For “limited,” Winner has in mind that our conventional 
understanding of technology is such that we see it as pertaining to a fairly narrow 
scope of our regular existence. This has a lot to do with being limited to use at 
specific occasions (as in the case of “occasional”); but, rather than being simply 
concerned with our use of technology (e.g. flying, phoning, hammering), it 
perhaps more importantly includes the idea that technology’s power and influence 
over us (e.g. what influence does flying, phoning, or hammering have over me?) 
is limited as well (as in the case of “nonstructuring,” which is described below). 
 In addition to being “occasional, limited, and nonproblematic”, Winner 
adds to the conventional description of technology “innocuous” and 
“nonstructuring” (although it seems to me that these two are best considered as 
more fundamental parts to “nonproblematic”). By “innocuous” he does not mean 
to imply that the default view of technology is one where it can never be used for 
malicious purposes, or that bad things cannot occur in consequence to their 
application. Instead, the idea is that by supposing a “mere use” understanding we 
are proclaiming technology to be intrinsically morally neutral. His main idea here 
is that “The language of the notion of “use”…includes standard terms that enable 
us to interpret technologies in a range of moral contexts” (Winner, 1986, p. 6). 
Thus: “Tools can be “used well or poorly” and for “good or bad purposes”; I can 
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use my knife to slice a loaf of bread or to stab the next person that walks by” 
(Winner, 1986, p. 6). Because of this indiscriminateness – this “promiscuous 
utility” that “technological objects and processes” seem to have – the question of 
a moral goodness or badness with respect to any given technology or 
technological artifact is essentially rendered moot. To paraphrase the unofficial 
slogan of the National Rifle Association: “Technologies don’t harm people. 
People harm people.” 
 By “nonstructuring,” Winner has in mind the idea that our (i.e. humans’) 
relationship with technology is essentially one-way: we create, modify, use, and 
so on, technologies but technology does not create, modify, use, and so on, us 
(this is part of their “limitedness,” as described above). This aspect of the 
conventional view of technology is “one of occasional human interaction with 
devices and material conditions that leave individuals unaffected” (Winner, 1986, 
p. 14); once I put my tool back in the toolbox, put down my phone, or exit the 
plane, these technologies have no real bearing in my day-to-day life. Moreover, if 
I lack a toolbox or phone or refuse to fly on planes, their presence in the world 
and use by others can have no impact relevant to me. Ultimately, according to this 
view, the structure of my own life is (almost) solely up to me, with technology 
and its artifacts limited to the ambit. 
However, when it comes to many of the technologies we face today, 
especially enhancement technologies, to a great extent these particular aspects 
(i.e. “occasional,” “limited,” “innocuous,” and “nonstructuring”) simply do not 
apply. While we can and presumably do sometimes think of these tools, phones, 
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planes, etc., as the sorts of things that once put out of sight hence become out 
mind, the truth is that “[t]he kinds of things we are apt to see as “mere” 
technological entities” – including the aforementioned tools, phones, and planes – 
“become much more interesting and problematic if we begin to observe how 
broadly they are involved in conditions of social and moral life” (Winner, 1986, p. 
6). As Winner (1986) points out, “As they become woven into the texture of 
everyday existence, the devices, techniques, and systems we adopt shed their tool-
like qualities to become part of our very humanity” (p. 12). Consequently, “In an 
important sense we become the beings who work on assembly lines, who talk on 
telephones, who do our figuring on pocket calculators, who eat processed foods, 
who clean our homes with powerful chemicals” (Winner, 1986, p. 12). This 
means that even the more seemingly innocent activities we engage in are not freed 
from risk of technological reshaping. While Winner (1986) admits that things like 
“working, talking, figuring, eating, cleaning, and such things have been parts of 
human activity for a very long time,” he maintains that “technological innovations 
can radically alter these common patterns and on occasion generate entirely new 
ones, often with surprising results” (p. 12). Thus, in the end, “the very act of using 
the kinds of machines, techniques, and systems available to us generates patterns 
of activities and expectations that soon become “second nature”” (Winner, 1986, 
p. 11). 
In addition to changing the fabric of the physical world that surrounds us, 
technological changes also often impact the construction of our thought. For 
example, Winner (1986) suggests that “[t]he introduction of a robot to industrial 
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workplace not only increases productivity, but often radically changes the process 
of production, redefining what “work” means in that setting” (p. 6). Similarly, 
“When a sophisticated new technique or instrument is adopted in medical 
practice, it transforms not only what doctors do, but also the ways people think 
about health, sickness, and medical care” (Winner, 1986, p. 6). Technology 
thereby has the power to alter our self-conception, which is a key part of why 
Winner (1986) exclaims, “If the experience of modern society shows us 
anything…it is that technologies are not merely aids to human activity, but also 
powerful forces acting to reshape that activity and its meaning” (p. 6). As such, 
“The crucial weakness of the conventional idea [of technology] is that it 
disregards the many ways in which technologies provide structure for human 
activity” (Winner, 1986, p. 6). 
 Given this power to shape and provide structure, Winner (1986) says, “the 
important question about technology becomes, As we “make things work,” what 
kind of world are we making?” (p. 17). This means that we need to pay attention 
to the whole gambit of technological effects, including the “psychological, social, 
and political conditions” that come about as “part of any significant technical 
change” (Winner, 1986, p. 17). Given this range of consequences to our 
technological choices, we are burdened with a much greater responsibility than 
our forebears, meaning that from the outset we need to ask ourselves such 
questions as: “Are we going to design and build circumstances that enlarge 
possibilities for growth in human freedom, sociability, intelligence, creativity, and 
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self-government? Or are we headed in an altogether different direction?” (Winner, 
1986, p. 17). Hence, we need to ask ourselves political questions. 
 According to Winner (1986), incorporating a political perspective into our 
understanding of technology helps to fight against the view of “naïve 
technological determinism – the idea that technology develops as the sole result of 
an internal dynamic and then, unmediated by any other influence, molds society 
to fit its patterns” (p. 21). Since, as Winner (1986) points out, “Those who have 
not recognized the ways in which technologies are shaped by social and economic 
forces have not gotten very far” (p. 21), a sort of “technological politics” would 
appear to be necessary. However, there is a decided danger in tipping the scales 
entirely to the other pole since taken literally this “technology as politics” 
“suggests that technical things do not matter at all” (Winner 1986, p. 21).  Hence, 
“Once one has done the detective work necessary to reveal the social origins – 
power holders behind a particular instance of technological change – one will 
have explained everything of importance” (Winner, 1986, p. 21). This implies that 
“What matters is not technology itself, but the social or economic system in which 
it is embedded” (Winner, 1986, p. 20): a naïve political determinism that is no 
improvement over naïve technological determinism. Because of this inherent 
danger in sliding to the extreme of pure political determinism, Winner (1986) 
suggests that the politicized view of technology act as “complement to, rather 
than a replacement for, theories of the social determination of technology,” 
thereby allowing us to identify “certain technologies as political phenomena in 
their own right” (p. 22). 
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 For Winner (1986), those technologies that are “political phenomena in 
their own right” are ultimately “inherently political technologies” (p. 22). Using 
the definition of politics as “arrangements of power and authority in human 
associations as well as the activities that take place within those arrangements,” 
Winner (1986) offers two distinct types of political technologies: technologies 
that are “inventively” political and technologies that are “inherently” political (p. 
22). The former class of technologies includes “instances in which the invention, 
design, or arrangement of a specific technical device or system becomes a way of 
settling an issue in the affairs of a particular community” (Winner, 1986, p. 22). 
These sorts of technologies are basically political by accident, or by mere 
happening. They become political because “specific features in the design or 
arrangement of [them as] a device could provide a convenient means of 
establishing patterns of power and authority in a given setting” (Winner, 1986, p. 
38). An example would include an airplane and aerospace technology, which at its 
origin existed primarily as a scientific feat; that this technology has been used in 
the creation of missiles and dedicated in large part to warfare and other forms of 
political skirmish comes as an aftermath. These sorts of technologies are also in a 
meaningful sense independent of the underlying political system in which they 
happen to be found; airplanes can feasibly exist whether in a capitalist or a 
communist system, a utopia or an anarchy.  
The latter class of technologies includes cases of what Winner (1986) calls 
“inherently political technologies,” namely, “man-made systems that appear to 
require or to be strongly compatible with particular kinds of political 
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relationships” (p. 22). Unlike airplanes which, as a technology, appear to be at 
least somewhat politically promiscuous, inherently political technologies require 
certain underlying social and political conditions in order to come into being. An 
example offered by Winner – perhaps a touchy carry-over of post Cold War 
mentality – is the atomic bomb. According to Winner (1986), “As long as it exists 
at all, its lethal properties demand that it be controlled by a centralized, rigidly 
hierarchical chain of command closed to all influences that might make its 
working unpredictable” (p. 34). This means that “[t]he internal social system of 
the bomb must be authoritarian; there is no other way” (Winner, 1986, p. 34). 
Moreover, this “state of affairs stands as a practical necessity independent of any 
larger political system in which the bomb is embedded [and] independent of the 
type of regime or character of its rulers” (Winner, 1986, p. 34). Thus, unlike the 
airplane which could presumably exist with a non-centralized government or even 
no government at all, atomic weapons require a strong, powerful, centralized 
political “ruler” of sorts to create and sustain them; As Winner (1986) would say, 
“there is no other way” (p. 34). 
When we turn to the example of enhancement technologies, it appears that 
we will most likely be dealing with another inherently political technology. It is, 
after all, hard to imagine how this technology can be developed and become 
widespread without massive government backing and government control (this, 
indeed, was part of Bertrand Russell’s (1924) key concern in “Icarus, or, the 
Future of Science,” responding to JBS Haldane’s (1923) far more cheerful 
outlook on the “gifts” of science and “man’s divine faculties of reason and 
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imagination” in “Daedalus, or, Science and the Future.”). Thus, we may be 
looking at our age’s version of the atomic bomb – an inherently political 
technology that has in a very real sense dissipated the “default” notion of 
technology as “occasional,” “limited,” “innocuous,” and “nonstructuring”, 
because the very fact that a given technology is “inherently political” renders such 
propitious notions moot. 
 For this reason, technologies that smack of being “inherently political” are 
inherently more problematic. Winner (1986) admits that “[i]t is true that not every 
technological innovation embodies choices of great significance”; in fact, “[s]ome 
developments are more-or-less innocuous [and] many create only trivial 
modifications in how we live” (p. 17). This, however, is not true of inherently 
political technologies, whose modifications are never trivial. Particularly 
problematic is that fact that rather than being themselves “limited” technologies, 
they are very powerful technologies that severely limit us in terms of the decision 
power we have in their governing. According to Winner (1986), in any “given 
category of technological change there are, roughly speaking, two kinds of 
choices that can affect the relative distribution of power, authority, and privilege 
in a community” (p. 27). In most cases, “the crucial decision is a simple “yes or 
no” choice – are we going to develop and adopt the thing or not” (Winner, 1986, 
p. 27). With this first decision typically comes a “second range of choices, equally 
critical in many instances, [which] has to do with specific features in the design or 
arrangement of a technical system after the decision to go ahead with it has 
already been made” (Winner, 1986, p. 28). This second set of decisions offers a 
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way of checking the first decision, modifying it as may be deemed necessary. It 
ideally allows us to assure that no technological decision is absolutely final, and 
grants us some semblance of comfort in knowing that we still have a remarkable 
degree of control over its outcome. 
 However, this control in safeguarding ourselves from technology run 
amok is far less present with inherently political technologies. “Here,” Winner 
(1986) says, “the initial choice about whether or not to adopt something is 
decisive in regard to its consequences [because there] are no alternative physical 
designs or arrangements that would make a significant difference” (p. 38). 
Moreover, there tend to be “no genuine possibilities for creative intervention by 
different social…that could change the intractability of the entity or significantly 
alter the quality of its political effects” (Winner, 1986, p. 38). Winner does seem 
at times to equivocate on how truly intractable inherently political technologies 
are. For example, he admits that “It is still true that in a world in which human 
beings make and maintain artificial systems nothing is “required” in an absolute 
sense” (Winner, 1986, p. 38). However, he hedges against this admission by 
maintaining that “once a course of action is under way…the kinds of reasoning 
that justify the adaptation of social life to technical requirements pop up as 
spontaneously as flowers in the spring” (Winner, 1986, p. 38). Meaning, of 
course, that for all our thoughts of “creative intervention” and “alternative 
design,” the design that best suits the given technology ultimately will out; and, 
whether genuinely intractable or not, for all practical purposes the initial yes-no 
decision is the final decision over which we have any real control. 
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 From this realization Winner proposes a sort of heuristic perspective on 
the potential (or perhaps likely) political and social outlook resulting from a given 
technological innovation. Similar to the suggestions from chapter 1 on an ethics 
for the future, Winner (1986) asks us to “suppose that every political philosophy 
in a given time implies a technology or a set of technologies in a particular pattern 
for its realization” and also “recognize that every technology of significance to us 
implies a set of political commitments that can be identified if one looks carefully 
enough” (p. 52). This means that “[w]hat appear to be merely instrumental 
choices are better seen as choices about the form of social and political life a 
society builds, choices about the kinds of people we want to become” (Winner, 
1986, p. 52). 
In the end, what Winner (1986) wants is for us to keep in mind throughout 
the process of technological adoption and, if possible, technological change, is: 
“What forms of technology are compatible with the kind of society we want to 
build?” (p. 52). The idea is that a society should at least attempt “to guide its 
sociotechnical development according to self-conscious, critically evaluated 
standards of form and limit” (Winner, 1986, p. 54), recognizing that with the 
“substantial investment of social resources” and potentially unforgiving 
consequences, “it always pays to ask in advance about the qualities of the 
artifacts, institutions, and human experiences currently on the drawing board” 
(Winner, 1986, p. 18). Moreover, if upon reviewing some plan currently on the 
drawing board “it is clear that the social contract implicitly created by 
implementing a particular generic variety of technology is incompatible with the 
  41 
kind of society we deliberately choose” – meaning, more pointedly, that “we are 
confronted with an inherently political technology of an unfriendly sort” – then, 
we are duty-bound to recognize that “that kind of device or system ought to be 
excluded from society altogether” (Winner, 1986, p. 55). As with the “ethics for 
the future” discussed in chapter 1, the idea here is that if the “image of man” – 
here understood largely in political and societal terms – is to come under threat 
with a potential future resulting from a given technologies, then we are duty-
bound to protect this image from the supposed future by barring the possibility of 
said technology taking root. 
 
Technology: Promethean 
 
Using Jonas’ analysis and terminology, the conventional view of technology that 
was presented in the previous section is most likely a carry-over of how we tend 
(or tended) to view “old” or “traditional” technologies. For Jonas (1979), one of 
the defining features of “earlier technology” is that it “was a possession and a 
state” (p. 34). We could “roughly describe technology [at that time] as comprising 
the use of artificial implements for the business of life, together with their original 
invention, improvement, and occasional additions” (Jonas, 1979, p. 34). Thus, 
they were viewed as mere technological entities: occasional, limited, innocuous, 
nonstructuring. Moreover, Jonas (1979) maintains, this “tranquil description” – 
while perfectly apt for “most of technology through mankind’s career (with which 
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it is coeval)” – is no longer adequate for the “new” or “modern” technologies with 
which we are confronted (p. 34). 
 The source of this inadequacy can largely be accounted for by the change 
in the “formal dynamics” of technology from the past to the present. According to 
Jonas, there are two main thematic approaches we can take in analyzing 
technology: “formal” and “material.” The formal approach analyzes “the formal 
dynamics of technology as a continuing collective enterprise, which advances by 
its own “laws of motion”” (Jonas, 1979, p. 34). It “considers technology as an 
abstract whole of movement” and seeks “to grasp the pervasive “process 
properties” by which modern technology propels itself – through our agency to be 
sure – into ever-succeeding and superceding novelty” (Jonas, 1979, p. 34). The 
material approach analyzes “the substantive content of technology in terms of the 
things it puts into human use, the powers it confers, the novel objectives it opens 
up or dictates, and the altered manner of human action by which these objectives 
are realized” (Jonas, 1979, p. 34). It “considers its concrete uses and their impact 
on our world and our lives” and “[looks] at the species of novelties themselves, 
their taxonomy, as it were, and [tries] to make out how the world furnished with 
them looks” (Jonas, 1979, p. 34). Corresponding with both of these approaches is 
“[a] third, overarching theme [of] the moral side of technology as a burden on 
human responsibility, especially its long-term effects on the global condition of 
man and environment” (Jonas, 1979, p. 34); regardless of the approach chosen – 
formal or material – Jonas believes that the technology analysis includes (or at 
least ought to include) a moral component. 
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 While the material approach would be useful if our intention was simply 
to analyze the use and impact of particular, concrete technologies or technical 
artifacts (e.g. nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, cognitive 
science, and so on), since our plan is to understand and critique “enhancement 
technologies” as a whole, we are better served by utilizing the formal approach, 
which allows us to look at the collective enterprise. In keeping with this approach, 
Jonas (1979) identifies four “manifest traits” of modern technology – of which 
enhancement technology is a prime example – from traditional technology: a 
tendency towards ever-increasing expansion and improvement; a quick spread of 
knowledge and practice; a circular relationship between means and ends; and an 
inherent idolization of “progress” (p. 35). 
 Considering the first trait – the tendency towards ever-increasing 
expansion and improvement – this tendency opposes the tendency of traditional 
technologies towards equilibrium and stasis. “In the past,” according to Jonas 
(1979), “a given inventory of tools and procedures used to be fairly constant, 
tending toward a mutually adjusting stable equilibrium of ends and means” (p. 
34). Moreover, once this “stable equilibrium” was achieved, it “represented for 
lengthy periods an unchallenged optimum of technical competence” (Jonas, 1979, 
p. 34). While he admits that technological revolutions occurred (e.g. stone age to 
bronze age, bronze age to iron age, etc.), he maintains that they happen “more by 
accident than by design” (Jonas, 1979, p. 34). Discounting such rarities as 
outward-enforced technological upheavals and unconscious “revolutions”, “the 
great classical civilizations had comparatively early reached a point of 
  44 
technological saturation”, an ““optimum” in equilibrium of means with 
acknowledged needs and goals [with] little cause later to go beyond it” (Jonas, 
1979, pp. 34-5). The rule for traditional technology was that “convention reigned 
supreme” and “[p]rogress…if it occurred at all…was by inconspicuous 
increments to a universally high level that still excites our admiration and, in 
historical fact, was more liable to regression than to surpassing” (Jonas, 1979, p. 
35). By contrast, modern technology tends to not approach equilibrium or a 
saturation point. Instead, it tends to “give rise, if successful, to further steps in all 
kinds of direction” (Jonas, 1979, p. 35). Thus, instead of a situation like the mere 
transition from bronze to iron followed by relative stability, we have a situation 
like the introduction of the first airplane, which leads to new missile research, 
new conceptions of travel and leisure, ever bigger and better and faster airplanes, 
and so on. 
 The second “manifest trait” of modern technology that differentiates it 
from traditional technology is the pace at which technical know-how and practice 
is spread and adopted. According to Jonas (1979), traditional technologies (if 
desirable) were often heavily guarded secrets that were therefore unable to spread 
between cultures or communities because no pathways were accessible for such 
information transfer, and the tendency was for technology to remain a fairly 
localized phenomenon that spread only infrequently and in such cases usually by 
brute force. Still, the more likely outcome was to simply languish and fizzle like 
“Alexandrian mechanics” than be transferred to a more universal status. By 
contrast, however, with modern technology “[e]very technical innovation is sure 
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to spread quickly through the technological world community, as also do 
theoretical discoveries in the sciences” (Jonas, 1979, p. 35) According to Jonas 
(1979), the fast spread of technological knowledge is “guaranteed by the universal 
intercommunication that is itself part of the technological complex”; and the 
spread of practical technological adoption is “enforced by the pressure of 
competition” (p. 35). Combined, we have a technology with a “quasi-automatic 
compulsion” (Jonas, 1979, p. 41) towards self-replication, self-expansion, and 
extended, mass adoption. 
 For the third formal trait – the relationship between means and ends – 
Jonas states that the key distinction between old technologies and new 
technologies is that with the former this relationship was unilinear, but with the 
latter it is circular. By unilinear, Jonas simply means that from the perspective of 
traditional technology, technical artifacts solely (or at least primarily) served as 
means to some end; hammers exist to pound nails, phones exist so people can call 
one another, planes exist to transport people from point A to point B via flight, 
and so on. However, from the perspective of modern technology “new 
technologies may suggest, create, even impose new ends, never before conceived, 
simply by offering their feasibility” (Jonas, 1979, p. 35). These new technologies 
“[add] to the very objectives of human desires, including objectives for 
technology itself” (Jonas, 1979, p. 35). Thus, we have the “dialectics of 
circularity” inherent in modern technology, where once these technologies are 
“incorporated into the socioeconomic demand diet,” whatever ends they fulfilled 
soon change from luxuries to “necessities of life,” thereby setting technology the 
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task of further perfecting the means of realizing them” (Jonas, 1979, p. 35). In the 
end, the supposed “mere” means, the “mere technological entities” begin 
suggesting – and even imposing – their own ends. 
 The fourth and final main trait of modern technology that Jonas points to 
is the ideology of progress. While with traditional technology progress more or 
less happened, with modern technology it is a goal – “an inherent drive which 
acts willy-nilly in the formal automatics of its modus operandi as it interacts with 
society” (Jonas, 1979, p. 35). On Jonas’ account (1979), “progress” is actually a 
descriptive term rather than a value term, because we can “resent the fact and 
despise its fruits” (p. 35); hence, progress need not be liked (or likeable). 
However, it is more than mere “change,” since in terms of technology “a later 
stage is always…superior to the preceding stage” (Jonas, 1979, p. 35). With 
modern technologies what we find is an “internal motion of a system [which] left 
to itself and not interfered with…leads to ever “higher,” not “lower” states of 
itself.” The upshot slogan becomes “Technology is destiny” (Jonas, 1979, p.35), 
and with this slogan comes newfound utopianism.  
According to Jonas (1979), “the pull of the quasi-utopian vision of an ever 
better life, whether vulgarly conceived or nobly” becomes a “motive 
force…autonomous and spontaneous” (p. 36). Whether these visions of “the 
American dream” and “the revolution of rising expectations” drive the 
technological ideology or progress, or whether they come as a result of this 
ideology, is unclear (Jonas, 1979, p. 36). But the fact that it plays a role is 
undeniable. As such, it is “moot to what extent the vision itself is post hoc rather 
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than ante hoc, that is, instilled by the dazzling feats of a technological progress 
already underway and thus more a response to than a motor of it” (Jonas, 1979, p. 
36); the important point is not which came first, technological progress or utopian 
fantasies, but that once both are present and centrally positioned they propel one 
another forward in an ever increasing, demanding fashion.  
 Corresponding with all four of these key changes in the formal dynamics 
of technology from traditional to modern is a change in the fundamental attitude 
surrounding such technology. Freed from the chains of equilibrium, slowness, 
unilinearity, and progress-neutral ideology, the Behemoth of modern technology 
casts our bearings towards uncharted – and indeed dark – waters. What we see 
now is a sort of Promethean drift in the technological mindset. It is Promethean 
with respect to both artifact and agent. For artifact, the transition from traditional 
technology to modern technology and the subsequent freeing from the chains 
imposed by pre-modern society represents a transition from technology as our 
“humble servant” to technology as an “enterprise” (Jonas, 1979, p. 35). The so-
called – or rather former – “mere technological entities” have come to “dominate 
our lives in fact”, and also instill in us “a belief in [their] being of predominant 
worth” (Jonas, 1979, p. 38). Thus, the “sheer grandeur” of the modern 
technological enterprise “tends to establish itself as the transcendent end,” and, in 
doing so “casts its spell on the modern mind” (Jonas, 1979, p. 38). 
 By changing its own status to “predominant” and “transcendent” end, 
modern technology also alters the status of mankind. According to Jonas (1979), 
“at its most modest, this change in modern technology’s status “means elevating 
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homo faber to the essential aspect of man” (p. 38). However, “at its most 
extravagant,” this change in statues “means elevating power to the position of his 
dominant and interminable goal” (Jonas, 1979, p. 38). This means the difference 
between man who happens to be tool-bearer (non-Promethean), man who is 
essentially a tool-bearer (moderately Promethean), and man who is necessarily a 
tool-bearer and a tool-seeker (extravagantly Promethean). At this most 
extravagant end, the chief vocation of man” is “[t]o become ever more masters of 
the world, to advance from power to power, even if only collectively and perhaps 
no longer by choice” (Jonas, 1979, p. 38). 
 While it is not necessarily the position of Winner or Jonas, I strongly 
suspect that this modern Prometheanism is largely responsible for the fact that 
technology is no longer “innocuous.” We have already witnessed “limited,” 
“occasional” and “nonstructuring” basically fly out the window with fast-
spreading, disequilibriating, circular “progress”, but the true source of our loss of 
(alleged) technological innocence is, to my mind, not so much the change in these 
“manifest traits” of the formal dynamics of technology itself; instead, it is more 
accurately the result of the change in our attitude as technological agents and the 
Promethean drift of the technological enterprise that comes about from this 
change in formal dynamics. In particular, with this Promethean drift the power 
dynamics in our world have radically shifted. While with traditional technology 
man’s power over others – and especially over nature – was extremely limited, 
“[m]odern technology has introduced actions of such novel scale, objects, and 
consequences that the framework of former ethics can no longer contain them” 
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(Jonas, 1984, p. 6). Jonas (1984) points in particular to “the critical vulnerability 
of nature to man’s technological intervention – unsuspected before it began to 
show itself in damage already done” (p. 6). With this damage came to light the 
fact that “the nature of human action had de facto changed, and that an object of 
an entirely new order – no less than the whole biosphere of the planet – has been 
added to what we must be responsible for because of our power over it” (Jonas, 
1984, p. 7). Contra Antigone’s famous Chorus (lines 335-370) suggesting 
awestruck accolade, we now have a sense of foreboding: the Earth does indeed 
become wearied, because man – “clever beyond all dreams” and armed with 
“inventive craft” – has worn Her down with ploughs of power she could not 
anticipate.  
 In addition to penetrating more deeply into Nature’s once mighty core, 
man’s technological prowess pervades time and space in a heretofore 
unprecedented fashion. For one thing, as Jonas (1984) points out, “The 
containment of nearness and contemporaneity is gone, swept away by the spatial 
spread and time span of the case-effect trains which technological practice sets 
afoot, even when undertaken for proximate ends” (p. 7). Due to its quick 
spreading speed and disequilibriating compulsion to amass innovation, we find 
that even the slightest advance or technical application can affect individuals (or 
other parts of nature) far away in terms of space or time, and set into motion 
things unforeseen in terms of proximate ends. Jonas adds to this the “aggregate 
magnitude” and frequent “irreversibility” of technological decisions in terms of 
their consequences; Pandora’s box, once opened, will not again contain whatever 
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evils we might – however accidentally – release into the world. And those evils 
will come to band together, spawning newer, greater evils. The result, Jonas 
(1984) says, is “that the situation for later subjects and their choices of action will 
be progressively different from that of the initial agent and ever more the fated 
product of what was done before” (p. 7) As we saw with Winner and inherently 
political technologies, later choices down the line become less and less 
efficacious, if they exist at all. 
 Couple with this the fact that the Promethean man will most likely want to 
open the box. For all the noble visions of what technology is and what it can 
achieve, festering beneath the surface is a much darker ambition, the sort of 
“Faustian soul” innate in Western culture, that drives it, nonrationally, to infinite 
novelty and unplumbed possibilities for their own sake” (Jonas, 1979, p. 36). No 
fear of Mephistopheles is enough to halt the juggernaut of progress, and once 
started, Prometheanism in the realm of modern technology cannot be undone: 
technology will compel it, and man will chose it, making it a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. This ultimately is “[t]he danger [derived] from the excessive 
dimensions of the scientific-technological-industrial civilization” otherwise 
known as “the Baconian program” – which “aim[s] knowledge at power over 
nature [and utilizing] power over nature for the improvement of the human lot”; 
and carries with it “intrinsic and self-reinforcing dynamics, necessarily propelling 
into extravagance of production and consumption” (Jonas, 1984, p. 140). Our 
“danger of disaster [wrought from] attending the Baconian ideal of power over 
nature through scientific technology arises not so much from any shortcomings of 
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its performance as from the magnitude of its success” (Jonas, 1984, p. 140); and 
“succeed” it will with the Promethean attitude propelling it onward. All the 
Gretchens of the world be damned. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
So, what does all of this mean for enhancement technologies? With respect to the 
‘enhancement’ part, we can devise a pragmatic understanding of what such 
technologies are: those technologies that use the right underlying technical and 
scientific expertise (e.g. nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, 
cognitive science, and other related sciences and technologies not discussed in 
this chapter), target the right sort of ‘human’ area (e.g. choosing our bodies; 
choosing our minds; choosing our life spans; improving performance; choosing 
our children; choosing our species; and other potentially related targets not 
mentioned herein), and endeavor to bring this target above the “mean” or 
“normal”, however this is to be understood given the time and society in which 
we find ourselves. With respect to ‘technology’, we have an image wherein 
enhancement technologies are the sort that will likely (if not inevitably) be 
“inherently political” and “modern”, and carry with them a strong Promethean 
impulse; thus, they will be politically, societally, and ideologically structuring so 
as to make themselves the transcendent end of our technological action, and will, 
once instituted, carry with them an (almost) unstoppable power. 
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Chapter 3 
COMMODIFICATION 
 
Having just culminated our discussion of enhancement primarily as a technology, 
we will now be considering enhancement primarily as an ideology. As stated in 
chapter 1, I take this enhancement ideology to arguably be in the majority of cases 
an ideology of commodification. The only counter-example I can in fact devise 
(which is outside the purview of this dissertation and which I will therefore not 
discuss here) occurs on Zarathustran grounds. There is already a sense in the 
literature surrounding the human enhancement debate that the enhancement 
attitude is potentially wrong because it is dehumanizing (see e.g. Habermas 2003; 
Kass 2003; President’s Council 2003). However, recent scholarship in psychology 
has shown that this concept of ‘dehumanization’ is markedly imprecise in its 
common usage (see e.g. Haslam, 2006; Haslam et al, 2005; Leyens et al, 2000; 
Leyens et al, 2001), and imprecise in its usage in the enhancement debate as well 
(see Wilson and Haslam, 2009). As such, I believe that we are better served by 
using a more technical term lacking such colloquial connotative difficulties; and 
we find such a term with ‘commodification’ (and as we will see later in this 
chapter, it is deeply connected with dehumanization). 
In contemporary discussion of commodification, ‘commodification’ is 
typically associated with an understood or implied relationship between what we 
term ‘commodities’ and the economic market. For example, in the introduction to 
her book Contested Commodities Margaret Radin (1996) states that a major 
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difficulty that arises within the debate on commodification is its challenge to our 
understanding of “the appropriate scope of the market” (p. xi). Likewise, Ivan 
Cohen (2003) proclaims that a primary goal of the commodification debate is to 
determine “a principled line between what can and cannot be permissibly sold” – 
i.e. what can and cannot legitimately be placed within the context market (p. 689). 
Similar scholars, Donna Dickenson (2007) and Nancy Schepher-Hughes (2001), 
hold that in order to designate some thing a ‘commodity’ it is necessary that that 
thing have some sort of “exchange value” (Dickenson, 2007, p. 29), particularly 
as a “token of economic exchange” (Schepher-Hughes, 2001, p. 2). While I am 
sympathetic to this tendency to understand commodification in terms of market 
association and recognize its prominence in the literature to date, I believe that 
commodification is best understood as being much more general. 
 My reasons for this belief are two-fold: First, when we look at the matter 
of commodification from an anthropological perspective, we see that the nature of 
a ‘commodity’ is quite fluid across time and cultures, and in degree of market 
infiltration; thus, as point of empirical fact, ‘commodity’ as it exists in the real 
world is not as narrow as ‘object of economic value’ or ‘object subject to market 
exchange’. Second, when we look at the matter of commodification from a 
bioethical perspective specifically with respect to humans, we see that the 
perceived threat of commodification is not limited to an actual market 
relationship. Bioethicists themselves believe that it can exist when there is solely 
market rhetoric or the treatment of a person or personal good in a way sufficiently 
similar to a market commodity that the effect is functionally the same as if it were 
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part of an actual market relationship; thus, the presence of an actual market 
relationship or exchange value does not appear to be the primary morally relevant 
feature for their understanding of ‘commodification’ either. 
 In order to motivate and explain this more nuanced understanding of 
commodification I will first present the classical anthropological understanding of 
commodification by focusing on the works of two key commodification theorists 
in the field, Arjun Appadurai and Igor Kopytoff, adding an addendum to the 
theory from contemporary anthropologist Lesley Sharp. Next, I present the 
bioethical understanding of commodification as it pertain to humans by focusing 
on those scholars whose work seems to set the benchmark for the field, Elizabeth 
Anderson and Margaret Radin. I will then bring the best of these theories together 
to build a final, more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon (or 
phenomena?) of commodification, and explain its relation to the enhancement 
attitude. 
 
Anthropological Perspective 
 
According to cultural anthropologist and social economist Arjun Appadurai 
(1986) – whose classic theory of commodification remains influential for modern 
anthropologists, and even some modern philosophers – we should view 
commodities not so much as a specific class of objects – namely, e.g., objects of 
economic value – but rather as objects with a certain kind of “social potential” (p. 
6). Appadurai (1986) says that even though most contemporary uses of the term 
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‘commodities’ refers to “special kinds of manufactured goods (or services), which 
are associated only with capitalist modes of production” (p. 7), we should 
nonetheless define ‘commodities’ as “objects of economic value” only 
provisionally, if at all (p. 3). Insofar as commodities are thought to be distinct 
from more seemingly value-neutral things – e.g. ‘objects’, ‘goods’, ‘products’, 
‘services’, and so on – Appadurai maintains that this perceived distinction is 
nothing more than the result of our own judgment (or judgments) imposed on the 
thing in question. In other words, from his anthropological perspective there is no 
inherent property in what we term ‘commodity’ that makes it a commodity; 
instead, there is only the individual or collective judgment being made that what 
we have is in fact a commodity. Thus, it is the “social potential” for something to 
be perceived as a commodity that is ultimately its distinguishing feature. 
 Because he believes that things are not commodities in virtue of 
themselves, but rather commodities only in virtue of being – and to the extent that 
they are – perceived as such, Appadurai (1986) considers the question, “What is a 
commodity?” to be superfluous. Instead, he says we should analyze the related 
question, “What sort of exchange is commodity exchange?” (p. 9). To do this we 
need to consider what he calls the ‘commodity situation’, which he describes as 
follows: “the commodity situation in the social life of any “thing” [is] defined as 
the situation in which its exchangeability (past, present, or future) for some other 
thing is its socially relevant feature” (Appadurai, 1986, p. 13) Thus, by changing 
our question in this manner we manage to move from thinking about commodities 
per se to thinking about commodities as functions of social judgment. 
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This commodity situation is further broken down into three components 
for any particular commodity: First, there is the commodity phase of a thing, 
which is a temporal feature, consisting of the time during which exchangeability 
is one of that thing’s socially relevant features. Second, there is the commodity 
candidacy of a thing, which is more of a “conceptual feature”, consisting of “the 
standards and criteria (symbolic, classificatory, and moral) that define the 
exchangeability of things in any particular social and historical context” 
(Appadurai, 1986, p. 14). According to Appadurai, this feature is fundamentally 
culture-dependent, since the values and criteria that designate a particular thing as 
being exchangeable can and do vary across time and cultures. Third, there is the 
commodity context of a thing, which refers to the different social transactions in 
which a thing’s exchangeability is either stated or implied, thereby linking that 
thing’s commodity candidacy with its commodity phase. These three features 
basically represent the when, why, and where of a given thing’s state as a 
(perceived) commodity. 
With these three features in mind, Appadurai claims that there are some 
things that are more or less “quintessential commodities.” He says, “To the degree 
that some things in a society are frequently to be found in the commodity phase, 
to fit the requirements of commodity candidacy, and to appear in a commodity 
context, they are its quintessential commodities” (Appadurai, 1986, p. 15). Thus, 
the sorts of manufactured goods and services that we most commonly associate 
with commodification because of their frequency and degree of infiltration in the 
market would be deemed quintessential commodities because they fulfill all three 
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of Appadurai’s criteria to a very high degree. Moreover, on a societal level, “[t]o 
the degree that many or most things in a society sometimes meet these criteria, the 
society may be said to be highly commoditized” (Appadurai, 1986, p. 15). Thus, 
on this view, if a society contains a very high number or percentage of 
“quintessential commodities” then that particular society is a highly 
commoditized society. 
 Appadurai also presents four different types of commodities, based on 
Jacques Maquet’s (1971) analysis. First, there are “commodities by destination”, 
which are “objects intended by their producers principally for exchange” (cited 
Appadurai, 1986, p. 16). Examples of this would be goods that are manufactured 
primarily (if not solely) for the purpose of being sold by the manufacturer. 
Second, there are “commodities by metamorphosis,” which are “things intended 
for other uses that are placed into the commodity state” (cited Appadurai, 1986, p. 
16). Examples of this may include gifts or items of sentimental value, such as a 
watch your grandmother gave you with the intention of it being a cherished 
heirloom, but which you instead decide to sell and place in the market. Third, 
there is “a special, sharp case of commodities by metamorphosis” which are 
“commodities by diversion, objects placed into a commodity state though 
originally specifically protected from it” (cited Appadurai, 1986, p. 16). These 
include by and large the “contested commodities” discussed further in the next 
section of this chapter, such as (per classic cases) prostitution, baby-selling, and 
so on. Finally, there are “ex-commodities,” which are “things retrieved, either 
temporarily or permanently, from the commodity state and placed in some other 
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state” (cited Appadurai, 1986, p. 16). Classic examples of this include works of 
art, where once purchased the owner or proprietor tends to view it with aesthetic 
intentions, rather than exchange intentions.  
These four types of commodities help to illustrate the fact that 
commodification is not simply limited to a thing being commodified or non-
commodified (as is, unfortunately, the popular breakdown in many analyses of 
commodification); instead, there are far more nuances that allow us to analyze 
commodification and commodities for potential moral or social problems. In 
particular, there is the special emphasis on the third type of commodity: 
commodities by diversion. The reason Maquet and Appadurai place special 
emphasis on this type is because “[t]he diversion of commodities from specified 
paths is always a sign of creativity or crisis” (Appadurai, 1986, p. 26). In 
particular, the diversion of something from being protected from commodification 
to being actively commodified carries with it, for us, great cause for concern. 
While Appadurai thinks that the sort of crisis that moves something from being 
commodification-protected to commodified is typically economic (e.g. resulting 
from famine or bankruptcy) and occasionally aesthetic (such as with a change in 
taste for artistic creations and other sorts of memorabilia), I believe that the main 
sort of crisis for our purposes in understanding commodification of humans and 
human goods is going to be a moral one, rather than merely an economic or 
aesthetic one. 
 I do, however, have two caveats to the aforementioned: First, there are, I 
believe, genuine instances where the primary crisis motivating the 
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commodification of a previously non-commodified good is indeed an economic 
one, such as, for example, prostitution and baby-selling, in which typically the 
individual involved in the sex or baby selling is brought to that point due to an 
economic hardship and themselves consider the selling of the “good” involved 
morally problematic. Second, I can imagine cases in which what I will claim is 
the commodification of something importantly human is motivated by aesthetics, 
such as, for example, persons engaging in specific forms of body modification, 
genetic modification, and so on, for the purposes of fulfilling some aesthetic ideal. 
These caveats aside, as we are dealing with the moral issue of commodification I 
will presume that it is an underlying moral crisis that is the primary motivation for 
the cases of commodification under consideration for the majority of this 
dissertation. 
 To explore more thoroughly this sort of moral crisis, we will now look at 
the work of another prominent theorist of the anthropological understanding of 
commodification: Igor Kopytoff. According to Kopytoff (1986), commodities are 
like persons: they each have individual histories or narratives, and in order to 
understand their place or role in society we need to look at that narrative. He 
claims that while “[f]or the economist, commodities simply are”, for the cultural 
anthropologist any commodity has a corresponding “biography” that tracks its 
movement within the society and culture in which it is found (p. 64). The idea 
here is that in any given culture, the “production of commodities” is not simply an 
economic or material process; it is also a “cultural and cognitive” one, where the 
‘commodity’ must be “culturally marked” as such. As with Appadurai, Kopytoff’s 
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cultural anthropological perspective holds that a thing’s status as ‘commodity’ is 
highly nuanced. For Appadurai, this includes a when (the “commodity phase”), a 
why (the “commodity candidacy”), and a where (the “commodity context”). 
Kopytoff continues this sort of analysis with a temporal aspect, wherein “the same 
thing may be treated as a commodity at one time and not at another”; a conceptual 
aspect, wherein “commodities must be…culturally marked as being a certain kind 
of thing”; and arguably adds to the commodity context an element of who, by 
noting that “the same thing may, at the same time, be seen as a commodity by one 
person and as something else by another” (p. 64). Here we again see the emphasis 
with anthropologists viewing the state of being a ‘commodity’ as not fixed, but 
highly fluid and dependent upon a number of external factors. 
 In light of this fluidity, however, Kopytoff maintains that there are still 
specific moments in which a thing is more or less essentially a commodity. He 
defines a commodity as “a thing that has use value and that can be exchanged in a 
discrete transaction for a counterpart, the very fact of exchange indicating that the 
counterpart has, in the immediate context, an equivalent value” (Kopytoff, 1986, 
p. 68). In fact, it is only at this time of exchange when the status of something as a 
commodity is uncontroversial: he states, “The only time when the commodity 
status of a thing is beyond question is the moment of actual exchange” (Kopytoff, 
1986, p. 83). However, since the act of commodification exists at a discrete time, 
this allows for the thing or things involved to then be ‘decommoditized’ 
afterwards (Kopytoff, 1986, p.69). For this reason, much like Appadurai who 
believes that commodification is best viewed as some sort of “social potential”, 
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Kopytoff (1986) thinks that commodification “is best looked upon as a process of 
becoming rather than as an all-or-none state of being” (p. 73). 
 According to Kopytoff’s view, we can provisionally divide the world into 
two kinds of things: commoditized and decommoditized (which he alternately 
refers to as “singularized”). However, since in the real world there are in fact 
neither perfectly commoditized nor perfectly singular things, this provisional 
division of the world between commodities and non-commodities is best viewed 
as existing along a continuum rather than as an all-or-nothing state (Kopytoff, 
1986, p. 87). Setting up a sort of dichotomized spectrum ranging from perfectly 
commoditized things (namely, those “that [are] exchangeable with anything and 
everything else”) to perfectly decommoditized (or “singular”) things (namely, 
things that are exchangeable with nothing else), Kopytoff argues that the world is 
best viewed as a collection of forces attempting to move the various things of the 
world along this continuum. “Although the singular and the commodity are 
opposites,” he says, “no thing ever quite reaches the ultimate commodity end of 
the continuum between them. There are no perfect commodities” (Kopytoff, 
1986, p. 87). Correspondingly, there are no perfect singulars. But, he points out 
that the “exchange function of every economy appears to have a built-in force that 
drives the exchange system toward the greatest degree of commoditization that 
the exchange technology permits” (Kopytoff, 1986, p. 87). And acting against this 
exchange function are “[t]he counterforces [of] culture and the individual, with 
their drive to discriminate, classify, compare, and sacralize” (Kopytoff, 1986, p. 
87). 
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In the end, what we have is “a two-front battle for culture as for the 
individual – one against commoditization as the homogenizer of exchange values, 
the other against the utter singularization of things as they are in nature” 
(Kopytoff, 1986, p. 87). Moreover, this is a battle not only over singular and 
commoditized things; it is a battle over singular and commoditized worlds (and 
worldviews). Setting up another dichotomized spectrum ranging from a “perfectly 
commoditized world [as] one in which everything is exchangeable or for sale” 
and a “perfectly decommoditized world [as] one in which everything is singular, 
unique, and unexchangeable” (Kopytoff, 1986, p. 69), we have a world vision 
wherein the forces of the economic market – especially in “large-scale, 
commercialized, and monetized societies” (Kopytoff, 1986, p. 88) – attempt to 
push everything in a society towards perfect (or near perfect) commoditization, 
while individuals and cultures attempt to push back, “sacralizing” certain things 
and protecting them from the long arm of the market. 
 According to Kopytoff (1986), this fighting of forces is perhaps most 
obvious in contemporary Western culture, where “we take it more or less for 
granted that things – physical objects and rights to them – represent the natural 
universe of commodities,” whereas we take it more or less for granted that  
“people…represent the natural universe of individuation and singularization” (p. 
64). This clear-cut intellectual division between persons as singular and objects as 
commodity, which Kopytoff claims is fairly anomalous compared to the world at 
large (see e.g. pp. 84-85), creates a serious problem when we consider where we 
ought to place certain human attributes and personal goods. Even if we are 
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committed to protecting ‘persons’ from commodification, how far this protection 
ought to extend outwards from an actual human person (whatever that is) to those 
elements that either compose or surround him or her is not a clear or easy decision 
to make. As previously stated, economies try to push most things in a culture 
towards the commodity end of the commodity-singularity scale. As such, it would 
seem that anything not clearly encapsulated by the term ‘person’ would be 
deemed fair game for the economy to push towards the commodity end.  
Currently, the West suffers from an apparent cultural confusion as to what 
‘person’ things are to be sacralized and protected from commodification, and 
which are free to be sold; for example, human organs, babies, and pregnancy all 
are kept (at least openly) out of the market, but ova and sperm can be openly sold 
without any legal repercussion. This seeming inconsistency has doomed our 
culture to a kind of cognitive dissonance about commodities and non-
commodities. The problem of value equivalence - which “involves taking the 
patently singular and inserting it into a uniform category of value with other 
patently singular things” (Kopytoff, 1986, p. 71) – is not apparent when the things 
in question are fairly innocent, non-human goods. For example, most individuals 
do not find the exchange of labor for money, and money for goods or services 
produced by labor, to be particularly problematic. This “labor theory of value” is 
common in the West, and can offer a rough guide for how a car, a hamburger and 
a haircut can all semi-cohesively exist in the same sphere of ‘commodity’; if each 
of these goods and services can be roughly translated into the labor invested into 
them, then there is a common denominator through which they are connected. 
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However, the problem of value equivalence does more clearly arise when we try 
to place both persons (and personal goods) and objects in the world of 
commodities. After all, how do we connect a car and a baby within the same 
sphere? How many hamburgers are equal to a human heart? Intuitively, we do not 
think that there is any such standard that can collapse all these things into a single 
sphere of commodities. 
 It is this lack of an intuitive standard that connects cars, babies, and so on, 
coupled with the fact that we occasionally do see all these things seemingly 
placed in the same group, that causes the aforementioned cognitive dissonance. 
As Kopytoff (1986) says, “When things participate simultaneously in cognitively 
distinct yet effectively intermeshed exchange spheres, one is constantly 
confronted with seeming paradoxes of value” (p. 82). He offers as an illustration 
of this phenomenon the example of a Picasso, which “though possessing a 
monetary value, is priceless in another, higher scheme” (Kopytoff, 1986, p. 82). 
Because of this “we feel uneasy, even offended, when a newspaper declares the 
Picasso to be worth $690,000, for one should not be pricing the priceless” 
(Kopytoff, 1986, p. 82). However, there is a sense in which “the “objective” 
pricelessness of the Picasso can only be unambiguously confirmed to us by its 
immense market price” and its status of singularity “is confirmed not by the 
object’s structural position in an exchange system, but by intermittent forays into 
the commodity sphere, quickly followed by reentries into the closed sphere of 
singular “art”” (Kopytoff, 1986, pp. 82-83). 
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 According to Kopytoff (1986), the most notable feature of our “paradoxes 
of value” – at least with respect to the Picasso – is the “inner compulsion to 
defend oneself, to others, and to oneself, against the charge of “merchandising” 
art” (p. 83). Because the singular world of art and the commodity world of 
exchange “cannot be kept separate for very long” – for example, “priceless” 
though the Picasso is, the museum will eventually find need of insuring it – what 
we will see is that “museums and art dealers will name prices, be accused of the 
sin of transforming art into a commodity, and, in response, defend themselves by 
blaming each other for creating and maintaining a commodity market” (Kopytoff, 
1986, p. 83). As Kopytoff (1986) points out, this is not mere “ideological 
camouflage for an interest in merchandising”; it is a genuine struggle we as a 
society face given the paradox that we are, in a sense, singularists at heart who 
nonetheless live in a ‘necessarily’ commoditized world (p. 83). 
As seen in the above example, there is great difficulty in keeping the 
‘singular’ singular in a highly commoditized society; objects like works of art find 
themselves traipsing briefly into the world of monetary exchangeability, even if 
just for the purposes of insurance, because there is a sense in which our culture 
demands of it a monetary valuation. Similarly, while we openly say that every 
human life is priceless, human lives are nonetheless priced for the purposes of life 
insurance or medical insurance; so entrenched are we in the language of mammon 
that everything has a price if we press hard enough. But the fact is that we do not 
want to price all things, or at least feel like we should not want them to be priced. 
In face of the commoditization of certain items (e.g. a Picasso), there is an 
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apologetic stance – “an inner compulsion to defend [ourselves]” against the 
commodification – a declaration that we would prefer that the pricing not occur. 
Thus, there seems to at least be an intuitive belief or understanding that there are 
some things in the world that are – or ought to be – sacred and unsullied by the 
priced world in which we find ourselves. So we see the problematic situation in 
which we find ourselves: we believe that certain things should not be made 
subject to exchangeability, but at the same time we often feel that the world 
compels that they be treated on occasion in just that manner. 
 This leads to a corresponding difficulty in how to respond to this apparent 
paradox that there are things that the economy or society will compel us to price, 
but that at the same time we feel ought not to be priced. According to Kopytoff 
(1986), what typically happens in this situation is that individuals within the 
society will “maintain some private vision of a hierarchy of exchange spheres, but 
the justification for this hierarchy [will not be] integrally tied to the exchange 
structure itself” (p. 82). Since the system, which is based on commodification and 
exchangeability, has no way of accounting for the decommodification of 
anything, individuals who want to keep certain things out of the commodity 
sphere will find it necessary to import their justification for this separation from 
somewhere else, such as aesthetics, morality, religion, and so on. However, what 
we find is that these individual responses are unlikely to be systematic or 
consistent with one another, thus “leading to what appear to be anomalies in 
cognition, inconsistencies in values, and uncertainties in action” (Kopytoff, 1986, 
p. 82). The final result is a “flattening of values that follows commoditization and 
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[an] inability of the collective culture of a modern society to cope with this 
flatness” (Kopytoff, 1986, p. 88). These two consequences – the flattening of 
values and the culture’s correspondingly impotent response – combine to frustrate 
those individuals who wish to protect some things from commodification, but 
who therefore struggle to find any adequate strategy for doing so; they also give 
strength to the economic forces propelling a society towards ever greater 
commodification, because the forces that fight against them are by comparison 
weak and scattered.  
This is even more worrisome now that various increases in biology and 
medical technologies – including emerging enhancement technologies – encroach 
ever more deeply into those things that have, at least historically, been seen as 
intimately human and personal, and therefore singular. It is here that the work of 
contemporary anthropologist Lesley Sharp (2000) and her examination of 
increased human commodification resulting from these changes in biology and 
medicine add a meaningful addendum to the anthropological theory of 
commodification. In her work “The Commodification of the Body and Its Parts”, 
Lesley Sharp is primarily concerned with commodification as it results from body 
fragmentation. Since she focuses specifically on commodification of the body, not 
commodification in general, her analysis is decidedly narrower than what was 
offered by fellow anthropologists Appadurai and Kopytoff. However, her analysis 
does highlight the more recent trend in anthropology to view commodification as 
including a sort of fragmentation or deconstruction of personal identity and (in her 
case mainly bodily) integrity, which is more particularly relevant to our over-
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arching topical focus of human enhancement which, by and large, targets areas 
central to personal identity and integrity. 
On Sharp’s (2000) analysis, whether the body is fragmented 
“metaphorically and literally,” whether “through language, visual imaging, or the 
actual surgical reconstruction, removal, or replacement of specific parts”, makes 
little difference; the presence of metaphorical fragmentation is sufficient to 
suggest an underlying commodification (p. 289). Moreover, according to Sharp, 
fragmentation is just one of many terms used to highlight or indicate the potential 
presence of commodification (although it clearly is the preferred one, and perhaps 
even the best). Within the over-arching scheme of “fragmentation” rhetoric, she 
finds that there are a number of words that act as clues to anthropologists (and 
other scholars) that objectification and commodification either have occurred or 
are in fact occurring, including any form of dehumanizing, “reductionist 
language” (e.g. “fragmented”, “malleable”, “colonizable” ,”subjectified”, 
“medicalized” and so on). This is not to say that fragmentation (and related terms) 
are in fact commodification; but, their presence “is significant because it flags the 
possibility that commodification has occurred” (Sharp, 2000, p. 293).  
Specific to the aforementioned rhetorical examples: “The medicalization 
of life, the fragmentation of the body, and the subjectification of colonized 
subjects all potentially dehumanize individuals and categories of persons in the 
name of profit” (Sharp, 2000, p. 293), or, more broadly, in the name of exchange. 
According to Sharp (2000), “The theme of objectification [and commodification] 
is clearly central to all these examples” since in them we are “transforming 
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persons and their bodies from a human category into objects of economic desire” 
(p. 293). This means that, ultimately, as the human body, human sexuality, human 
genetics, and so on, become increasingly commodifiable in terms of our ability to 
decompose humans into these various saleable or exchangeable components – 
medicalized, fragmented, subjectified, and so on – the need for a coherent, 
systematic justification to forbid such exchangeability becomes more pressing. 
For this, we will have to turn to a bioethical analysis of human commodification. 
 
Bioethical Perspective 
 
According to bioethicist Elizabeth Anderson (1990), “To say that something is 
properly regarded as a commodity is to claim that the norms of the market are 
appropriate for regulating its production, exchange, and enjoyment” (p. 72). By 
contrast, “To the extent that moral principles or ethical ideals preclude the 
application of market norms to a good, we may say that the good is not a (proper) 
commodity” (Anderson, 1990, p. 72). Thus, as with Appadurai and Kopytoff we 
have a sort of world division in which all things are provisionally either 
commodities or non-commodities (or, as Kopytoff would say, commodities and 
singularities).  
For Anderson, the main reason that we might object to the use of market 
norms with respect to a given good would be that is fails to value that good in an 
appropriate way (p. 72). One manner in which the use of market norms fails to 
value something in an appropriate way is when doing so undermines an important 
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value associated with, or inherent to, the thing in question. In her book Value in 
Ethics and Economics, Anderson (1993) argues that applying market exchange to 
certain ‘human’ things is commodifying and dehumanizing because doing so 
leads to the diminishment of human freedom and human autonomy.  She defines 
an individual as free if he or she has access to a wide range of options for 
expressing his or her judgments; thus, freedom requires that a person have 
“significant opportunities…to value different kinds of goods in different ways” 
(Anderson, 1993, p. 141). She defines a person as autonomous if he or she 
“confidently governs” himself or herself by self-determined principles and 
judgments; thus, a person is autonomous if that person has the power to value 
goods in a way that he or she “reflectively endorses” (Anderson, 1993, p. 142). 
So, on this account an ideally free and autonomous individual is able to live by 
and have unfettered access to those life choices that allow him or her to fully 
realize and embody his or her self-chosen life valuations. 
To make this state of affairs possible so that an ideally free and 
autonomous individual might plausibly be able to exist, Anderson maintains that 
there need to be “significant constraints” on the scope of the market. For example, 
since the use of addictive drugs make one susceptible to addiction, thereby 
limiting one’s ability to be self-determining, we have reason to prohibit the sale of 
these drugs on the grounds of protecting autonomy. Similarly, since the buying 
and selling of votes potentially enables the wealthy to control political outcomes, 
thereby limiting “collective autonomy”, we have reason to prohibit the sale of 
votes on the grounds of protecting autonomy. On her view, then, if we can 
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determine what goods are necessary for autonomy, we will then know what ought 
to be protected from potential commodification. 
Ultimately, those things most important to the preservation of autonomy, 
for Anderson, are “goods embodied in the person” (Anderson, 1993, p. 142), with 
examples including freedom of action and power of productive and reproductive 
labor. Anderson claims that selling these sorts of goods to someone else reduces a 
person’s autonomy by subjecting himself or herself to another’s domination. 
Thus, it appears that, on her view, any seeming relinquishment of self-
determination and subsequent submission to other-determination is necessarily 
detrimental to autonomy, and we should therefore block this possibility by 
prohibiting such goods from entering the market and, in so doing, protect 
autonomy by assuring that any “rights in ourselves” remain inalienable. 
According to Anderson, there are two questions we ought to ask ourselves 
in order to determine if a certain good ought to be deemed an economic good, 
subject to commodification and market valuations. First, we ask ourselves, “do 
market norms do a better job of embodying the ways we properly value a 
particular good than norms of other spheres?” If our answer is “no,” Anderson 
says, “then we shouldn’t treat them as commodities but rather locate them in non-
market spheres” (Anderson, 1993, p. 143). The second question we ask ourselves 
is, “do market norms, when they govern the circulation of a particular good, 
undermine important ideals such as freedom, autonomy, and equality or important 
interests legitimately protected by the state?” If our answer is “yes,” then she 
claims that “the state may act to remove the good from control by market norms” 
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(Anderson, 1993, pp. 143-4). Corresponding with these two questions it is 
apparent that on Anderson’s account we have two reasons for excluding some 
good or thing from the market: First, if the more appropriate way to value that 
thing is in non-market terms; second, even if market terms may be appropriate, 
we find that other, more important interests would be undermined by applying 
market norms to that thing. 
 In order to answer the first question we will need to explore how things 
are valued when they are treated as market goods. According to Anderson, an 
essential part of the nature of how we value commodities, considering the social 
relations within which we produce and distribute them, is that they are pure “use”; 
commodities are only valued instrumentally, and never intrinsically. This is 
contrasted with other noncommodified valuations such as respect, whereby the 
good in question is valued intrinsically. These “modes of valuation” (Anderson, 
1990, p. 72) can be roughly approximated in Kantian terms of “use” and 
“respect”, wherein “use” refers “to the mode of valuation proper to commodities, 
which follows the market norm of treating things solely in accordance with the 
owner’s nonmoral preferences” (Anderson, 1990, p. 72). 
 However, to say that market valuation of a thing simply consists in “use” 
is, for Anderson, insufficient. Instead, she proposes what she takes to be the “five 
features” that express and embody our attitudes surrounding economic freedom 
and economic exchange: impersonality, egotism, exclusivity, want-regarding, and 
an orientation to “exit” rather than to “voice” (Anderson, 1993, p. 145). Of these 
five features, she believes that the attitude of impersonality is central. According 
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to Anderson, the norms that govern our market relations are the kind that are 
basically “suitable for regulating the interactions of strangers.  Each party to a 
market transaction views his relation to the other as merely a means to the 
satisfaction of ends defined independent of the relationship and of the other 
party’s ends” (Anderson, 1993, p. 145). In other words, each party is allowed – 
nay, expected– to be driven simply by his or her own egoistic desires. The buyer 
of some good on the market is not expected to concern himself with various 
features of the seller: what the seller’s interests are; whether the good is being 
sold freely or out of desperation; what sort of “value” the seller places on the 
good; and so on. What matters instead is whether or not the seller is willing to sell 
the good at a price that the buyer is willing to pay. If the sale is made, there is no 
real or implied future obligation either parties have to the other; once the 
exchange is completed, their relationship is over, and the seller has no potential 
claim to what happens to the good once sold. 
According to Anderson, this sphere of economic exchange exists in 
contrast to what she calls the “sphere of personal relations”. This competing 
sphere is defined by the ideals of intimacy and commitment. The norms 
governing personal relations are personal, suitable for regulating the interactions 
of friends or family. Parties involved consider not simply their own wants, needs 
and desires, but those of the other party as well; each party views the other as an 
end, not simply a means to the satisfaction of an independent, egoistic end; there 
is a presumed continuance of the relationship once the ‘exchange’ is over, an 
expected reciprocity, and the good in question is a “shared good” that is part of 
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the relationship. Insofar as exchanges can legitimately occur in this sphere of 
personal relations, Anderson maintains they must be limited to gift-giving, never 
to including buying and selling (or, presumably. bartering, trading, or similar). 
Thus, in the end we have two competing, non-overlapping spheres of valuation, 
each with their own corresponding attitudes and relationship ideals. 
As illustration of her views on the contrasting realms of relations and their 
corresponding attitudes, Anderson considers the example of prostitution. She 
says, “From a pluralist standpoint, prostitution is the classic example of how 
commodification debases a gift value and its giver” (Anderson, 1993, p. 154). 
According to Anderson (1993), “[t]he specifically human good of sexual acts 
exchanged as gifts” is the sort of thing that “is founded upon a mutual recognition 
of the partners as sexually attracted to each other and as affirming an intimate 
relationship in their mutual offering of themselves to each other” (p. 154). This 
means that is “is a shared good” wherein a “couple rejoices in their union, which 
can be realized only when each partner reciprocates the other’s gift in kind, 
offering her own sexuality in the same spirit in which she received the other’s – as 
a genuine offering of the self” (Anderson, 1993, p. 154). In the case of 
prostitution, however, “[t]he commodification of sexual “services” destroys the 
kind of reciprocity required to realize human sexuality as a shared good” because 
by viewing the encounter as an economic exchange “[e]ach party values the other 
only instrumentally, not intrinsically” (Anderson, 1993, p. 154). Thus, Anderson 
says, since we tend to value sex as being a shared good the likes of which is best 
understood by the sphere of personal relations, to let it be bought and sold in the 
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sphere of economic relations is wrong. She claims, “The goods of the personal 
sphere, which are shared gift values, cannot be adequately realized by market 
norms” (Anderson, 1993, p. 158); as such, market norms do not do a better job of 
embodying how we ought to value sex than do the norms of a competing sphere 
of valuation, namely the sphere of personal relations. 
Since we have just answered “no” to Anderson’s first question on 
determining whether or not some good should be allowed into the market, we 
need not necessarily continue on with the second question and determine whether 
or not selling sex diminishes autonomy and freedom. But, if we do proceed with 
such an analysis, it is clear that on Anderson’s account prostitution does indeed 
inhibit autonomy. According to Anderson, when we reduce personal preferences 
and valuations to mere market choices, the question of whether and how these 
choices represent an individual’s “reflective endorsement” is dropped and deemed 
unnecessary. This, she maintains, fails to take account of various social relations 
and the types of domination of the self by others that would necessarily occur 
when goods that are “embodied in the person are commodified and alienated to 
others” (Anderson, 1993, p. 165). Accordingly, we conclude that autonomy is in 
fact harmed by governing such goods by market norms. 
In addition to her view that there are different spheres of relations that 
correspond to different modes of valuation, Anderson also believes that there are 
higher and lower modes of valuation. When dealing with human goods, it is not 
simply the fact that we are using a less apt mode of valuation when we place these 
goods in the market; we are also subjecting them to a lower mode of valuation 
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than that of which they deserve. When we treat as an object of mere use 
something that warrants respect, we are degrading that object. This “[d]egradation 
occurs when something is treated in accordance with a lower mode of valuation 
than is proper to it” (Anderson, 1990, p. 77). Since, she says, “We value things 
not just “more” or “less,” but in qualitatively higher and lower ways” this means, 
for example, that “[t]o love or respect someone is to value her in a higher way 
than one would if one merely used her” (Anderson, 1990, p. 77). 
A classic example of this qualitative valuation is seen in the case of 
children and surrogacy. According to Anderson (1990), when viewed properly 
children are “loved by their parents and respected by others” (p. 77) However, in 
the case of surrogacy “children are valued as mere use-objects by the mother and 
the surrogate agency when they are sold to others, and by the adoptive parents 
when they seek to conform the child’s genetic makeup to their own wishes” 
(Anderson, 1990, p. 77). This means that “commercial surrogacy degrades 
children insofar as it treats them as commodities” – mere-use objects ((Anderson, 
1990, p. 77). 
Returning to the earlier example of prostitution, using market norms to 
govern human sexuality is not only wrong because there is a better way to govern 
it, but because there is a higher way to govern it. Love and respect are higher 
modes of valuation, and therefore more befitting. In the end, perhaps the greatest 
harm caused by using the incorrect, lower mode of valuation for “human” things 
(e.g. sex and babies) is its effect on our conception of proper human flourishing. 
According to Anderson (1990), “The ideals which specify how one should value 
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certain things are supported by a conception of human flourishing” (p. 73). Thus, 
“To fail to value things appropriately” – in this case, to treat a human or human 
good as a commodity – “is to embody in one’s life an inferior conception of 
human flourishing” (Anderson, 1990, p. 73). The fear here is that if we continue 
to push many things of human value closer to the commodity end of the 
commodity-singularity continuum, we will end up with a diminished view of 
humanity, and of ourselves. 
 In fact, it is this “inferior conception of human flourishing” and the 
diminishment of human value that fellow bioethicist Margaret Radin sees as the 
most dangerous consequence of human commodification. After considering 
various popular accounts for why the inclusion of human goods on the market is 
problematic, she concludes that the corresponding market rhetoric is inconsistent 
with an appropriate view of human flourishing, and consequently diminishes an 
individual’s personhood and self-development. 
In discussing noncommodification – which she terms here ‘market-
inalienability’ – Radin focuses specifically on nonsalability, whereby certain 
goods cannot be bought, sold or traded in the market. She does this in part 
because she still wants to allow the gifting of certain things that should not be 
sold; thus, these goods are able to be placed outside of the marketplace, but “not 
outside the realm of social intercourse” (Radin, 1987, p. 1953). As Radin sees it, 
the desire to make something market-inalienable often expresses a desire for the 
noncommodification of that thing. She says, “By making something nonsalable 
we proclaim that it should not be conceived of or treated as a commodity” (Radin, 
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1987, p. 1855). This means that when we say “something is noncommodifiable,” 
we meant that “market trading is a disallowed form of social organization and 
allocation” and we moreover “place that thing beyond supply and demand pricing, 
brokerage and arbitrage, advertising and marketing, stockpiling, speculation, and 
valuation in terms of the opportunity cost of production” (Radin, 1987, p. 1855). 
The thought here seems to be that if a good is made nonsalable, then 
noncommodification of that good is assured. Or, in the least, we are stating that 
we believe that the good in question should not be thought of or treated like a 
commodity.  
 Before proceeding to her argument against the commodification of certain 
human goods, Radin makes a number of distinctions that she believes are relevant 
in understanding the commodification debate. First, she identifies three general 
views of commodification: universal commodification, whereby everything can or 
ought to be considered in market terms; universal noncommodification, whereby 
everything cannot or should not be considered in market terms; and pluralism, 
whereby there are certain things that do or should exist in normative realms 
outside of the market, e.g. rights, politics, families, and so on, but many or most 
goods in society can justifiably be placed in the market. This corresponds with 
Kopytoff’s analysis of societies as ranging from perfectly commoditized 
(universal commodification) to perfectly decommoditized (universal 
noncommodification), with pluralism representing a sort of partially 
commoditized society. 
  79 
 She also distinguishes between broad commodification and narrow 
commodification. According to her interpretation, narrow commodification refers 
specifically to the actual (or, at least, legally permitted) buying and selling of 
something. By contrast, broad commodification refers not only to the actual 
buying and selling of something, but also to the market rhetoric involved, the 
sorts of attitudes surrounding treating the given interactions of market 
transactions, and the use of monetary cost-benefit analysis as the appropriate 
means of judging the given interactions. This latter form of commodification fits 
with Anderson’s view that commodification can exist when there is simply the 
use of market norms of valuation and market rhetoric, and it is the form that 
Radin ends up adopting in her analysis of the problems with human 
commodification. 
Since she is dealing with the problem of commodification as broadly 
understood, she looks more closely at the issue of market rhetoric. She considers 
as a key question about the problem of market rhetoric the following: “Why 
should it matter if someone conceptualizes the entire human universe as one giant 
bundle of scarce goods subject to free alienation by contract[?]” with the added 
caveat, “especially if reasoning in market rhetoric can reach the same result that 
some other kind of normative reasoning reaches on other grounds?” (Radin, 1987, 
pp. 1877-8), and explores in turn the three most common answers to the question. 
The first answer says, “It matters because the rhetoric might lead less-than-perfect 
practitioners to wrong answers in sensitive cases” (Radin, 1987, p. 1878). The 
idea here is that even if a sophisticated practitioner might not be confused or 
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misled by commodification talk, imperfect practitioners might be led to the wrong 
answers. For example, one worry about surrogacy and ‘baby selling’ is that 
thinking about the babies in economic terms might lead people to think of all 
humans in economic terms, not simply babies. Here, it may be the case that only 
unsophisticated, imperfect practitioners would reach this conclusion; but, 
proponents of this argument say that the risk of that error (here, the 
commodification of all human beings) in certain cases (e.g. baby selling) is 
deemed sufficient to block the marketing of these sorts of goods. 
The second answer says that it matters because the rhetoric itself is 
insulting, or, it injures personhood regardless of the result. She considers the 
example of rape, where “for all but the deepest enthusiast, market rhetoric seems 
intuitively out of place here, so inappropriate that it is either silly or somehow 
insulting to the value being discussed” (Radin, 1987, p. 1880). The basis for this 
intuition, Radin (1987) says, “is that market rhetoric conceives of bodily integrity 
as a fungible object,” that is, something “replaceable with money or other objects” 
(p. 1880). In practice, “A fungible object can pass in and out of the person’s 
possession without effect on the person as long as its market equivalent is given in 
exchange” (Radin, 1987, p. 1880). For Radin (1987), “To speak of personal 
attributes [generally] as fungible objects – alienable “goods” – is intuitively 
wrong” (p. 1880). This means that “thinking of rape as a fungible object in market 
rhetoric implicitly conceives of as fungible something that we know to be 
personal, in fact conceives of as fungible property something we know to be too 
personal even to be personal property” (Radin, 1987, p. 1880). Therefore, it is not 
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just the case that personal things are sacred, and therefore should be treated as 
singular; rather, Radin (1987) believes, “Systematically conceiving of personal 
attributes as fungible objects is threatening to personhood, because it detaches 
from the person that which is integral to the person” (p. 1881). This means that 
there is an underlying reason for the sacralizing: the presumption of personal 
attribute fungibility is a threat to personhood, and for this reason certain things 
should be sacralized. 
 The third answer Radin (1987) considers as to why conceptualizing “the 
entire human universe as one giant bundle of scarce goods subject to free 
alienation by contract” is problematic is that it simply is not the case that 
“reasoning in market rhetoric can reach the same result that some other kind of 
normative reasoning reaches on other grounds” (pp. 1877-8), at least with respect 
to human goods and human flourishing. She believes that market rhetoric 
represents a radically different kind of normative discourse than we ought to be 
using with respect to humans. And, if we do use it, the results are simply not the 
same. As she explains: “Market rhetoric, if adopted by everyone, and in many 
contexts, would indeed transform the texture of the human world” (Radin, 1987, 
p. 1884). For example, “This rhetoric leads us to view politics as just rent seeking, 
reproductive capacity as just a scarce good for which there is high demand, and 
the repugnance of slavery as just a cost” (Radin, 1987, p. 1884). On this account, 
market rhetoric becomes the whole of our normative talk, supplanting other norms 
and values (Radin, 1987, pp. 1884-5). 
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Moreover, Radin (1987) says, “To accept these views is to accept the 
conception of human flourishing they imply, one that is inferior to the conception 
we can accept as properly ours” (p. 1885). To explain what she means by the idea 
of a conception of human flourishing being “properly ours”, Radin (1987) suggest 
that “[i]n order to decide what conception of human flourishing is properly ours, 
all we can do is reflect on what we now know about human life and choose the 
best from among the conceptions available to us” (p. 1884, footnote 131). For 
Radin (1987), this means that “we should not accept a conception of human 
flourishing that” denies certain fundamental values we might have, such as 
“politics as (also) community self-determination,” “of reproductive capacity as 
essentially human and personal,” and an understanding that “the pain of 
witnessing criminal acts and unjust institutions is not like the price of shoes or 
snowplows” (p. 1884, footnote 131). On Radin’s view, then, it would not matter if 
we could somehow price politics, reproductive capacity, and so on, perhaps in 
virtue of the labor theory of value or similar, because regardless of whether or not 
we can price these things, we should not, because doing so is inconsistent with 
our reflectively determined conception of proper human flourishing. However, in 
the end, we may choose other values. 
Radin also expands this view of human flourishing to include our views of 
personhood. According to Radin (1987), “our understanding of personhood” is 
such that “we are committed to an ideal of individual uniqueness that does not 
cohere with the idea that each person’s attributes are fungible, that they have a 
monetary equivalent, and that they can be traded off against those of other 
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people” (p. 1885). Thus, the problem with broad commodification and universal 
market rhetoric is that it “transforms our world of concrete persons, whose 
uniqueness and individuality is expressed in specific personal attributes, into a 
world of disembodied, fungible, attribute-less entities possessing a wealth of 
alienable, severable “objects”” (Radin, 1987, p. 1885). It thereby “reduces the 
conception of a person to an abstract, fungible unit with no individuating 
characteristics” (Radin, 1987, p. 1885). 
 This “fungible unit with no individuating characteristics” is to be 
contrasted with what Radin believes is the more “proper” understanding of 
persons and personhood. For her, “a better view of personhood” (Radin, 1987, p. 
1904) must give adequate account to three important features of personhood: 
freedom, identity, and contextuality. Freedom, as she defines it, emphasizes the 
power to choose for oneself (i.e. “free will”). Identity deals with “the integrity and 
continuity of the self required for individuation”; this includes having a unique 
identity that is “integrated and continuous” over time (Radin, 1987, p. 1904). The 
third feature, contextuality, focuses on the inevitable interconnectedness between 
a person and his or her surrounding environment, giving greater emphasis on 
those environmental aspects that are integral to the person and his or her self-
conception, such as a sense of ‘home’, place, interpersonal relations, and so on.  
According to Radin, if a given view of personhood cannot offer a satisfactory 
account of each of these three features, then we should not adopt it.  
Given these three necessary features, on Radin’s (1987) final account the 
more appropriate view of personhood recognizes various things – such as “one’s 
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politics, work, religion, love, sexuality, friendships, altruism, experiences, 
wisdom, moral commitments, character, and personal attributes” (p. 1906) – as 
integral to a person and, therefore, not alienable and monetizable.  And to 
commodify these things, she believes, or to adopt a societal scheme that uses the 
rhetoric of commodification for them, “undermines personal identity…[and does] 
violence to our deepest understanding of what it is to be human” (Radin, 1987, p. 
1906). A major part of this resulting “violence” is that individuals ultimately end 
up suffering from a sort of alienation, whether personal or social: at the personal 
level, to the extent that the market rhetoric and conceived fungibility is 
internalized, the individual suffers from a “disorientation of the self” (Radin, 
1987, p. 1907); at the social level, to the extent that this rhetoric is not 
internalized, the individual finds herself or himself alienated from the social 
structure that does use and accept this rhetoric. Both of these forms of an 
alienation response to commodification will be explored more fully in the next 
chapter. 
  
Working Analysis of Commodity and How it Relates to Enhancement 
 
Having explored some of the archetypal views of commodification in the 
anthropology and bioethics literature, we are now in a better position to devise an 
overarching conception that can be used for the remainder of this dissertation. As 
I will define it, a commodity is a ‘thing’ (loosely defined so as to tentatively 
include humans, human attributes, personal goods, and so on) that has the social 
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potential for being perceived – at some time, in some social context, as per some 
cultural markings that define it as such to the individuals involved – as having as 
a defining feature is potential exchangeability for some other thing. While, as with 
Kopytoff, I believe that a thing’s status as a commodity is guaranteed only at the 
moment in which it is actually participating in some sort of exchange (because at 
that moment the potential exchangeability has been proven in virtue of being 
actualized), I do not believe that it is necessary for a thing to ever undergo some 
form of social exchange for it to be deemed a commodity. Instead, on my 
analysis, it will be sufficient to say that the thing in question might arguably be 
perceived as a thing with exchangeability potential. 
Since I adopt what Radin referred to “broad commodification” analysis, 
on my view to say that something is perceived as having exchangeability potential 
is roughly equivalent to saying that it is perceived as governed – or perhaps 
simply governable – by the “norms of the market”, as Anderson would put it. 
Since the presence of this set of norms is often indicated by its corresponding 
rhetoric, on my analysis it will be sufficient to declare a given thing a commodity 
if the rhetoric surrounding it at a particular time or in a particular context is the 
sort of rhetoric that is associated with this set of norms. While the rhetoric of 
pricing and exchangeability will probably be a clearer indication of some 
underlying commodification, I nonetheless believe we can expand this list to 
include aspects of Sharp’s “fragmentation rhetoric” as well. As such, if the thing 
in question is perceived as “fragmented”, “malleable”, “colonizable”, 
”subjectified”, “medicalized”, “fungible”, “alienable”, and similar, we will 
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therefore have reason to suspect that that thing may have the social potential of 
being a commodity. 
This is not a particularly serious deviation from the kind of analysis 
offered by Radin earlier. In discussing some of the problems with using the 
rhetoric of universal commodification in dealing with “things of value to the 
person”, Radin (1987) says that a major difficulty is that these things are 
described as being “in principle alienable” (pp. 1859-1860, footnote 44). In fact, 
throughout her analysis, Radin (1987) frequently equates (or, at least, associates) 
alienation with commodification (see, e.g. p. 1861, pp. 1877-8, and p. 1885). 
While the fact that something can be decomposed into fragments does not 
necessarily mean that those fragments can ultimately be separated from that thing 
for the purposes of exchange, the alienability and exchange of a thing’s 
components does require that those components first be fragmentable; so, 
fragmentation is a clue that there may be the potential for commodification. 
Also, in my analysis there can be degrees of commodification. Like 
Appadurai, I believe that the more that a thing finds itself in a time during which 
it is defined by its potential exchangeability, as a bearer of the cultural markings 
of exchangeability, or in social contexts that either state or imply potential 
exchangeability, the more quintessentially that thing is deemed a commodity. It 
may also be the case that the more such a thing finds itself governed by more 
explicitly market rhetoric, rather than simply fragmentation rhetoric, we will 
consider it more explicitly a commodity. 
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I also believe that the more things in a society that contain the social 
potential of being a commodity – roughly, the more things perceived as 
potentially exchangeable – the more highly commoditized is that society. By 
contrast, the less things in a society bearing this potential, the less highly 
commoditized is that society. To use Kopytoff’s description: “the perfectly 
commoditized world would be one in which everything is exchangeable or for 
sale. By the same token, the perfectly decommoditized world would be one in 
which everything is singular, unique, and unexchangeable” (Kopytoff, 1986, p. 
69). This will be important in analyzing what is ultimately wrong with human 
modification and its corresponding commodification: that it pushes our society 
further and further towards the commodity end of the singular-commodity scale, 
which ultimately leads to a diminishment of human flourishing and a destruction 
of human nature and proper human value. 
The relation that this account bears to enhancement is hopefully (at least 
partly) obvious: insofar as enhancement technologies target some human feature 
(gene, neurochemical makeup, physical or mental trait, etc) it is fragmenting the 
given human and decomposing him or her to a point where at least that feature is 
isolatable and, at the point of enhancement, exchangeable for some other and/or 
better feature. If the hallmark of a commodity is that its socially relevant feature is 
its exchangeability for something else – which I take here to allow for 
bidirectionality of definition – then the feature for which enhancement is sought is 
by necessity a commodity. If we focus on broad commodification, this means that 
the talk of potential human enhancement is then, also by necessity, 
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commodification talk. I hereby take all of this to be fairly straightforward, which 
means that in our analysis of the moral ills commodification (and enhancement) 
entail, our final account of how human enhancement might undermine human 
flourishing may well hinge on its relative quintessence. 
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Chapter 4 
COMMODIFIED MAN 
 
Having just explored the general concept of ‘commodification’ in some of its 
dominant anthropological and bioethical meanings, we will now turn to the matter 
of what happens to the individual who is being commodified. As stated in chapter 
3, the accepted use of commodification that will be employed for the remainder of 
this chapter includes a broad interpretation, whereby we may say that an 
individual is being commodified even when there is no explicit exchange taking 
place, but rather simply the presence of commodification rhetoric and attitudes. 
Additionally, this commodification rhetoric includes the related concepts (e.g. 
fragmented, malleable, etc.), as well as the view of individuals being 
commodified as being able to suffer such commodification to varying degrees. 
 While there are no doubt many different kinds of (negative) responses that 
a commodified individual may experience – and there is no doubt that, in a sense 
and to some degree, we are all commodified in some domain(s) of our lives – I 
will focus on five key responses that help us to understand the commodification-
enhancement attitude. First, I will consider how commodification closes off a 
person’s ‘right’ to an open future for self-determination and self-fulfillment, 
based on Joel Feinberg’s analysis. Second, focusing on Jurgen Habermas’ 
argument about prenatal genetic engineering, I will consider how 
commodification of an individual functions as a form of invasion and control. 
Third, I will describe how commodification results in an individual’s sense of 
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fragmented identity, drawing heavily from Michael Shapiro. Fourth, I will discuss 
how commodification and its associated invasion and fragmentation lead to the 
commodified individual suffering from either self-alienation or alienation from 
others. Finally, I will present the psychological theory called ‘objectification 
theory’ and explain how the felt subjective experiences and psychological 
consequences of objectification arguably parallel the experiences we would 
expect from individuals being commodified. 
 Although these five consequences are discussed individually, they are 
arguably part of a cluster of commodification consequences, and perhaps even 
indicative of a progression of consequences. For example, beginning with the 
more general effect of a person’s open future being closed, we can see that this 
closing off is potentially more insidious with various forms of human 
enhancement technologies than current modes of parental and societal control, 
resulting in what amounts to a co-authored life and a corresponding feeling of 
invasion of self. This invasion can in turn lead to an individual’s fragmentation of 
personal identity, and both of these – invasion and fragmentation – can lead to 
alienation, both from oneself and from others in society. This self-alienation – as 
well as the commodification itself – leaves the individual suffering from the 
psychological consequences of objectification. Thus, all these consequences are 
apparently part of an interlocking whole (which can broadly be thought of as: 
commodified man as object). 
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Commodified Man and the Open Future 
 
For Joel Feinberg (1980), the right to an open future is essentially a premature or 
“anticipatory” autonomy right. Autonomy rights in adults include such things as 
the right to vote, to drink, to drive, and so on. Some autonomy rights, which 
Feinberg (1980) classifies as “protected liberties of choice” (p. 125), are the sort 
that cannot apply to children because they lack the capacity necessary to make 
that sort of choice. For example, there is the autonomy right to “the free exercise 
of one’s religion…which presupposes that one has religious convictions or 
preferences in the first place” (Feinberg, 1980, p. 125). Another example would 
be the right of an individual to protect his or her body from intrusive measures by 
refusing medical treatment. Since children are not thought to have the capacity to 
understand the full ramifications of such a choice, decisions of this sort are 
typically conferred to the parents or guardian (or an appropriate court appointed 
surrogate decision-maker). However, upon reaching adulthood, the right to this 
sort of decision-making is in essence ‘returned’ to the former child, who now 
(barring any reasons to suspect diminished capacity) takes full possession of it. 
 A key component of Feinberg’s analysis of the right to an open future 
includes this idea of representative adults (or perhaps society at large) acting like 
the ‘trustees’ of a child’s autonomy rights; they have a duty to protect them until 
the child is old enough to use them himself or herself. This is why Feinberg 
(1980) categorizes the right to an open future as a more general expression for 
what he calls “rights-in-trust” or “anticipatory autonomy rights” (p. 125). These 
  92 
rights look like autonomy rights in adults, but, given the fact “that the child 
cannot very well exercise his free choice until later when he is more fully formed 
and capable…[they] are to be saved for the child until he is an adult” (Feinberg, 
1980, p. 125). 
 Even though they are not full-fledged autonomy rights, Feinberg (1980) 
claims that they “can be violated “in advance,” so to speak, before the child is 
even in a position to exercise them” (pp. 125-6). This sort of violation “guarantees 
now that when the child is an autonomous adult, certain key options will already 
be closed to him” (Feinberg, 1980, p.126). As such, “[h]is right while he is still a 
child is to have these future options kept open until he is a fully formed self-
determining adult capable of deciding among them” (Feinberg, 1980, p. 126). 
This means that because the child has a present right protecting his or her future 
autonomy, surrounding individuals have a corresponding duty to not violate that 
present right by acting in such a way that they end up closing off those future 
options that are necessary for a self-determined, autonomous adult. 
 While Feinberg does not explicitly limit the future options to those 
necessary for a self-determined, autonomous adult (as I just did), he clearly does 
not advocate that the right to an open future protect and ensure a completely open 
future. He believes that there will always be an “inevitable narrowing of options” 
(Feinberg, 1980, p. 146) because “whatever policy is adopted by a child’s parents, 
and whatever laws are passed and enforced by the state” will have “substantially 
narrowed” “the child’s options in respect to life circumstances and 
character…well before he is an adult” (Feinberg, 1980, p. 146). Over the course 
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of childhood, socialization and education mold and influence the development of 
the boy’s or girl’s “own values, tastes, and standards, which will in turn determine 
in part how he [or she] acts, feels, and chooses” (Feinberg, 1980, p. 146). This 
will then in turn reinforce a tendency to continue acting, feeling, choosing, and so 
on, until the child’s character is fully set. This means that, according to Feinberg 
(1980), “children are not born with a precisely determined character structure” (p. 
146). Moreover, since “they must be socialized by measures of discipline if they 
are to become fit members of the adult community, and this must be done even if 
it is against the wishes of the pre-socialized children themselves” (Feinberg, 1980, 
p. 141), a certain element of “paternalism” and control (from either parent or 
state) will be unavoidable – and indeed desirable – in the upbringing of any child. 
 But, this paternalistic element cannot limit the child in any way that the 
parents and society wish, or else the child’s right to an open future will have 
indeed been violated. According to Feinberg (1980), there are two specific things 
being protected by the right to an open future: the right of self-determination and 
the good of self-fulfillment (p. 145); violating either of these two things will be 
particularly problematic on his account. For Feinberg (1980), the right of self-
determination means that a person has a right to determine “his own life-
circumstances”, including career-type, lifestyle, religious affiliation, and other 
related things (p. 145). The right of self-determination also means that a person 
has a right to determine his own character, which includes “that set of habitual 
traits that we create by our own actions and cultivated feelings in given types of 
circumstances [and] our characteristic habits of response to life’s basic kinds of 
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situations” (Feinberg, 1980, p. 145). In addition to this, we have the good of self-
fulfillment, which includes three necessary components: “the development of 
one’s chief aptitudes into genuine talents in a life that gives them scope”; “an 
unfolding of all basic tendencies and inclinations, both those that are common to 
the species and those that are peculiar to the individual”; and “an active 
realization of the universal human propensities to plan, design and make order” 
(Feinberg, 1980, p. 143). 
To summarize: what we want to protect by ensuring a child’s open future 
is that, as an adult, he or she will be able to live a life that fits with his or her self-
reflective conception of the good life, which includes the choice of life-
circumstances and character, the development of talents, and the realization of 
self-potential. This is why I characterized earlier the violation of a right to an 
open future as being specifically limited to violating those options necessary for a 
self-determined, autonomous adult: it is not the right to any open future that is 
valued, but a specific view of what kind of future constitutes “a better view of 
personhood” (Radin, 1987, p. 1905). 
 Feinberg’s above analysis of the good life and a better view of personhood 
is similar to those set out by Elizabeth Anderson (1990, 1993) and Margaret 
Radin (1987), as presented in the previous chapter. Recall that as part of the good 
life, Anderson believes that a person should be both free and autonomous. This 
requires that a person self-govern by self-determined principles and values (i.e. be 
autonomous) and have access to a wide range of options for expressing these self-
determinations (i.e. is free). Since the goal of this freedom is no doubt that it 
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enables a person’s self-fulfillment, her view of the good life and Feinberg’s are 
roughly the same.  
Similarly, Radin conceives of personhood as containing three main 
components: freedom, identity, and contextuality. On her account, freedom is 
primarily the power to choose for oneself, like Feinberg’s account of self-
development; identity deals with a person being able to have or to develop an 
integrated, unique identity; and contextuality has to do with those aspects of a 
person’s lived-in environment that enable him or her to develop this sort of 
identity. Arguably, this integrated, unique identity is only made possible when 
there is self-fulfillment, and this self-fulfillment entails that the person be placed 
in and interacts with an appropriate context in order that that identity can be 
achieved. So we can see that, to a great extent, Feinberg, Anderson and Radin are 
all concerned about the same (liberally-minded) things with respect to the goods 
of human development and human flourishing, and our duty (should we share the 
same vision of human good) to protect them as such. 
 When we take this given understanding of personhood and recognize that 
it is the real reason why an open future matters – not simply the protection of 
future autonomy rights – I do not see why we should not be able to expand on 
Feinberg’s analysis of violating a person’s right to an open future to include 
similar violations with adults. Feinberg’s underlying intuition seems to be that any 
undue intrusions on a person’s development that inhibit his or her ability to be 
self-determined and self-fulfilling at some future point, one at which that self-
determination and self-fulfillment would be otherwise expected had the intrusions 
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not occurred, are ipso facto morally problematic. While Feinberg would no doubt 
want to block this understanding of his view because it opens the doors to 
paternalism, if the interpretation in the forgoing sentences is correct, then it is not 
obvious to me that on this account we must limit our analysis to children; that the 
individual in question is in the process of self-development, and that the 
intrusions inhibit the development of the person that the given individual “will 
become if his [or her] basic options are kept open and his [or her] growth kept 
“natural” or unforced” (Feinberg, 1980, p. 127), appear to be sufficient grounds 
for protecting that individual from these inhibiting intrusions. 
 Perhaps, when we are dealing with adults, Feinberg intends for us to 
analyze any violations or intrusions of this sort as straight out violations of 
autonomy. However, consider his explanation of how the child and adult are 
related in his open future argument. He says, “In any case, that adult does not 
exist yet, and perhaps he never will. But the child is potentially that adult, and it is 
that adult who is the person whose autonomy must be protected now (in 
advance)” (Feinberg, 1980, p. 127). If we simply replace ‘adult’ with ‘future 
person’ and ‘child’ with ‘current person’, we have exactly the case I described in 
the previous paragraph. Since the parallel between the two is so strong, it would 
seem like either we ought to be able to protect adults in similar developmental 
conditions by appealing to their right to an open future, or else protect the 
children under a straight out right to autonomy as well.  
 Or, perhaps instead Feinberg believes that, as a person ages, he or she 
garners ever increasing degrees of control over the process of self-development. 
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As such, children might demand more specific protection in ensuring their open 
future because they are more vulnerable to its being violated at a time when they 
cannot reasonably be said to have reflectively agreed to it, or have the reasonable 
expectation to have been able to fight against it. This would fit with his contention 
that “from the beginning the child must – inevitably will – have some “input” in 
its own shaping, the extent of which will grow continuously even as the child’s 
character itself does” and in this way he or she “can contribute towards the 
making of his [or her] own self and circumstances in ever-increasing degree” 
(Feinberg, 1980, p. 149). As he sees it, “At every subsequent stage” in the child’s 
self-development, “the immature child plays an ever-greater role in the creation of 
his own life, until at the arbitrarily fixed point of full maturity or adulthood, he is 
at last fully and properly in charge of himself” (Feinberg, 1980, p. 150). At this 
point he is “sovereign within his terrain [and] his more or less finished character 
the product of a complicated interaction of external influences and ever-increasing 
contributions from his own earlier self” (Feinberg, 1980, p. 150). 
The problem with this account, however, is that Feinberg seems to assume 
a slow, interactive development process, presumably along the lines of Claudia 
Mills’ (2003) interpretation of the open future argument as consisting of 
“encouraged versus discouraged options” (p. 501). Since Feinberg (1980) already 
conceded to an “inevitable narrowing of options” (p. 146), she maintains, 
“Options, then, are not properly viewed as open or closed, but as more or less 
encouraged or discouraged, fostered , or inhibited” (Milles, 2003, p. 501). 
However, certain acts of narrow commodification – like, e.g., choosing or 
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changing a child’s genetic makeup – are not simply encouraging one 
developmental pathway and discouraging another; they in fact close off certain 
pathways that would have been available otherwise, or ensure that a particular 
pathway is guaranteed. Moreover, when we consider broad commodification and 
the arguably pervasive presence that is inherent in market or fragmentation 
rhetoric, were such rhetoric to become an ever-present aspect of the “texture of 
the human world” (Radin, 1987, p. 1881), that sort of presence would hardly be 
considered merely ‘encouraging’ or ‘discouraging’, but indeed overbearing. 
One final thought: even though Feinberg self-describes the open future 
argument as being essentially an autonomy-based argument, I suspect that a better 
understanding of it is that it is a personhood-based argument. True, his conception 
of personhood utilized includes a strongly favored autonomy component (he is, 
after all, liberally inclined). However, the primary goal for protecting this 
autonomy appears to be that doing so is necessary in order to protect adequate 
individual personhood and overall human flourishing. As such, should we choose 
to cash out the open future violations as resulting from commodification and 
commodifying rhetoric, we should declare them problematic because they are 
damaging personhood and human flourishing, rather than simply autonomy. 
 
 
Commodified Man and Invasion and Control 
 
Perhaps a better way of understanding the problems of commodification when it 
involves open future violations is to look to the corresponding invasion of person 
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that occurs. Because this sort of invasion is arguably more apparent when we 
consider the kinds of commodifying technologies that are implemented before an 
individual is born, thereby closing off the potential open future in a more 
definitive and insidious manner, we will look at this sort of example.  
One major proponent of this argument – which states that pre-birth 
modification leads to a problematic violation of the right to an open future – is 
Jurgen Habermas. Habermas (2003) focuses specifically on genetic modifications 
that are aimed at human enhancement, and his basic argument is that “[e]ugenic 
programming of desirable traits and dispositions” is morally problematic because 
“it commits the person concerned to a specific life-project or, in any case, puts 
specific restrictions on his freedom to choose a life of his own” (p. 61). More 
specifically, “[e]ugenic interventions aiming at enhancement reduce ethical 
freedom insofar as they tie down the person concerned to rejected, but irreversible 
intentions of third parties, barring him from the spontaneous self-perception of 
being the undivided author of his own life” (Habermas, 2003, p. 63) Thus, we see 
that for Habermas the specific kind of open future violation that is morally 
problematic is one that the individual would upon self-reflection reject, but which 
cannot in fact be rejected because it has already been fixed by the intervener 
through his or her intervention. This requires more than simply the 
encouragement or discouragement of life options; rather, there must be a forced 
commitment to one option, or the irreversible restriction of another. The reason 
that this violation and forced commitment are morally problematic is, ultimately, 
because it invades the self-conceived personhood of the individual in question.  
  100 
On his account, Habermas (2003) refers to the encouragement or 
discouragement of life options as non-genetic “intentions” (p. 61), and the actual 
eugenic manipulation for desired traits as genetic intentions. He concedes to his 
opponents that a parent’s genetic intentions for his or her child during such 
eugenic programming would no doubt closely parallel their non-genetic intentions 
– e.g. a parent’s desire that his or her child become a doctor, develop an athletic 
or musical talent, and so on, and subsequent encouragement that the child develop 
talents or career aspirations along such lines. Moreover, he believes that it is 
possible in cases of both non-genetic intentions and genetic intentions that these 
intentions are internalized by the given child, and therefore do not lead to ill 
effects and the feeling of invasion. However, he objects to genetic engineering 
specifically because it leaves open the distinct possibility of “dissonant cases”, 
which he does not believe are genuinely possible with non-genetic intentions.  
Consider the example where parents want their child to become a doctor 
and actively encourage that life course. If the child in question “appropriates these 
expectations as aspirations of his own” (Habermas, 2003, p. 61), meaning he or 
she does not see the goal of being a doctor as something alien and imposed upon 
himself or herself, then there is no resulting feeling of invasion. As Habermas 
(2003) puts it, “If an intention is “appropriated” in this way, no effect of 
alienation from one’s own existence as a body and a soul will occur, nor will the 
corresponding restrictions of the ethical freedom to live a life of one’s own be 
felt” (p. 61). However, in those instances in which the parental intention is not 
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appropriated, this will result in what he calls “dissonant cases” (Habermas, 2003, 
p. 61), wherein there is a feeling of invasion and resulting alienation.  
While it may initially appear that there can be dissonant cases in response 
to non-genetic parental intentions, Habermas believes that these cases are in fact 
fixable. Recall that non-genetic intentions are essentially limited to the 
socialization process, a matter of encouragement or discouragement. According to 
Habermas, the power of this socialization process is ultimately limited. As he sees 
it, “[s]ocialization processes proceed only by communicative action, wielding 
their formative power in the medium of propositional attitudes and decisions” 
(Habermas, 2003, p. 61). These attitudes and decisions “are connected with 
internal reasons even if, at a given stage of its cognitive development, the “space 
of reasons” is not yet widely open to the child itself” (Habermas, 2003, p. 62), and 
the reasons can be given to (or discovered by) the child and ultimately critiqued. 
Because of this sort of “interactive structure,” the child has the option – even if 
only available in adolescence or adulthood – to “respond to and retroactively 
break away from” the initial parental communication (Habermas, 2003, p. 62). On 
Habermas’ account, then, non-genetic intentions can only take the form of 
communication, which by its nature inevitably leaves open the possibility for the 
child to contest that communication and rebel against the intention. No matter 
how strongly a child’s parents wish him or her to become a doctor, and express 
that wish, the child always has the option of simply saying, “No,” and “They can 
retrospectively compensate for the asymmetry of filial dependency by liberating 
themselves through a critical reappraisal of the genesis of such restrictive 
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socialization processes” (Habermas, 2003, p. 62). Thus, for Habermas (2003), 
even the strongest forms of communicative action that threaten to invade an 
individual and his or her sense of person “may be resolved analytically, through 
an elaboration of self-reflexive insights” (p. 62). 
 For genetic intentions, however, there is no communicative action to 
which the child can say, “No.” According to Habermas (2003), “With genetic 
enhancement, there is no communicative scope for the projected child to be 
addressed as a second person and to be involved in a communication process” (p. 
62). This means that even once the child becomes an adolescent or an adult, he or 
she has no option here for “critical reappraisal” or “a revisionary learning 
process” like he or she had with communicative action. Thus, “Being at odds with 
the genetically fixed intention of a third person is hopeless. The genetic program 
is a mute and, in a sense, unanswerable fact” (Habermas, 2003, p. 62). While it is 
not clear, even with Habermas, that intentions limited to “communicative action” 
are in fact going to be that easy to respond to – after all, the more we learn about 
developmental psychology the more we realize how truly puissant certain aspects 
of parental and adult influence are on the impressionable mind – it is clear that 
Habermas wants to make a distinction between communicative and genetic 
intention such that meaningful response to the former is at least far more likely in 
that any response to the latter is truly impossible. This is because, in contrast to 
non-genetic intentions, where even the strongest form of communicative action 
can be resolved, with genetic intentions, even the weakest form of eugenics is in a 
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sense irresolvable; there is no option of replying, reappraising, contesting, and so 
on.  
This is perhaps where the distinction between Feinberg’s analysis of the 
open future and Habermas’ analysis of eugenic intervention is most apparent. 
According to Feinberg (1980), it is false to say “that there is any early stage at 
which a child’s character is wholly unformed and his talents and temperament 
entirely plastic,” since “in the continuous development of the relative-adult out of 
the relative-child there is no point before which the child himself has no part in 
his own shaping” (p. 148). Contra Feinberg, Habermas maintains – and I believe 
rightly so – that any sort of genetic intervention that occurs before a child’s birth 
is necessarily beyond that child’s power to shape. Hence, while Feinberg claims 
that there is no part of the developmental process that we should consider to be 
explicitly beyond the possibility of the child’s input, there seems to genuinely be 
such a time, although perhaps best conceived of as ‘pre-development’. 
 Of course, it looks as though even with the developmental process there 
are certain aspects of it that are permanently barred from an individual’s input, 
regardless of whether there are genetic intentions being enforced. Even Habermas 
(2003) agrees, saying, “All persons, including those born naturally, are in one way 
or another dependent on their genetic program” (p.64). As such, “There must be a 
different reason for dependence on a deliberately fixed genetic program to be 
relevant for the programmed person” (Habermas, 2003, pp. 64-5). For Habermas 
(2003), this reason is that “He is principally barred from exchanging roles with his 
designer. The product cannot, to put it bluntly, draw up a design for its designer” 
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(p. 65). According to Habermas (2003), in the case of genetic programming we 
have a “program designer” who “carries out a one-sided act for which there can 
be no well-founded assumption of consent” by “disposing over the genetic factors 
of [the designee with] the paternalistic intention of setting the course, in relevant 
respects, of the life history of the dependent person” (p. 64). This designee – or 
“dependent person” – “may interpret, but not revise or undo this intention,” 
thereby making the consequences of this original “intention” irreversible 
(Habermas, 2003, p. 64). In this way, liberal eugenics is problematic for 
Habermas (2003) because of the type of interpersonal relationship it creates “for 
which there is no precedent” (p. 63), resulting in ‘irreversible dependence’; it is a 
relationship of necessary asymmetry, wherein the “creation” can never switch 
places with the “creator”, resulting in “a specific type of paternalism” (p. 64). 
Because of this degree of control that the designer has to invade and alter the 
designee, and because there is no sense in which the designer and the designee 
can switch places in society, the result is that we have an “unprecedented and 
irreversible” form of paternalism over “biological destiny” (Kass, 2003, p. 52). 
In addition to harming the individual subject to eugenic interventions, 
Habermas believes that this sort of paternalism also harms society. For Habermas, 
the absence of “irreversible dependence” of one person on another is a necessary 
condition for moral agency in interpersonal relationships. While he admits that 
there are in fact asymmetrical relationships in society, he nonetheless maintains 
that we recognize them as an obstacle to “egalitarian interpersonal relations” 
(Habermas, 2003, p. 63) that ideally should not be present. Moreover, even if we 
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cannot in fact change this asymmetry of power, we can at least in principle 
change them and recognize them as being in need of change insofar as they go 
against our shared conceptions of human flourishing. Thus, the problem with 
“eugenic programming” is that it “establishes a permanent dependence between 
persons who know that one of them is principally barred from changing social 
places with the other” and “which is irreversible because it was established by 
ascription…is foreign to the reciprocal and symmetrical relations of mutual 
recognition proper to a moral and legal community of free and equal persons” 
(Habermas, 2003, p. 65). In the end, then, the irreversible act present in eugenic 
intervention is problematic because, in addition to harming the individual being 
genetically altered, it also permanently undermines our collective understanding 
of human flourishing by undermining the sorts of relationships we believe to be 
warranted when dealing with “free and equal persons.” 
 While Habermas (2003) conceives of the problematic relationship between 
designer and designee in terms of its “irreversible dependence” and “moral self-
understanding” (p. 72), I believe that it is perhaps better understood in terms of 
invasion and control. On this analysis, what is happening in this irreversible 
dependence is that the designer wields an unprecedented degree of control over 
the designee, as evidenced by the fact that the designee cannot meaningfully 
consent, contest, reappraise, or, on Habermas’ analysis, change places with the 
designer. Moreover, this sort of control, when recognized as a “dissonant case”, is 
necessarily a form of invasion. In wielding and acting upon this degree of control, 
the designer is in essence encroaching more decidedly upon the interior of the 
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person in question. In effect, as Habermas (2003) puts it, “the designer makes 
himself the co-author of the life of another, he intrudes – from the interior, one 
could say – into the other’s consciousness of her own autonomy” (p. 82). 
Ultimately, this intrusion is felt as a form of invasion – an assault from the outside 
– and it can in turn affect an individual’s “moral self-understanding” by causing a 
sort of fragmentation of identity or alienation, both of which are discussed in the 
following two sections of this chapter. 
 
Commodified Man and Fragmented Identity 
 
In addition to violating an open future and invading and controlling an individual, 
the commodification of that individual can also lead to fragmentation in his or her 
identity. According to legal scholar and bioethicist Michael Shapiro (1990), 
“Certain technologies fragment the unity of human life processes and the social 
structures that are built upon them, assault their givenness, and break them down” 
(pp. 334-5). The main examples he considers are reproductive technologies, life-
prolonging techniques, forms of human enhancement, and organ transplantation; 
but, on his account, essentially any technology that “presupposes knowledge that 
life forms and processes are alterable, manipulable…and predictable in ways that 
remind one of made rather than found or received entities” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 
337), would qualify as a fragmenting technology. Relating to chapter 3, this 
would likely include essentially any commodifying or fragmenting technologies. 
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 According to Shapiro (1990), part of the problem with the “fragmentation 
and reassembly of the world” is that it acts as a “challenge [to] our classification 
systems and, therefore, challenge [to] the core of our descriptive and normative 
thinking” (pp. 338-9). This is because “[f]ragmentation and reassembly create 
anomalies” – strange things “that simply do not fit our forms of thought and 
discourse” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 339). This fragmentation and reassembly leads to 
“strange beings that straddle personhood and thingness (or animalness or 
plantness)” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 371-2). When we consider certain fragmenting 
technologies with the capacity to significantly alter either the traits of existing 
beings (e.g. “persons, fetuses, some early embryos”) or possible persons or beings 
(e.g. “by reworking the genetic material in early embryos”), the source of this 
fragmentation (at least as it relates to how we think about personal identity) is 
how the technologies in question focus our attention and efforts of specific traits 
(Shapiro, 2005, p. 309). 
While there are a number of different kinds of variables that go into trait 
changes (e.g. rate of change; original role of the trait; global effect of the trait, and 
so on) (Shapiro, 2005, pp. 311-2), Shapiro says we should focus on what he refers 
to as the “intrusive” variables. Despite the associated pejorative connotations with 
a word like “intrusive”, when describing trait changes themselves Shapiro (2005) 
means for the term to be used in a descriptive, morally neutral fashion, referring 
simply to “the more “discontinuous” aspects of technological change of traits” (p. 
312 footnote 17), such as, e.g., genetic manipulations that alter what would have 
been the natural genetic course of an individual as opposed to genetic 
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manipulations that would simply enable the natural course to continue as 
projected. 
This neutral description of intrusive trait changes is contrasted with the 
idea of moral intrusion, which he describes by saying, “a technological choice or 
outcome is morally intrusive when it eludes or straddles categories that guide the 
application of moral criteria” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 357). With humans, then, 
fragmenting technologies – also often examples of intrusive trait changes – are 
morally intrusive because they treat human beings as being “fully manipulable 
physical systems” which acts as “an anomaly” because “it creates an intersection 
between sets – objects and persons – that we normally (if unreflectively) view as 
disjoint” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 357). According to Shapiro (1990), “Things that 
straddle categories bearing moral force are unsettling partly because the rules 
governing our dealings with them have lost at least some force” (p. 357). Thus, by 
turning humans into anomalous person-object entities, we are confronted with 
“things” that threaten our folk categorization of the world, which in turn leads to a 
sort of disequilibrium 
Such cognitive disquiet comes about in response to the apparent joining of 
things traditionally conceived of as being disjoint (humans and objects), which is 
a result of engaging in the kind of trait focusing normally only reserved for 
objects and applying that degree of focus to humans. As Shapiro (1990) points 
out: “The very idea of planned technological modification of traits entails an 
intensified focus on discrete traits” which ends up “amplifying the attention we 
historically paid to individual traits and their varying presentations, both in 
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ourselves and in others” (p. 314). Now, in itself, some degree of trait attention is 
perfectly benign; after all: “We do not, for the most part, view each other as 
indistinguishable or fungible, and we do not mate with or befriend traitless 
wraiths” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 314). The significance, to Shapiro (1990), seems to be 
partly in the “matter of planning” (p. 343). In the cases of trait changing 
technologies, he says, “we are necessarily centering our attention on a subset of 
attributes (variously described) to the exclusion (at least temporarily) of others” 
(Shapiro, 1990, pp. 343-4). This degree of attention on a specific trait, however, 
and the corresponding view that that trait is fungible – otherwise how would we 
consider it changeable, replaceable, and so on? – runs the risk of being too similar 
to how we view and treat objects. 
Specific to the object-person intersection mentioned above, Shapiro 
(1990) says, “If human beings or human material are dealt with in ways 
associated with objects, the fear is that we will transfer the object status to 
humans generally” (p. 351); thus, the “descent from person to object…is indeed 
the central nightmare of the new biology” (p. 354). While Shapiro focuses on 
genetic interventions as the harbingers of this descent, arguably any 
“biotechnology that comes closer and closer to the natural functions and 
mechanisms of the human body also raises doubts about what are the genuinely 
‘human’ qualities of the body” and therefore “poses the question of human 
identity as well as the distinction of body and machine” (Lenk and Biller-Adorno, 
2007, p. 178). In the end, a major part of what is morally intrusive about 
fragmentation technologies that create an object-person intersection – or perhaps 
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simply make the boundary between the two less clear – is the fact that they 
confuse our ability to place ‘objects’ and ‘persons’ into their appropriate moral 
categories. 
 This confusion of ‘object’-‘person’ moral categorization in turn affects an 
individual’s sense of personal identity. In answer to the question, “How do 
reduction, objectification, and mere use bear on personal identity, if at all?” 
Shapiro (2005) replies, “They would seem to affect identity as perceived by 
others and by oneself, and in some extreme situations the 
reduced/objectified/merely-used party may operate functionally as an object, from 
all viewpoints, including his own” (p. 343). Thus, the worry is that if the moral 
categories of ‘object’ and ‘person’ are not sufficiently separated as a consequence 
of some fragmenting or commodifying technology, then individuals might view 
themselves and others as mere objects; since they can no longer clearly 
distinguish themselves from objects, personal identity is fragmented to include 
both ‘person’ and ‘object’ associations with respect to the individual’s sense of 
self.  
To see how this fragmentation of identity in a person might come about, 
Shapiro (2005) asks us to “[c]ompare technological alteration of traits with the 
modifications of machines” (p. 344). He says, “If we are doing the same sort of 
thing to persons as we do to machines [then] perhaps we are objectifying persons 
by assimilating – reducing – them to things.” (Shapiro, 2005, p. 344) His 
comparison example involves “adjusting the toaster from “toast” to “bagel” [and] 
switching Donovan the quarterback from “pass” to “run”” (Shapiro, 2005, p. 
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344). From the outside, this adjustment “from “toast” to “bagel”” and “from 
“pass” to “run””” (Shapiro, 2005, p. 344) may look like the same sort of thing. If 
so, the concern is that those outside will come to view or treat Donovan in some 
meaningful way like they would a toaster, and Donovan will need to incorporate 
that into his psyche. The underlying concern here is that if an individual sees 
himself or herself as being treated like an object – in either action or rhetoric and 
attitude – then the result is a fragmentation of personal identity as a person, to 
personal identity as some sort of person-object hybrid, or perhaps, more 
worryingly, solely object. 
 In addition to the specific impact of this fragmentation of personal 
identity, Shapiro (2005) is also concerned with what he calls the “conceptual 
impact” of “the known availability or prospect of technological modification of 
traits…on the concept of personal identity” (p. 316). For Shapiro (2005), 
“conceptual impact” with respect to personal identity is not an easy thing to 
define; however, he offers as a rough estimation the idea that if our concept of 
personal identity gets “battered in some nonstraightforward senses” (p. 317), then 
that is sufficient grounds for claiming that there is a conceptual impact afoot. 
With the example of technological intervention and its conceptual impact on 
personal identity, Shapiro focuses on the sort of cognitive dissonance that happens 
to our sense of self and understanding of humanity that results when people are 
treated increasingly like decomposable units, fragmented into components and 
reassembled into seemingly new beings. 
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 For an example of how conceptual impact works, we can return to the oft 
used example in the commodification debate: prostitution. If, as Anderson and 
Radin proclaim, sex is meant to be a shared, reciprocal good “founded upon a 
mutual recognition of the partners as sexually attracted to each other and as 
affirming an intimate relationship in their mutual offering of themselves to each 
other” (Anderson, 1993, p. 154), then the selling of sex – which does not fall 
under the reciprocal, shared good paradigm – creates a sort of conceptual “split” 
(Shapiro, 2005, p. 318). Similarly, consider the example of pregnancy and 
surrogacy – the fact that a single child can have both genetic mother and a 
gestational mother. This is a recent technological phenomenon that results in the 
“unbundling” of our concept of motherhood, which used to contain both genetic 
and gestational components automatically. 
 This sort of conceptual impact can also occur when concepts previously 
thought to be separate are suddenly joined together. Considering again the issue 
of prostitution, there is not simply the dissolution of sex and mutual sharing that is 
at issue; there is also the joining of sex and money, which are usually treated as 
functionally non-overlapping concepts. Hence, when they are found conceptually 
intertwined, there is a similarly problematic conceptual impact like we had when 
concepts previously held together were separated. 
 Note that the presence or potential for a problematic conceptual impact 
resulting from a novel bundling or unbundling does not necessarily entail that this 
(un)bundling is immoral. For example, as a liberal society and as liberally-minded 
people we may wish to say that gay marriage is not immoral, even though it 
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unbundle from “marriage” the notion of “heterosexuality” and bundles to 
marriage the notion of “homosexuality.” Similarly, if we go so far as to legalize 
plural marriage we will unbundles from “marriage” the notion that it is limited to 
two people and bundle to it the notion that there can be many. Any of these 
unbundlings and subsequent bundlings will have problematic conceptual impacts 
(as seen by raucous contemporary debate and outcry). But we may not wish to say 
that such changes are immoral. 
 With this understanding of conceptual impact, we can see that there are at 
least two distinct ways in which commodification and fragmenting technologies 
are potentially morally problematic. First, by focusing attention on specific traits 
and viewing them as malleable, changeable, upgradeable, and so on, these traits 
are therefore treated as decomposable and separable from the conception of a 
person’s identity. For certain traits and trait changes, this perceived separability 
may not be particularly problematic. More specifically, if the traits being changed 
are not central to a person’s conception of personal identity, or if the changes in 
question are relatively minor in degree, then the conceptual impact may ultimately 
be minor. For example, to a woman for whom hairstyles are fairly unimportant to 
core identity, the whimsical change from bob to bouffant may be of little 
consequence; for Pope’s Belinda, however, such change would lead to nothing 
less than the invocation of the gods. Locks aside, when we face more central 
attributes and more extensive changes, the result will likely be an instability in our 
view of personal identity (Shapiro, 2005, p. 327). 
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 The second morally problematic form of conceptual impact that might 
occur with commodifying and fragmenting technologies is the ‘bundling’ together 
of seemingly disparate concepts. As above, the conceptual impact and its effect on 
moral understanding is arguably linked to the centrality and importance the given 
concepts have to personal identity. Returning to the marriage example, it may be 
that marriage is a feature of such fundamental importance in the lives of the 
population that the conceptual impact impacted by gay or plural marriage is of 
near astronomical proportions, thereby indicating a genuine moral intrusion. 
However, the more mundane and benign example where we have unbundled 
“cow” from “leather” and bundled to the latter “polyurethane” – thereby creating 
the fashion anomaly “pleather” – is of little conceptual and moral impact (except, 
e.g., on Project Runway). Perhaps things would be different if we were cows. 
With respect to personal identity, the more problematic concepts that are 
likely to be brought together are ‘person’ and ‘object’. As previously mentioned, 
there is a perceived “central nightmare” that if the categories of ‘person’ and 
‘object’ are too closely associated, then the moral status of ‘object’ – and the 
corresponding way we treat and think about objects – will be transferred to 
persons, resulting in a “descent from person to object” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 354). 
This is arguably the form of personal identity fragmentation that would occur as a 
result of the invasion and control discussed in the previous section. When “the 
designer makes himself the co-author of the life of another” (Habermas, 2003, p. 
82), he or she treats the other essentially as an object, since in our accepted 
concepts only objects actually have designers (this is, of course, unless you 
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include a religious perspective wherein human individuals are designed by a 
creative intelligence; but this is outside the purview of this dissertation). 
Alternatively, the designer may cause fragmentation in the designee through 
another sort of bundling, since the designee now must conceive of his or her 
personal identity as including ‘self’-authorship and ‘other’-authorship, when 
typically ‘other’ does not pervade one’s sense of self in this fashion. Whatever the 
method – whether conceptual impact via bundling or unbundling – fragmenting 
and commodifying technologies, rhetoric, and attitudes can negatively affect and 
fragment an individual’s sense of personal identity, thereby making these 
technologies, etc., morally problematic. 
 
Commodified Man and Alienation 
 
In addition to the potential problems of a closed future, invasion and control of a 
person, and fragmentation of identity, the commodification of individuals can also 
lead to a person feeling a sense of alienation. As briefly indicated in chapter 3, 
according to Radin, there are two possible types of alienating responses to 
commodification: First, “If the discourse of fungibility” – that is, the view that 
one or more of one’s personal attributes is separable from oneself – “is partially 
made one’s own, it creates disorientation of the self that experiences the distortion 
of its own personhood” (Radin, 1987, p. 1907). As a sort of classic Marxist 
example, “workers who internalize market rhetoric conceive of their own labor as 
a commodity separate from themselves as persons; they dissociate their daily life 
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from their own self-conception” (Radin, 1987, p. 1907). Second, if the discourse 
of fungibility is not internalized – and to the extent that it is not internalized – “it 
creates alienation between those who use the discourse and those whose 
personhood they wrong in doing so” (Radin, 1987, p. 1907). As a parallel to the 
above example, “workers who do not conceive of their labor as a commodity are 
alienated from others who do, because, in the workers' view, people who conceive 
of their labor as a commodity fail to see them as whole persons” (Radin, 1987, p. 
1907). 
On Radin’s account of alienation, then, the difference between the two 
types of alienation results essentially from whether or not the individual in 
question internalizes (or “appropriates”, as Habermas would say) the surrounding 
commodifying rhetoric and attitudes. Insofar as the rhetoric is internalized, the 
individual suffers from a sort of self-alienation; insofar as it is not internalized, he 
or she suffers from a sort of alienation from others and society. 
 Radin’s analysis of alienation is at least partly derived from the work of 
Karl Marx, who in his “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844” 
discussed the alienating effects of “Estranged Labour”. As Marx (1978) saw it, 
labor doesn’t just produce commodities; it also reproduces itself and produces the 
worker himself (or herself) as a commodity, and it “does so in the proportion in 
which it produces commodities generally” (p. 71). Marx therefore saw a sort of 
inverse relationship between the power of overall commodification in a society 
and the power (or value) of the individual, “With the increasing value of the 
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world of things [proceeding] in direct proportion the devaluation of the world of 
men” (Marx, 1978, p. 71).  
According to Marx’s analysis, the generation of this inverse relationship, 
and its resulting alienation, occur essentially as follows: First, “The worker puts 
his life into the object; but now his life no longer belongs to him but to the 
objects” (Marx, 1978, p. 72) . Moreover, “Whatever the product of his labour is, 
he is not” (Marx, 1978, p. 72). As such, “the greater this activity, the greater is the 
worker’s lack of objects” and “the greater this product, the less is he himself” 
(Marx, 1978, p. 72). This means that “[t]he alienation of the worker in his 
product” represents “not only that his labour becomes an object, an external 
existence, but [also] that it exist outside him, independently, as something alien to 
him, and that it becomes a power of its own confronting him” (Marx, 1978, p. 72), 
In a sense, then, the life of the worker becomes transferred from himself to the 
object of his labor, which feeds off him as a parasite and becomes stronger as he 
becomes weaker. 
Marx therefore sees not only an inverse relationship between the world of 
commodities and the world of men, but in fact an antagonistic one; commodities 
themselves become “hostile” forces, generating alienation for the individuals who 
create them. Moreover, by experiencing these commodities as hostile forces, 
Marx says that the worker ends up becoming estranged or alienated not only from 
the commodities themselves, but also from his own self. He asks, “How would the 
worker come to face the product of his activity as a stranger, were it not that in the 
very act of production he was estranging himself from himself?” (Marx, 1978, p. 
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73) After all, the product of labor “is…but the summary of the activity of 
production,” so if this product “is alienation, production itself must be active 
alienation, the alienation of activity, the activity of alienation” (Marx, 1978, pp. 
73-4). In the end, “the estrangement of the object of labour is merely [the 
summary of] the estrangement, the alienation, in the activity of labour itself” 
(Marx, 1978, p. 74). Because Marx (1978) sees a person’s labor as “belong[ing] 
to his essential being” (p. 74) – which in Radin’s (1987) terms would mean that it 
is something “integral to personhood” (p. 1906), or in Feinberg’s (1980) analysis 
an important part of a person’s self-determination (p.145) – the experience of his 
labor as something alien to himself means that the worker inevitably feels 
alienated from himself, because his very person has become fragmented and 
alienating.  
 This estrangement from one’s own labor in turn leads to an individual 
feeling alienated from others. Marx (1978) asks the question, “If the product of 
labour is alien to me, if it confronts me as an alien power, to whom, then, does it 
belong? If my own activity does not belong to me, if it is an alien, a coerced 
activity, to whom, then, does it belong?” (p. 77). His answer: “To a being other 
than me” (Marx, 1978, p. 77). According to Marx (1978), “If the product of 
labour does not belong to the worker, if it confronts him as an alien power, this 
can only be because it belongs to some other man than the worker” (p. 77). 
Moreover, “If the worker’s activity is a torment to him, to another it must be 
delight and his life’s joy” (Marx, 1978, p. 77). And, since “[n]ot the gods, not 
nature, but only man himself can be this alien power over man,” this means that 
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the “other” must be some other man (Marx, 1978, p. 78). The result of man’s 
estranged labor is therefore ultimately an alienation and “estrangement of man 
from man” (Marx, 1978, p. 77).  
Moreover, unlike Radin (1987) who thinks that this estrangement 
essentially occurs between those who internalize the commodification rhetoric 
and those who do not (p. 1907), on Marx’s account it looks as though everyone 
who internalizes the commodifying rhetoric will experience this estrangement 
from others. He says, “Every self-estrangement of man from himself and from 
nature appears in the relation in which he places himself and nature to men other 
than and differentiated from himself” (Marx, 1978, p. 78). As such, relationships 
with every other man become estranged relationships. 
This direct relationship between alienation from self and alienation from 
others was further explored by neo-Marxist Herbert Marcuse, whose later 
interpretation of Marx likewise maintains that these two types of alienation 
necessarily occur simultaneously. According to Marcuse (1941), “Labor separated 
from its object is, in the last analysis, an ‘alienation of man from man’” (p. 279). 
In labor, “individuals are isolated from and set against each other. They are linked 
in the commodities they exchange rather than in their persons” (Marcuse 1941, p. 
279). Consequently: “Man’s alienation from himself is simultaneously an 
estrangement from his fellow men” (Marcuse, 1941, p. 279). In this respect, then, 
Radin’s division of commodification as resulting two types of alienation is 
practical only in terms of categorization; in the real world – should we agree with 
Marx and Marcuse – they will necessarily be present concurrently. 
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Returning to Habermas’ (2003) analysis of how commodification and the 
closed future lead to the experience of a co-authored life, we can see how this 
intrusion “from the interior…into the other’s consciousness of her own 
autonomy” (p. 82) relates to the types of alienation just described. “Insofar as the 
genetically altered person feels that the scope for a possible use of her ethical 
freedom has been intentionally changed by a prenatal design,” Habermas (2003) 
says, “she may suffer from the consciousness of sharing the authorship of her own 
life and her own destiny with someone else” (p. 82). Moreover, “[t]his sort of 
alienating dilution or fracturing of one’s own identity” functionally represents 
“that an important boundary has become permeable” (Habermas, 2003, p. 82). 
Namely, it represents that “the deontological shell which assures the inviolability 
of the person, the uniqueness of the individual, and the irreplaceability of one’s 
own subjectivity” has been breached, and is now open to external manipulations 
(Habermas, 2003, p. 82). Hence, Habermas (2003) conceives of alienation as 
“dilution or fracturing of one’s own identity” (p. 82), which arguably is akin to 
Shapiro’s analysis of fragmentation. But, this fragmentation follows the pattern 
Marx described as to how the experience of commodities as alien, hostile forces 
leads to self-alienation. When the individual, like the worker, sees part of his 
genes, his neuro-chemical makeup, his essential self, and so on, as a stranger to 
himself and the result of an outside source or influence, then he can become 
estranged from that part of his self, and perhaps over time even his entire sense of 
self. 
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 This self-alienation will in turn lead the individual in question to feel 
alienated from others: the recognition that this estrangement from his or her own 
personhood requires that that personhood, in effect, belong to another leads to him 
or her feeling alienated from others. If the individual can point to a specific 
invader, like Habermas’ designee who can pick out the designer, then there is a 
particular ‘other’ from which he or she can be alienated. However, when we move 
away from Habermas’ example of a single individual engaging in specific 
commodifying acts to a broad commodification example of a society engaging in 
widespread commodifying rhetoric and attitudes, then there is no one person that 
the commodified, alienated person can point to as the ‘other’. This is arguably a 
better extension of Radin’s (1987) understanding of the “alienation between those 
who use the discourse and those whose personhood they wrong in doing so” (p. 
1907); here, everyone using the discourse – i.e. everyone involved in the 
commodifying rhetoric – constitutes the ‘other’ from which the commodified 
individual is alienated. If, in the end, the entire society or the structure of the 
society itself is guilty of some form of broad commodification, then the alienated 
individual may ultimately feel alienated from his or her entire surroundings in 
addition to his or her own self. 
 
Commodified Man and Objectification 
 
In addition to feeling invaded and alienated, an individual being commodified is 
also likely to feel objectified. While nomologically similar, there is at present a 
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specific theory of objectification that is distinct from commodification, so it 
warrants its own discussion section as part of understanding the present overall 
theory. Martha Nussbaum (1995) suggests that there are at least seven different 
plausible conceptions at play when we are discussing objectification. First, is 
instrumentality, whereby “The objectifier treats the object as a tool of his or her 
purposes” (Nussbaum, 1995, p. 257). Second, there is the denial of autonomy, 
whereby “The objectifier treats the object as lacking in autonomy and self-
determination” (Nussbaum, 1995, p. 257). Third is inertness, wherein, “The 
objectifier treats the object as lacking in agency, and perhaps even activity” 
(Nussbaum, 1995, p. 257). Fourth, we have fungibility, when “The objectifier 
treats the object as interchangeable (a) with other objects of the same type, and/or 
(b) with objects of other types” (Nussbaum, 1995, p. 257).  Fifth, there is 
violability, wherein “The objectifier treats the object as lacking in boundary-
integrity, as something that is permissible to break up, smash, break down” 
(Nussbaum, 1995, p. 257). Sixth is ownership, when “The objectifier treats the 
object as something that is owned by another, can be bought or sold, etc” 
(Nussbaum, 1995, p. 257). Finally, we have the denial of subjectivity, where “The 
objectifier treats the object as something whose experience and feelings (if any) 
need not be taken into account” (Nussbaum, 1995, p. 257). 
 Arguably many (or all) of these types of objectification, or combinations 
thereof, qualify as the sort of commodification and fragmentation discussed in 
chapter 3 and earlier sections of this chapter. For example, the second version 
(denial of autonomy) looks like Feinberg’s concern about violating an 
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individual’s open future; the fourth version (fungibility) is a primary component 
in Radin’s analysis of commodification; the fifth version (violability), fits with 
both Habermas’ understanding of commodification as a form of invasion and 
Shapiro’s view that commodification leads to fragmentation; and the sixth version 
(ownership) is essentially the traditional view of commodification. The other 
versions (first, third, and seventh) might also qualify as the sort of pervasive 
commodification rhetoric and attitudes that we are concerned with respect to 
broad (e.g. rhetorical) commodification. 
 Given this consideration of how objectification, at least roughly speaking, 
is a form of the kind of commodification with which we are concerned, the 
primary focus of this section is going to be on how objectification affects the 
person being objectified. In order to understand these effects of objectification, 
we will look more closely at the psychological theory called ‘objectification 
theory’, focusing on the work of Barbara Frederickson and Tomi-Ann Roberts. 
They emphasis in particular the consequences of sexual objectification as 
experienced by women; however, since, as Nussbaum points out, there are several 
available types of objectification not limited to sexual objectification, I believe 
that we can use their analysis of the effects of sexual objectification as a plausible 
illustration of the potential effects of these other forms of objectification as well. 
Moreover, when we consider the contention by such scholars as Donna Dickenson 
(2007) that the various forms of commodifying technologies act in such a way as 
to subject all those commodified – both male and female alike – “to the 
objectification that was previously largely confined to women’s experience” (p.8), 
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then we have reason to believe that the objectification effects of being 
commodified may indeed be quite similar to those of being sexually objectified. 
According to Frederickson and Roberts (1997), “The common thread 
running through all forms of sexual objectification is the experience of being 
treated as a body (or collection of body parts) valued predominantly for its use to 
(or consumption by) others” (p. 174). Using Nussbaum’s different types of 
objectification, Frederickson and Robert are using a combination of at least the 
first (instrumentality – in terms of being valued mainly for consumption by 
others) and third (inertness – in terms of being just a body) types. They are also 
using an understanding of objectification as reducibility to parts or functions that 
are taken as representative of the value of the whole. In another description of 
sexual objectification, Frederickson and Roberts (1997) say, “Sexual 
objectification occurs whenever woman’s body, body parts, or sexual functions 
are separated out from her person, reduced to the status of mere instruments, or 
regarded as if they were capable of representing her” (p. 175). The closest parallel 
to this that we have in Nussbaum would be something along the lines of a hybrid 
of versions four (fungibility) and five (violability), since the bodily integrity of 
the woman being objectified is broken down into decomposable ‘units’, which are 
then treated as exchangeable with similar ‘units’ in other women. Thus, we have a 
view of objectification wherein a body or body parts are seen are separable from a 
person, or a person reducible to a mere body or body parts, and these parts, which 
are functionally interchangeable with similar parts in any other, are in turn 
thought freely available for exploitation by the objectifier. 
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In their analysis, Frederickson and Roberts focus on the effects of 
experiencing “objectifying gaze”. They contend that “The most subtle and 
deniable way sexualized evaluation is enacted – and arguably the most ubiquitous 
– is through gaze, or visual inspection of the body” (Frederickson and Roberts, 
1997, p. 175). According to their view, there are three main “related arenas” in 
which a woman might experience objectifying gaze, namely: “within actual 
interpersonal and social encounters”; “in visual media that depict interpersonal 
and social encounters”; and “in people’s encounters with visual media that 
spotlight bodies and body parts and seamlessly align viewers with an implicit 
sexualizing gaze” (Frederickson and Roberts, 1997, p. 176). This third 
manifestation, Frederickson and Roberts (1997) claim, is “perhaps most insidious 
manner in which objectifying gaze infuses American culture” (p. 176). In brief, 
“objectifying gaze occurs in certain kinds of objectifying social or interpersonal 
encounters and in visual media depicting such interpersonal encounters or 
focusing on specific body aspects” Frederickson and Roberts, 1997, p. 176). 
These specific arenas aside, however, I believe that the sort of “ubiquitous” nature 
of objectifying gaze fits well with our understanding of broad commodification as 
being an ever-present rhetoric of attitude of the thing or individual in question 
being open to commodification. 
 The primary harm that results from this sort of ubiquitous objectifying 
gaze is that it eventually leads, in most cases, the individual being objectified to in 
turn engage in self-objectification. According to Frederickson and Roberts (1997), 
objectifying treatment “coaxes girls and women to adopt a peculiar view of self. 
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Objectification theory posits that the cultural milieu of objectification functions to 
socialize girls and women to, at some level, treat themselves as object to be 
looked at and evaluated” (p. 177). Thus, beginning “with compliance to 
minimally sufficient external pressures,” this objectification socialization 
“proceeds through interpersonal identification, and ends with individuals claiming 
ownership of socialized values and attitudes, often by incorporating them into 
their sense of self” (Frederickson and Roberts, 1997, p. 177). To use Habermas’ 
terminology, the individual “appropriates” the objectifier’s view and expectation 
that she (or he) is open to objectification – therefore reducible to a mere body, 
body part, or function, interchangeable with similar parts in others, and freely 
available for use. For Radin, this would mean that the objectified individual has 
made the discourse of objectification (or, in our case, commodification) partially 
her or his own. 
 As a result of this internalization of the objectifying attitude, the 
individuals being objectified can adopt an “observer’s perspective on self” and 
“come to view themselves as objects or “sights” to be appreciated by others” 
(Frederickson and Roberts, 1997, p. 179). According to objectification theory, this 
leads “to a form of self-consciousness, characterized by habitual monitoring of the 
body’s outward appearance” (Frederickson and Roberts, 1997, p. 179). Some 
studies indicate that those women who self-monitor often view their relative 
attractiveness in terms of exchange value, something to be “good treatment in 
relationships” and “social and economic power”, thereby behooving them “to 
anticipate the repercussions of their appearance… [and] to be their own first 
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surveyors” (Frederickson and Roberts, 1997, p. 178) “as a strategy…to help 
determine how other people will treat them, which has clear implications for their 
quality of life” (Frederickson and Roberts, 1997, p. 180). However, Frederickson 
and Roberts (1997) maintain that “This habit of self-conscious body-monitoring is 
far from trivial” (p. 180). Instead, they “propose that it can profoundly disrupt a 
woman’s flow of consciousness” because “significant portions of women’s 
conscious attention can often be usurped by concerns related to real or imagined, 
present or anticipated, surveyors of their physical appearance” (Frederickson and 
Roberts, 1997, p. 180). Moreover, “This habitual body monitoring…can create a 
predictable set of [negative] subjective experiences” (Frederickson and Roberts, 
1997, p. 180). 
 Included in this set of subjective experiences that result from (self-) 
objectification are: increased shame and anxiety, loss of peak motivational states, 
and lack of awareness of internal bodily states. According to Frederickson and 
Roberts (1997), “The negative emotion of shame occurs when people evaluate 
themselves relative to some internalized or cultural ideal and come up short” (p. 
181). Over time, this attitude towards oneself often becomes recurrent, difficult to 
alleviate, and global (Frederickson and Roberts, 1997, p. 182). They point out, 
“Individuals experiencing shame tend to attribute their short-comings globally to 
the self in its totality (e.g., “I am a bad person”) rather than narrowly to their 
specific actions (e.g., “I did something bad”)” (Frederickson and Roberts, 1997, p. 
181). Moreover, “The extent to which body “correction” is motivated by shame 
elevates the task of meeting societal standards of beauty to a moral obligation” 
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(Frederickson and Roberts, 1997, p. 182). Thus, once an individual has 
internalized the objectification rhetoric and ideals of a society, she or he might 
ultimately see it as a moral obligation to fulfill those ideals. 
 This shame is often associated by anxiety, which Frederickson and 
Roberts (1997) describe by saying, “People experience the negative emotion of 
anxiety when they anticipate danger or threats to self; distinct from fear, however, 
these threats often remain ambiguous” (p. 182). With respect to appearance 
anxiety in particular, Frederickson and Roberts (1997) say, “Not knowing exactly 
when and how one’s body will be looked at and evaluated can create anxiety 
about potential exposure” (p. 182). More broadly, we can say that an individual 
who lives in a society wherein one might frequently be exposed to objectification 
(or commodification) experiences frequent anxiety over not knowing exactly 
when, where, or by whom she or he will be so objectified (or commodified). 
 This anxiety, which requires the individual “to maintain an almost chronic 
vigilance” with respect to her body and her observer’s perspective of self 
(Frederickson and Roberts, 1997, p. 183), in turn leads to the diminishment of 
“peak motivational states”. As defined by Frederickson and Roberts (1997), peak 
motivational states are “those rare moments during which we feel we are truly 
living, uncontrolled by others, creative and joyful” (p. 183). Women in highly 
objectifying cultures end up experiencing a diminishment of these states in one of 
two ways: First, women “are interrupted when actual others call attention to the 
appearance or functions of her body” (Frederickson and Roberts, 1997, p. 183). 
Second, trying to maintain “an observer’s perspective on physical self forces 
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women to simultaneously experience their bodies as “objects” as well as 
capacities” (Frederickson and Roberts, 1997, p. 184). When considering 
commodification, this analysis would basically mean that an individual being 
commodified could suffer from a diminishment of peak experiences in one of two 
ways: First, when being subjected to acts of narrow commodification, such as 
being actively objectified by receiving a “cat call”, actively invaded in terms of 
some external co-author, and so on. Second, when being subjected to broad 
commodification, which imposes an ever-present “observer’s perspective” and 
forces the individual to see himself or herself as both ‘person’ and ‘object’, ‘self’ 
and ‘other’, and so on. 
 Active adoption of an observer’s perspective also results in a lack of 
awareness of internal bodily states. According to Frederickson and Roberts 
(1997), this lack of awareness of internal bodily states leads to feeling that the self 
and body are “alienated” or “distant” (p. 184). An individual is no longer able to 
read his or her own “physiological cues”, and instead looks for external cues that 
might indicate an underlying physical state. One proposed explanation is that 
“Because women are vigilantly aware of their outer bodily appearance, they may 
be left with fewer perceptual resources available for attending to inner body 
experience” (Frederickson and Roberts, 1997, p. 185). Another, more disturbing, 
explanation is that perpetually adopting the observer’s perspective may actually 
lead women to have their own first-person perspectives on their selves completely 
supplanted by an observer’s perspective on the self (Frederickson and Roberts, 
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1997, p. 187); they therefore cannot read their internal bodily states simply 
because they have become so far removed from their own sense of self. 
 As a result of this set of negative subjective experiences caused by an 
individual’s habitual body monitoring – increased shame and anxiety, loss of peak 
motivational states, and lack of awareness of internal bodily states – Frederickson 
and Roberts indicate a number of potential mental health risks. In particular, they 
discuss the increased likelihood that an individual undergoing these subjective 
experiences will also suffer from unipolar depression, sexual dysfunction and 
eating disorders (Frederickson and Roberts, 1997, p. 185). However, I believe that 
the more distressing consequence is the plausible “loss of self” (Frederickson and 
Roberts, 1997, p. 187), or “silencing” of the self (Frederickson and Roberts, 1997, 
p. 193). When there is a self that is experiencing depression, dysfunction of 
disorders, there still is hope that these negatives can be alleviated and the 
underlying self healed; but with the self gone and entirely subsumed by an other’s 
perspective, it is not clear that the original self can be saved. 
 Frederickson and Roberts (1997) do allow that “an observer’s perspective 
on the body might become internalized to varying degrees” (p. 180). As such “We 
would expect to find individual differences in the degree to which girls and 
women self-objectify” (Frederickson and Roberts, 1997, p. 180). Moreover, there 
are likely to be differences in an individual’s experience of being objectified from 
either himself or herself, or from others. Accordingly: “some women may have 
internalized and consequently be dogged by observers’ perspectives on their 
bodies in most of the contexts in which they find themselves”; others, however, 
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“may only be made aware of these perspectives when, for example, they receive a 
“cat call” while walking down a busy street” (Frederickson and Roberts, 1997, p. 
180). Nonetheless, Frederickson and Roberts (1997) maintain “that in a culture 
that objectifies the female body, whatever girls and women do, the potential 
always exists for their thoughts and actions to be interrupted by images of how 
their bodies appear” (p. 180). For commodification, this would mean that in a 
highly commoditized society – one with ever-present market rhetoric or 
fragmentation rhetoric – an individual will, in essence, always have the “social 
potential” for being commodified. 
 
Conclusion: Commodified Man as Object 
 
While throughout this chapter we have seen a seemingly wide array of potential 
commodification effects – physical, emotional, and attitudinal – they can all 
reasonably be cashed out as variations of a view wherein man is seen as object. 
Returning to the beloved potter v pot scenario from chapter 1, you will perhaps 
recall that this relationship was fundamentally and irreversibly asymmetrical, with 
the potter having unquestionable control over the creation and outcome of the pot. 
This level of control denies the possibility of the pot having an open future (a la 
Feinberg), and demands a level of power over the pot that becomes genuinely 
invasive (a la Habermas). Moreover, the inherent right of the potter over the pot 
necessitates that the pot has, at a minimum, a co-authored life (with the potter as 
co-author), which can lead to a sense of alienation (a la Radin and Marx) and – 
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given the power and righteousness of the potter – a sense of unrighteousness, 
shame, etc. (a la Frederickson and Roberts). And finally, insofar as we do not 
believe that people and pots ought to both be categorized as ‘objects’, the fact of 
the person being treated like a pot results in a fragmentation to identity and is ergo 
immoral (a la Shapiro). Contra Job our attitude here should not be one of self-
despite, and we should be most unwilling to repent to dust and ashes. 
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Chapter 5 
MAN COMMODIFYING 
 
Perhaps more interesting than the feelings of those individuals being commodified 
are the correlative attitudes of those individuals who are doing the commodifying 
(including, of course, the possibility that one might be both). I say more 
interesting because, in working under the assumption that we might be heading 
towards some near or distant future in which human enhancement technologies 
will be widely available and more widely used, then at present, we are more likely 
the ones doing the commodifying. In our quest to establish an ethics for the future 
it is not enough to hypothesize about those who will be harmed in the wake of our 
decisions now and what their emotional responses might be; we need also to 
consider what we ourselves will become in the making of these decisions and 
whether, having thus made them, we will continue to be “a mankind worthy of the 
human name” (Jonas, 1979, p. 42). 
 While I had originally intended to do this by separating the matter of man 
commodifying into two distinct chapters – one in which man extends this drive to 
commodify outwards and against others; and another in which this drive is 
extended inwards, and man engages in a form of self-commodification – as the 
two chapters progressed it became increasingly clear to me that my desire for the 
outward-inward dichotomy to present itself along clear lines would simply not be 
translatable into the actual attitudes as we find them. The further I delved, the 
more convinced I became that beneath this drive on both sides of this illusory 
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dichotomy was essentially the same sort of impulse, one that would ultimately 
manifest itself differently depending on the commodifying agent and the 
commodifying object. I have therefore decided to keep the two types of 
commodification manifestation together under one chapter.  
For each of the following three sections, then, I will be considering both 
the inherent commodification attitudes of the individuals who are commodifying 
others as well as the inherent commodification attitudes of the individuals who are 
commodifying themselves. I will consider first the commodification manifestation 
that is outward directing, then the manifestation that is inward directing, typically 
devoting greater space to the former. In doing this, I do not mean necessarily to 
imply that the outward directing form of commodification is the prior or more 
fundamental of the two (such as with Freud, who in discussing sadism and 
masochism considers sadism, which is outward directing, to be the primary, 
fundamental impulse, whereas masochism is essentially sadism turned inwards 
when it cannot achieve an appropriate outside outlet. After discussing some of the 
features of the respective type of commodification and its corresponding 
commodification attitude, in both outward and inward manifestation, I will 
highlight what I take to be some of the key features of the relevant attitude of the 
commodifying man in that section. 
I will begin in the next section with the notion of commodifying man as a 
manufacturer. Since we ended the previous chapter with the general conclusion 
that a commodified man is essentially an object or product of manufacture (e.g. a 
pot), I believe it is most appropriate to begin our discussion of commodifying man 
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with the correlate member of this relationship: the manufacturer (or, more 
broadly, the objectifier). After this, I will turn to the related notion of 
commodifying man as master. It is related, I will argue, because it is hard to 
conceive of a manufacturer who does not consider himself or herself a sort of 
master of the object of manufacture; however I also treat it separately because the 
defining attitudinal feature is different and, moreover, we can arguably consider a 
master who is not also a manufacturer. Next, I draw out the more menacing 
implications of the attitude of a commodifying man, namely that it represents a 
form of sadism when directed outwards, or masochism when directed inwards. 
Finally, I explain and expand upon what I believe to be the main underlying 
impulses of the commodifying attitude. 
 
Commodifying Man as Manufacturer 
 
For dealing with the notion of commodifying man as a manufacturer we will be 
taking two main approaches. First, in considering the general attitude of man 
commodifying an ‘other’, we will look to the more specific case of engineering or 
enhancing children, and the resulting manufacturer-product dichotomy that usurps 
the treasured parent-child relationship. For this, we will emphasize the work of 
bioethicist Leon Kass and the President’s Council of Bioethics (2003). We will 
also discuss some of the implications of this view when it extends past the parent-
child relationship to human-human relations more generally. Next, we will 
explore the role of man as manufacturer of himself or herself, drawing mainly 
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from the work of bioethicist and feminist scholar Kathryn Pauly Morgan (1991) 
on cosmetic surgery. Finally, having thus illustrated the manufacture-like 
relationship that such commodification encourages, we will consider some of the 
general traits of a commodifying man acting as a manufacturer. 
 In 2003, the President’s Council on Bioethics (henceforth referred to as 
the Council) – chaired by Leon Kass – critically explored a number of proposed 
biotechnological “pursuits” of “happiness” – better children, superior 
performance, ageless bodies, and happy souls. While we might arguably consider 
all of these “pursuits” to be areas subject to potential human commodification, the 
pursuit of better children is where the attitude of commodifying man as 
manufacturer is perhaps most apparent, and so we will focus our efforts here. In 
analyzing this particular pursuit, the Council considers at least three general 
arguments about the potentially objectionable effects of biologically engineering 
humans – particularly one’s offspring: (1) a concern about changing the parent-
child relationship; (2) the moving of procreation toward manufacture; and (3) 
expanding parental choice and mastery over the next generation. 
 For the first argument – the change in the parent-child relationship – the 
Council points out the already present shifting parental attitude from gift to 
conditional existence. According to the Council (2003), “the practice of prenatal 
screening has established as a cultural norm (or at least as a culturally acceptable 
norm)” the idea “that admission to life is no longer unconditional, that certain 
conditions or traits are disqualifying” (p. 36). Thus, they believe, “there appears to 
be a growing consensus, both in the medical community and in society at large, 
  137 
that a child-to-be should meet a certain (for now, minimal) standard to be entitled 
to be born” (President’s Council, 2003, p. 36). This growing practice of making 
the existence of children conditional upon them meeting certain minimum 
standards – increasingly common as a result of the widespread practice of prenatal 
genetic diagnosis – when expanded to the eventual choosing of qualities an 
individual wants for his or her children, is thought to cause a shift in parental, as 
well as societal, attitudes towards prospective children. Specifically, according to 
the Council (2003), it is a shift “from simple acceptance to judgment and control, 
from seeing a child as an unconditionally welcome gift to seeing him as a 
conditionally acceptable product” (p. 37). 
 Now, we might question the Council’s assumption that at present children 
are, in point of fact, welcomed unconditionally; we might also take issue with the 
presumption that if not viewed as an “unconditionally welcome gift” then the only 
other option is to be viewed as “a conditionally acceptable product”. However, let 
us bracket these concerns and see what follows if the Council is indeed correct in 
their futurological assessment: If the Council is right, then coinciding with this 
perception of one’s child “as a conditionally acceptable product” are heightened 
quality standards and a diminished tolerance of imperfection. While selecting 
against disease primarily functions to eliminate parents’ fears about any potential 
future ailments their child might have, selecting for specific traits seems to add to 
parents’ hopes and expectations about their child’s future potential for excellence. 
According to the Council (2003), this ““better” child may bear the burden of 
living up to the standards he was “designed” to meet” (p. 55). Not only does the 
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oppressive weight of this burden potentially “impinge upon the child’s freedom to 
make his own way in the world” (President’s Council, 2003, p. 55) (see, e.g. 
chapter 4 of this dissertation), but when moved to a societal level, this burden of 
perfection might lead to widespread intolerance of those individuals who fail to 
live up to this perfection – i.e. those individuals who are deemed “imperfect”. 
Even now, parents who have children with Down Syndrome and related 
afflictions are often looked down upon for not screening such a child out; Kass 
and the rest of the Council worry about how much worse the social pressure will 
be to only have perfect children once the technology becomes more advanced, 
and that soon even those parents who might have otherwise viewed their child as 
an “unconditionally welcome gift” might ultimately come to view him or her as a 
“conditionally acceptable product” because of this social consensus. Thus, their 
worry is that beginning with a shift of parental attitude in individual cases, 
whereby the children are seen as products (of manufacture), we will end up with a 
shift of societal attitude wherein both children and adults are subject to being 
viewed like products rather than people: like pots, made for certain purposes that, 
should they fail to fulfill them, are (modestly) viewed as “less than” and 
(extravagantly) subject to elimination. 
 This shifting perception of individuals as the products of manufacture is 
even more evident when we look at the procedural changes in the creation of 
children, and how these children come to be, in a very real sense, made or 
manufactured. To illustrate this, the Council (2003) asks us to consider a 
hypothetical scenario wherein “a decade from now, IVF and PGD have been 
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perfected to the point where preimplantation screening is safe and effective, not 
prohibitively expensive, and capable of identifying a wide range of markers for 
heritable disorders” (p. 53). This means that “prospective parents (perfectly 
fertile) routinely have the option of using these technologies in order to select an 
essentially disease-free embryo for transfer to the mother’s womb” (President’s 
Council, 2003, p. 53). The Council (2003) asks whether under such hypothetical 
circumstances “might not the practice become moderately” – perhaps even highly 
– widespread?” They wonder, “Could many people come to regard using IVF plus 
PGD as safer (for the child) than the randomness of sex, and therefore preferable 
to natural procreation even when there is no particular history of genetic disease?” 
(p. 53). The concern here is not so much that these technologies might ensure 
better health (indeed, the Council, like most people, would deem health a worthy 
value and a worthwhile goal); the main concern the Council has is that as a result 
of such widespread adoption of these technologies we do irreversible damage to 
another worthy value – the meaning of child-bearing (and, more broadly, inter-
human relations). 
For the Council, the widespread adoption and infiltration of IVF and PGD 
into our social psyche is not just a small shift in procreation, but rather a complete 
usurpation of the original act. According to the Council (2003), “The salient fact 
about human procreation in its natural context is that children are not made but 
begotten” (p. 70). What they mean by “begotten” is that “children are the issue of 
our love, not the product of our wills. A man and a woman do not produce or 
choose a particular child, as they might buy a particular brand of soap [but] stand 
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in relation to their child as recipients of a gift” (President’s Council, 2003, p. 70). 
Part of being a “gift” is the notion that with gifts “we learn to accept as gratefully 
as we can”; by contrast, “products of our wills we try to shape in accordance with 
our wants and desires” (President’s Council, 2003, p. 70). Since, on their account, 
“[p]rocreation as traditionally understood invites acceptance, not reshaping or 
engineering”, the attitude wherein children are made is wrong, since we have lost 
the sense of children as gifts and instead see them as existing “simply for our 
fulfillment” (President’s Council, 2003, p. 70). 
As before, we may take issue with the sort of either-or perspective 
imposed by the Council. Indeed, it hardly seems fair or accurate to suppose that a 
parent views their child as either a gratefully accepted, loved gift or as a designed 
product of narcissistic wish-fulfillment; even in the case of soap-selection we can 
appreciate certain properties of the soap (e.g. lather, color, scent, etc.) for their 
own sake rather than purely for our self-service. But, these concerns aside we 
begin to see with IVF and PGD a shift – even if only a subtle one – underlying 
parental attitude, wherein, “procreation begins to take on certain aspects of the 
idea – if not the practice – of manufacture, the making of a product to a specified 
standard” (President’s Council, 2003, p. 55). Instead of simply letting nature take 
its course – as per “traditional” procreation – we now have a situation where 
“[t]he parent – in partnership with the IVF doctor or genetic counselor – becomes 
in some measure the master of the child’s fate” (President’s Council, 2003, p. 55). 
This newly added, more mechanistic measure is thought to lead to “a more 
objectified understanding of children” (Widdows, 2009, p. 41) – wherein they are 
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products of design, subject to a given standard – “and a more mechanical and 
contractual construction of the parenting relationship” (Widdows, 2009, p. 41) – 
whereby they are expected to meet that standard as part of the ‘contract’ of their 
conditional existence. 
Elsewhere, Kass (1997) describes this problem of what happens when the 
seemingly more benign goals of genetic screening move towards the control of 
genetic engineering and genetic enhancement. While he agree that “health and 
fitness are clearly great goods,” he says, “there is something deeply disquieting in 
looking on our prospective children as artful products perfectible by genetic 
engineering, increasingly held to our willfully imposed designs, specifications and 
margins of tolerable error” (Kass, 1997, p. 20). For him, “One must never forget 
that these are human beings upon whom our eugenic or merely playful fantasies 
are to be enacted” (Kass, 1997, p. 23). The problem with genetic enhancement 
then has to do with what it takes “to achieve the requisite quality control over new 
human life” (Kass, 1997, p. 25). For this, “human conception and gestation will 
need to be brought fully into the bright light of the laboratory” where it will then 
be “fertilized, nourished, pruned, weeded, watched, inspected, prodded, pinched, 
cajoled, injected, tested, rated, graded, approved, stamped, wrapped, sealed and 
delivered” (Kass, 1997, p .25); according to Kass, “There is no other way to 
produce the perfect baby” (p. 25). This image is one of an assembly production 
line – baby by Honda, or perhaps baby by the Central London Hatchery and 
Conditioning Center – and it is likely this sort of imagery that underpins the 
intuition that, even if for benign or health-driven goals, we should be concerned 
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about the potentially unpleasant and damaging attitudinal side-effect wherein “the 
world of genetic engineering” is one in which “our children would become 
products of our own manufacture” (Annas, 2005, p. 35). 
While this example of engineered children is more narrow than we 
ultimately want for our argument – especially since it runs the risk of bringing in 
confounding baggage of the special status of the parent-child relationship, pre-
existent control aspects potentially inherent in the relationship, and so on – it 
illustrates in a very poignant way the sense of manufacture that accompanies the 
more general view that another’s traits can be determined, exchanged, upgraded, 
and so on down the line. The more expanded worry is that this view of children 
will extend to our view of humans writ large, and that in seeing people as mere 
“assemblages of molecules, arranged in a certain way” (Annas, 2002, p. 135), 
open to the ‘pruning’ and ‘prodding’ of laboratory production we will begin to 
“view [ourselves] and each other as products which can be “manufactured,” and 
subject to quality-control measures,” as things that can “be “made to measure,” 
both literally and figuratively” (Annas, 2002, p. 135) . 
We have already begun to see this mechanistic mentality slip itself into 
our social psyche. Take, for example, the increasingly mechanized, commodified 
view of the human body: In their 1998 Hastings Center Report, Dorothy Nelkin 
and Lori Andrews analyzed the escalating view of the human body as a location 
for “prospecting.” They say that as a result of this prospecting attitude, “The body 
is a “project” – a system that can be divided and dissected down to the molecular 
level” (Nelkin and Andrews, 1998, p. 35). The body is “viewed as an object with 
  143 
replaceable and collectible parts” ((Nelkin and Andrews, 1998, p. 32), “popular 
repugnance” of which “is suggested by a recurrent image of the bar code on the 
body” ((Nelkin and Andrews, 1998, p. 36). Anthropologist Cecil Helman (1988) 
concurs with these findings, indicating that as a result of the more frequent 
division and dissection of the human body – more specifically with implants and 
transplants – “the image of the body in industrial society…has been 
reconceptualized as a ‘machine’…The body is now a collection of ‘parts’ or 
‘pieces’, for which ‘spares’ are available when they finally wear out” (p. 15). 
Moreover, these spare parts “are mass-produced, impersonal [and] replaceable” 
(Helman, 1988, p. 15), which is in keeping with the machine-like imagery. 
 Similarly mechanistic understandings of the human mind have come to 
dominate contemporary psychology and psychiatry, wherein many psychological 
disturbances are seen as mostly (if not solely) the result of damaged mental 
machinery, faulty hardware to be fixed with, e.g., Prozac as we might fix a faulty 
car with a new part (see e.g. Kramer, 1993; for arguments as to the problematic 
nature of this sort of view, see e.g., Freedman, 1998). Collectively, the mind and 
body have come to be described metaphorically as ““systems,” “chemical 
building blocks,” “hardware,” “software”” and so on, which “have, in effect, 
objectified the person, who becomes less an individual than a set of mechanical 
parts or chemical processes that can be calibrated or well defined” (Shapiro, 1990, 
p. 337, footnote 33). In the end, this mechanistic view of mind and body – 
viewing it as a decomposable system, etc – likens humans to being themselves 
mechanistic – mere products of manufacture. 
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 When directed inwards, however, this attitude of man as manufacturer is 
perhaps even more problematic. To see why this is so, we will look at one already 
existent form of self-manufacture, namely cosmetic surgery. According to 
feminist bioethicist Kathryn Pauly Morgan (1991), one striking, even defining, 
feature of cosmetic surgery is that in it “actual, live women are reduced and 
reduce themselves to “potential women” and choose to participate in anatomizing 
and fetishizing their bodies as they buy “contoured bodies,” “restored youth, and 
“permanent beauty” (p. 28). Thus, these women are seen as – and moreover see 
themselves as – malleable (since they are “potential women”), reducible to pieces 
(since they are “anatomizable”), and, in a sense, alienable (since they fetishize the 
traits or features for which improvement is sought). (see e.g. chapter 4 for further 
discussion of these traits.) 
 In her analysis, Morgan believes that current trends in the medical view of 
human being, such as we see with cosmetic surgery, emphasize a mechanistic, 
machine-like understanding of humans. According to Morgan (1991), “Western 
scientific medicine views the human body essentially as a machine” (p. 31). This 
“machine model,” she says, “carries with it certain implications, among which is 
the reduction of spirit, affect, and value to mechanistic process in the human 
body” (Morgan, 1991, p. 31). It also “facilitates viewing and treating the body in 
atomistic and mechanical fashion,” meaning that, e.g., “the increasing 
mechanization of the body in terms of artificial hearts, kidneys, joints, limbs, and 
computerized implants is seen as an ordinary progression within the dominant 
model” (Morgan, 1991, p. 31). When this perspective of the mechanical human is 
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internalized, individuals then are “increasingly socialized into an acceptance of 
technical knives” (Morgan, 1991, p. 32), knives that mold and shape and cut, 
knives that manufacture bodies. 
 One inherent feature of this acceptance of technical knives is the 
corresponding acceptance of the ‘natural’ human body as primitive and 
changeable. According to Morgan (1991), “The domain of technology is often set 
up in oppositional relation to a domain that is designated “the natural” (p. 31). As 
part of this “oppositional relation,” technology is often assigned the role of 
“transcendence, transformation, control, exploitation, or destruction”, whereas 
“the technologized object or process is conceptualized as inferior or primitive, in 
need of perfecting transformation or exploitation through technology in the name 
of some “higher” purpose or end” (Morgan, 1991, p. 31). As a result, “What is 
designated “the natural” functions primarily as a frontier rather than as a barrier”, 
and areas that “were previously regarded as open to variation primarily in 
evolutionary terms…are now seen by biotechnologists as domains of creation and 
control” (Morgan, 1991, p. 31). 
 Also, like Kass and the President’s Council on Bioethics, Morgan believes 
that the technologies of perfection will ultimately become instruments of control. 
Comparing cosmetic surgery to IVF and other forms of reproductive technology, 
Morgan (1991) points out that “[a]s more and more reproductive technologies and 
tests are invented (and “perfected” in and on the bodies of fertile women)” what 
happens is that “partners, parents, family, obstetricians, and other experts on 
fertility pressure women to submit to this technology in the name of “maximized 
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choice” and “responsible motherhood”” (p. 39). As a result, “women are being 
subjected to increasingly intense forms of coercion, a fact that is signaled by the 
intensifying lack of freedom felt by women to refuse to use the technology if they 
are pregnant and the technology is available” (Morgan, 1991, p. 39). By analogy, 
Morgan (1991) believes that with respect to cosmetic surgeries: “Women who 
refuse to use these technologies are already becoming stigmatized as 
“unliberated,” “not caring about their appearance” [or] as “refusing to be all that 
they could be”” (p. 40). 
 According to Morgan’s (1991) account, “technology is making obligatory 
the appearance of youth and reality of “beauty” for every woman who can afford 
it” and “[n]atural destiny is being supplanted by technologically grounded 
coercion [that] is camouflaged by the language of choice, fulfillment, and 
liberation” (pp. 40-1). As such, what appears at first glance to be an instance of 
choice is in fact an instance of conformity (Morgan, 1991, p. 36). Moreover, 
Morgan (1991) believes that this conformity is not just to the creation of 
“beautiful bodies and faces but white, Western, Anglo-Saxon bodies in a racist, 
anti-Semitic context” (p. 36). Thus, the “technical knives” that we are being 
socialized to accept are in fact: “Magic knives. Magic knives in a patriarchal 
context. Magic knives in a Eurocentric context. Magic knives in a white 
supremacist context” (Morgan, 1991, p. 32). 
 What Morgan (1991) finds “particularly alarming” about the social 
acceptance of these “magic knives” is that as a result of acceptance “what comes 
to have primary significance is not the real given existing woman but her body 
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viewed as a “primitive entity” that is seen only as potential, as a kind of raw 
material to be exploited in terms of appearance, eroticism, nurturance, and fertility 
as defined by the colonized culture” (p. 37). Thus, when turned inwards the view 
of man as manufacturer means that an individual not only sees others as mere 
objects of manufacture, but he or she also embraces that view as applied to 
himself or herself. Self-manufacture therefore leads to individuals viewing 
themselves mechanistically, like “a series of quantifiable traits…that are subject 
to augmentation or alteration” (Bess, 2008, p. 124). 
 However, as stated earlier we are concerned here not only with the descent 
of man to universally commodified object in the form of a product, whether in the 
realm of designer child, decomposable body, mechanistic mind, or object of self-
manufacture; we are also concerned with the attitude of the commodifier as a 
manufacturer, regardless of the object of this manufacture attitude. What, we may 
ask, is the essence of this attitude? Throughout this section, we have already seen 
some of the key features: First, a manufacturer manufactures something (or 
someone) for some purpose, be it design, function, excellence, aesthetics, and so 
on. Thus, there is a corresponding expectation that the product of manufacture 
fulfill that purpose, else it is essentially a failure. This means that the 
manufacturer feels a more or less conditional acceptance and appreciation of the 
product of manufacture (Note: Some may argue that, especially with children, 
parents (or manufacturers) may ultimately offer full acceptance even in face of 
failed expectations; however, I suspect this is the mark of a particular personality, 
and the default response to a product that fails one’s expectations is rejection.); it 
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is an instrumental relationship, one that does not require that the manufacturer 
take into account any intrinsic worth of the product of manufacture. For example, 
with respect to cosmetic surgery we might say that the object or product of 
manufacture is valuable to the manufacturer only insofar as it (e.g. a smaller nose, 
younger-looking skin, an ‘enhanced’ complexion) fulfills or meets his or her 
expectations (e.g. aesthetic appeal, and so on). Similarly, with the mechanistic 
conception of mind according to psychopharmacology, a given feature of an 
individual’s personality is valuable only insofar as it serves his or her goals (or, 
perhaps, the goals of the psychiatrist, or the state, etc.); as such, if he or she would 
prefer not to be ‘rejection sensitive’, or would rather be more assertive or 
competitive, and so on, then according to the perspective of the manufacturer 
there is no compelling reason not to simply change the mechanism of that 
individual’s mind to better fit the other, ‘enhanced’ view of self.  
Second, a manufacturer perceives the object under manufacture as being 
open to poking, prodding, pruning, and so on (which in turn may mean that it is 
available to be patented, sold, copied, and so on). To use the terminology from 
chapter 4 on objectification, the manufacturer sees the product as being violable, 
fungible, and subject to ownership (see also Nussbaum, 1995, p. 257). Returning 
to the example of cosmetic surgery, the individual seeking the surgery must view 
himself or herself – at least with respect to his or her body – as open to the 
surgery being sought. Moreover, the trait or feature being altered must in a sense 
be viewed as fungible, since it is essentially going to be exchanged for an 
alternate, ‘enhanced’ feature. Also, not explicitly mentioned prior but implied in 
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this relationship being the manufacturer and the product of manufacture is the 
“irreversible dependence” of the latter on the former (see also chapter 4); a 
manufacturer is allowed – nay expected – to tinker with products, but products are 
never meant to tinker back.  
A third feature of the manufacturing attitude, one that is not explicit in the 
previous discussions of this section, is the potential coldness of the manufacturer 
in relating to the product of manufacture. The clinical image of a baby built by 
Honda, or the mechanistic views of the human body as a machine and the human 
mind as “software”, do not illicit any warmer response than that of a car, robot, or 
computer – how should manufacturers of the latter differ in attitude from 
manufacturers of the former? In her analysis of the felt monstrosity of certain 
biotechnologies, Mary Midgley (2000) expands on this sort of ‘coldness’ attitude, 
saying, “The really strange and disturbing thing about all these images” of man as 
manufacturer “is the alienation of the human operator from the system he works 
on” (p. 12). In his relation to this “system”, the man “appears as an extraneous 
critic, a fastidious reader, free to reshape books to suit his own taste, a detached 
engineer redesigning a car to his own satisfaction” (Midgley, 2000, p. 12). 
Moreover, “Even when the book or car in question is a human body – perhaps his 
own,” Midgley says, “this designer stands outside it, a superior being who does 
not share its nature. Readers can always get another book if they don't like the 
first one, and car-owners are not much surprised at having to get another car” 
(Midgley, 2000, p. 12).  
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She asks, therefore, “What sort of being, then, is this operator supposed to 
be?” (Midgley, 2000, p. 12). In a word, perhaps: detached. A commodifying man 
who acts as manufacturer stands outside and above the product of his 
manufacture; he can change it as he sees fit, abandon it if he sees fit to, and there 
is no sense of emotional attachment or guaranteed or unconditional responsibility 
in his relationship to the product. While this detachment may appear inconsistent 
when we consider the given individual who is commodifying himself or herself – 
after all, he or she cannot properly thought to be standing entirely outside his or 
her own self! – there is still a sense in which this individual is at least standing 
outside those features of himself or herself that are subject to commodification 
and enhancement. As such, whether man wields the scalpel against others or 
against himself, it remains a cold instrument of manufacture. 
 
Commodifying Man as Master 
 
Related to the view presented in the previous section – that of commodifying man 
as manufacturer – is the view of commodifying man as master. For dealing with 
this attitude extending outwards, the notion of mastery follows from that of 
manufacturer. After all, as Kass (1997) has stated, “As with any product of 
[man’s] making, no matter how excellent, the artificer stand above it, not as an 
equal but as a superior, transcending it by his will and creative prowess” (p. 23). 
Accordingly, the manufacturer necessarily is a master. In discussing cloning, Kass 
(1997) points out that “[s]cientists who clone animals make it perfectly clear that 
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they are engaged in instrumental making; the animals are, from the start, designed 
as means to serve rational human purposes” (p. 23). By extension, he supposes, 
cloned human beings will be treated in a similar fashion – instrumentally 
valuable, designed to serve some utilitarian function for the designer. Individuals 
created via cloning will inevitably suffer from “inherently despotic” treatment, 
subject to control by the will of the cloner (Kass, 1997, p. 24). Therefore, by 
analogy, we might expect that similar forms of technological intervention – such 
as human enhancement technologies, and perhaps other forms of commodifying 
technologies as well – will result in roughly the same attitude that we see 
associated with cloning: the attitude of mastery. 
 For dealing with this attitude of mastery extended inwards – as a form of 
self-mastery – we may suppose that this attitude comes part and parcel with the 
enhancement program itself. One hallmark feature of the view man and human 
nature inherent in human enhancement is that man is a creature that is partly or 
wholly made, typically by himself or herself. For them, “Human nature…is 
dynamic, partially human-made, and improvable” (Bostrom, 2005, p. 213). Man 
is a “soft self” (Clark, 2007, p. 278), with “fluid boundaries” (Lock, 1993, p. 138) 
and “a constantly negotiable collection of resources easily able to straddle and 
criss-cross the boundaries between biology and artifact” (Clark, 2007, p. 278). 
Thus, it will not be necessary to establish the connection between human 
enhancement (or human commodification more generally) and the corresponding 
attitude of mastery, and we can instead turn to the nature of this attitude and some 
of its human consequences. 
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 To explore this attitude and its proposed consequences more fully, in this 
section we will be looking primarily at the work of one scholar who has spent 
substantial time exploring this attitude of mastery as it pertains to human 
enhancement – philosopher Michael Sandel. His classic The Case Against 
Perfection, while decidedly of the so-called “bioconservative” camp, is 
nonetheless one of the best investigations into the attitude of mastery as it pertains 
to human enhancement and human enhancement technologies. His argument, as 
we will see, is slightly more geared towards man commodifying others; however, 
his conclusions are generalizable to man commodifying himself or herself as well. 
Thus, for this section we will look initially at Sandel’s argument and conclusions. 
Then, we will consider their implications for both the outward and inward 
manifestations of the attitude of commodifying man as master, and end the 
section, as in the previous one, with a brief discussion of what we may consider to 
be some of the defining traits of this attitude. 
According to Sandel (2004), “the main problem with enhancement and 
genetic engineering…is that they represent a kind of hyperagency – a Promethean 
aspiration to remake nature, including human nature, to serve our purposes and to 
satisfy our desires” (p. 54). Thus, for him the real problem with human 
enhancement and human engineering is not “the drift to mechanism” – as we 
explored in the previous section – “but the drive to master” (Sandel, 2004, p. 54). 
After considering and rejecting the main arguments against four of the more 
popular examples of these sorts of enhancements – muscle enhancement, memory 
enhancement, height enhancement, and sex selection, all of which focus on 
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arguments from autonomy – he focuses on what he considers to be the “true” 
underlying problems with them, namely the attitudes they reflect and their 
diversion from the underlying telos or ideal they are supposed to embody. 
According to Sandel, the genetic and pharmaceutical engineering of humans leads 
to a diminished understanding about the moral status of nature, the proper stance 
of human beings towards nature and the given world, and the proper conception 
of human freedom and human flourishing. 
On Sandal’s (2004) analysis, there are three main things – “three key 
features of our moral landscape” (p. 60) – that are at risk because of the mastery 
attitude associated with enhancement: humility, responsibility, and solidarity. The 
source of this risk is fundamentally the denial of ‘giftedness’ that he believes 
necessarily accompanies the attitude of mastery. According to Sandel (2004), “the 
one-sided triumph of willfulness over giftedness, of dominion over reverence, of 
molding over beholding” (p. 60) – all of which constitute the overall attitude of 
mastery in question – ultimately dissolve “our sense of giftedness” (p. 60). He 
elaborates on this phenomenon of “giftedness,” saying, “To acknowledge the 
giftedness of life is to recognize that our talents and powers are not wholly our 
own doing, nor even fully ours, despite the efforts we expend to develop and to 
exercise them” and “to recognize that not everything in the world is open to any 
use we may desire or devise” (Sandel, 2007, p. 27; see also Sandel, 2004, p. 54). 
As such, “[a]n appreciation of the giftedness of life constrains the Promethean 
project and conduces to a certain humility” (Sandel, 2007, p. 27; see also Sandel, 
2004, p. 54). 
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Conversely, “If bioengineering made the myth of the “self-made man” 
come true,” Sandel (2004) says, “it would be difficult to view our talents as gifts 
for which we are indebted, rather than as achievements for which we are 
responsible” (p. 60; see also Sandel, 2007, pp. 86-7). Thus, there is an apparent 
dichotomy between the humility of giftedness and the pridefulness of mastery. 
Moreover, this pridefulness, to Sandel (2007), borders on hubris (p. 87) – 
something that is more apparent when we consider again the parent-child 
relationship. Traditionally understood, this relationship teaches parents lessons in 
loving acceptance and “being open to the unbidden”. The child in this relationship 
is a “gift” begotten, not an artifact made; as such, we are not allowed (or supposed 
to) actively choose what we get, but rather accept joyously that which we are 
given. According to Sandel (2007), in the appropriately understood parent-child 
relationship, parents should “appreciate children as gifts [and] accept them as they 
come, not as objects of our design, or products of our will, or instruments of our 
ambition” (p. 45). This acceptance of the unbidden helps instill in parents a sense 
of humility, thereby undermining the human tendency towards hubris. 
However, he says, “A Gattaca-like world in which parents became 
accustomed to specifying the sex and genetic traits of their children would be a 
world inhospitable to the unbidden, a gated community writ large” (Sandel, 2004, 
p. 60). Instead, parents as masters would have expectations that their children 
fulfill certain qualifications, contain certain qualities, and so on. This, for Sandel, 
is a greater harm than we see in man as a manufacturer. Contra Feinberg (1980) 
and Habermas (2003) (both discussed in chapter 4), Sandel (2007) maintains that 
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the problem with this degree of parental design “is not that the parents usurp the 
autonomy of the child they design” but rather “lies in the hubris of the designing 
parents, in their drive to master the mystery of birth” (p. 46; see also Sandel, 
2004, p. 56). According to Sandel (2007), “Even if this disposition does not make 
parents tyrants to their children, it disfigures the relation between parent and 
child” by depriving “the parent of the humility and enlarged human sympathies 
that an openness to the unbidden can cultivate” (p. 46; see also Sandel, 2004, p. 
56). Thus, what matters morally is not so much that in designing (or 
commodifying) another individual one denies his or her (autonomy) right to an 
open future, or even that the designer imposes upon the designee a relationship of 
irreversible dependence; instead, it is the attitude that the designer represents in 
engaging in the designing itself – the tyrannical drive to mastery divorced from 
humility. 
 According to Sandel, along with this decrease in humility comes a 
corresponding increase in personal responsibility. He says, “As humility gives 
way, responsibility expands to daunting proportions. We attribute less to chance 
and more to choice” (Sandel, 2007, p. 87). For him, “One of the blessings of 
seeing ourselves as creatures of nature, God, or fortune is that we are not wholly 
responsible for the way we are” (Sandel, 2007, p. 87; see also Sandel, 2004, p. 
60). By contrast, “The more we become masters of our genetic endowments, the 
greater the burden we bear for the talents we have and the way we perform” 
(Sandel, 2007, p. 87; see also Sandel, 2004, p. 60). Here, we see that the designers 
may ultimately suffer from an increased sense of responsibility as a result of the 
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act of design and its corresponding denial of giftedness and an openness to the 
unbidden. Because this act of design necessitates that the designer become 
himself or herself the sole master, so there will be no one else to blame should the 
design fail in its perfection. 
 Moreover, there will be no one else to praise should the design turn out 
right. This means that whoever or whatever exists as a result of the design has lost 
some of his/her/its capacity for free action, praiseworthiness, and 
blameworthiness (Sandel, 2007, p. 25). As Sandel (2007) explains: “It is one thing 
to hit seventy home runs as a result of disciplined training and effort, and 
something else, something less, to hit them with the help of steroids or genetically 
enhanced muscles” (p. 25). The question of enhancement and its potential threat 
to merit has been thoroughly explored elsewhere (Shapiro, 1991). However, the 
question of enhancement and its effect on responsibility warrants further 
discussion. Consider an individual who was designed or altered so as to perform 
the function of a stellar athlete. Should he or she succeed in this function, then 
there is a sense in which he or she is not the one responsible – and hence worthy 
of praise – for this success, but rather the designer (or perhaps the altered genes, 
traits, or whatever). However, what Sandel seemingly fails to mention, is the 
potential for this individual to feel the responsibility to perform the function for 
which he or she was designed (or to fulfill the function of the enhanced gene, 
trait, and so on). After all, time, money, and mastery went in to the design, so 
there may be a felt obligation to see that all these resources were not spent in vain. 
This runs remarkably close to the sort of invasion discussed in chapter 4. While 
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Sandel (2007) explicitly decries Habermas’ emphasis on autonomy and concern 
for securing a non-co-authored life (p. 45), this in fact appears to be a natural 
correlate to Sandel’s concern with responsibility. If “our capacity to act freely, for 
ourselves, by our own efforts, and to consider ourselves responsible – worthy of 
praise or blame – for the things we do and for the way we are” (Sandel, 2007, p. 
25) is undermined because these things (responsibility, praise, and blame) seem to 
belong to the designer rather than to ourselves, is this designer not in essence 
functioning like a co-author? 
 Sandel also worries that with the increase in responsibility there will be a 
diminishment of solidarity. He suggests that “the explosion of responsibility for 
our own fate, and that of our children, may diminish our sense of solidarity with 
those less fortunate than ourselves” (Sandel, 2007, p. 89). According to Sandel 
(2007), “The more alive we are to the chanced nature of our lot, the more reason 
we have to share our fate with others” (p. 89). For example, health insurance, 
wherein the healthy end up subsidizing the unhealthy, mimics solidarity only 
insofar as the insured are unaware of and unable to control for their own risk 
factors. After all, if the healthy can be assured of their genetics and know with 
confidence that they are unlikely to become sick, what motivation do they have to 
pay to be insured? By analogy, Sandel suspects that the more an individual feels 
responsible for his own good fortune – health or otherwise – the less he or she 
will feel compelled to share his or her good fortune with others. In the end, “The 
more alive we are to the chanced nature of our lot” – that is, the less responsible 
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we feel for our own lot in life – “the more reason we have to share our fate with 
others” (Sandel, 2004, p. 60). 
This is ultimately what connects solidarity with the earlier mentioned 
sense of giftedness. According to Sandel (2007), it is a “lively sense of the 
contingency of our gifts” – that is, “an awareness that none of us is wholly 
responsible for his or her success” – that keeps “a meritocractic society from 
sliding into the smug assumption that success is the crown of virtue that the rich 
are rich because they are more deserving than the poor” (p. 91; see also Sandel, 
2004, p. 61). For Sandel (2007), the most “compelling answer” as to why “the 
successful owe anything to the least advantaged members of society” comes from 
their sense that “[t]he natural talents that enable the successful to flourish are not 
their own doing but, rather, their good fortune – a result of the genetic lottery” (p. 
91; see also Sandel, 2004, p. 61). Ultimately if we view “our genetic endowments 
[as] gifts, rather than achievements for which we can claim credit,” then we can 
recognize that “it is a mistake and a conceit to assume that we are entitled to the 
full measure of the bounty they reap in a market economy” and correspondingly 
“[w]e therefore have an obligation to share this bounty with those who, through 
no fault of their own, lack comparable gifts” (Sandel, 2007, p. 91; see also Sandel, 
2004, p. 61). His concern, then, is that “[t]he meritocracy, less chastened by 
chance, would become harder, less forgiving” (Sandel, 2007, p. 92); in short: the 
worry is that if the drive to mastery were to become widespread or dominate our 
general societal attitude, we would then feel increasingly responsibly for our own 
fate and less responsible for the welfare of others. 
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 This, for Sandel, would be a serious loss to humanity. However, he 
appears less than optimistic about the prospect that, even perceiving this loss, we 
will manage to quell our desire for mastery. He believes that “[t]here is something 
appealing, even intoxicating, about a vision of human freedom unfettered by the 
given” (Sandel, 2007, p. 99). He says while “[i]t is often assumed that the powers 
of enhancement we now possess arose as an inadvertent by-product of biomedical 
progress” and then “stayed to tempt us with the prospect of enhancing our 
performance, designing our children, and perfecting our nature” (Sandel, 2007, 
pp. 99-100), the truth may well be the opposite. It may instead be that “genetic 
engineering is the ultimate expression of our resolve to see ourselves astride the 
world, the masters of our nature” (Sandel, 2007, p. 100). This view is more fitting 
with our Promethean understanding of man’s relationship to technology (see, e.g., 
chapter 2), and in the end the desire to be “DNA Master in the Game of Life” 
(Trew, 1997, p. 272) and continue with our conquests all the way to “the 
subjugation of the dark and evil elements of [our souls]” (Haldane, 1923) may be 
too alluring a prospect for us to pass up. 
 This “intoxicating…vision of human freedom unfettered by the given” 
(Sandel, 2007, p. 99) wherein we “see ourselves astride the world, the masters of 
our nature” (Sandel, 2007, p. 99) is arguably present with both the outward and 
inward directing versions of commodifying man as master. When directed 
outward, we can especially see this with the “hubris” of the designing parent. But 
in the case of any designer manufacturing the features of another human being 
there will no doubt be some sense of mastery over the nature of the designee. And 
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when directed inward, the sense of self-mastery seems clear when we consider the 
idea of a self-commodifying man as a self-made man, the latter of which it is hard 
to imagine does not follow from the former. 
 However, we are again concerned here with the attitude as well as the 
possible consequences to which Sandel points. What is the essence of the attitude 
of a commodifying man as master? Perhaps we should look to psychologist and 
behaviorist John B Watson (1930), who is famously quoted for a prime example 
of the attitude of mastery, saying if we but give him “a dozen healthy infants, 
well-formed, and [his] own specified world to bring them up in” then, “regardless 
of [any child’s] talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his 
ancestors”, Watson can “guarantee to take any one at random and train him to 
become any type of specialist [he] might select – doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-
chief and, yes, even beggar-man and thief” (p. 82). Watson (1930) does actually 
soften the impact of this attitude somewhat, when he continues: “I am going 
beyond my facts and I admit it, but so have the advocates of the contrary and they 
have been doing it for many thousands of years” (p. 82); however, the resounding 
confidence present in the first part of the quotation is a remarkable example of the 
attitude in question. In a word, perhaps, the essence in question with Watson’s 
example is: control. Thus, a commodifying man who acts as master is able to 
design and create whatsoever he wishes in the subject of that design, and the latter 
will be entirely at the mercy of the former. 
 Even when we consider a commodifying man as self-master, this essential 
attitudinal feature of control seems to hold true. In its more potentially benign 
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manifestations – such as those that emphasize a felt need for self-transformation 
and the molding of self into the type of person an individual feels he or she is 
meant to be (see e.g. Garet, 1991 for further discussion) – we might often say that 
the sort of control is a positive one. After all, individuals are often praised for the 
physical triumph of transforming their bodies via exercise and athletics, or for 
transforming their minds via education. In a democracy we pride ourselves on our 
individualism, and the myth of the self-made man has become socially accepted 
dogma. However, even with these more positive connotations it is a form of 
control nonetheless. And this sort of control, whether directed outwards or 
inwards, is in part what potentially leads to the next set of defining attitudes of a 
man commodifying. 
 
Commodifying Man as Sadist and Masochist 
 
Ultimately, when we extend the previous two commodification attitudes – 
manufacture and mastery – to their logical conclusions, we come to realize that 
the man commodifying is arguably, in point of fact, a sort of sadist (when 
directing the commodifying act or attitude outwards) or a sort of masochist (when 
directing the commodifying act or attitude inwards). In this section, we will 
consider how the commodification impulse results in both of these attitudes, 
focusing on the psychological accounts presented by Sigmund Freud and Erich 
Fromm, with additional insight from philosopher Gilles Deleuze. We will be 
looking both at how this relationship between commodification and 
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sadism/masochism occurs, as well as its implications for the underlying 
personality and attitude of the individual who is doing the commodification. We 
will begin with the outward manifestation of commodification as sadism, and then 
we will turn to the inward manifestation of commodification as masochism. 
Afterwards, we will briefly consider the general defining traits of both 
manifestations when we consider the attitude of commodifying man as sadist and 
masochist. 
 As the oft-proclaimed father of psychoanalysis Sigmund Freud (1961) has 
famously stated, “men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at 
the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, 
creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful 
share of aggressiveness” (p. 65) And, for Freud, it is this instinctual 
aggressiveness that endows man with his innate capacity for both sadism and 
masochism. While he did not actually coin either of the terms ‘sadist’ or 
‘masochist’ – that honor is bestowed upon Austrian psychiatrist Prichard Freiherr 
von Krafft-Ebing (in Psychopathia Sexualis, von Krafft-Ebing 1998) – he is 
nevertheless the first theorist to bring these two concepts into a sort of 
predominance in the realm of psychological and scholarly inquiry. 
The source of this theoretical predominance is Freud’s analysis of Eros, 
the life instinct, and Thanatos, the death instinct. (As a quick aside: Freud never 
actually used the term ‘thanatos’ to refer to the death instinct. Instead, colleague 
Paul Federn is said to have introduced the term for this usage (Menand, 2005, p. 
10)) As Freud (1961) defines them, Eros is basically “the instinct to preserve 
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living substance and to join it into ever larger units” (p. 73); by contrast, Thanatos 
is “another, contrary instinct seeking to dissolve those units and to bring them 
back to their primaeval (sic), inorganic state” (Freud, 1961, p. 73). According to 
his psychoanalytic theory, then, “[t]he phenomena of life could be explained from 
the concurrent or mutually opposing action of these two instincts” (Freud, 1961, 
p. 73). Both of these instincts are potentially aggressive in nature, since for Freud 
“the inclination to aggression is an original, self-subsisting instinctual disposition 
in man” (Freud, 1961, p. 77); however, the death instinct is more obviously 
aggressive, since it is inherently destructive, whereas he believes that the ‘libido’ 
manifestation of Eros can indeed be positive. 
 For Freud (1961), sadism is essentially a corrupted “alloy” between the 
libido of Eros and the destructive impulse of Thanatos (p. 74). This alloy leads, 
narrowly, to an individual’s sexual enjoyment being linked to his or her causing 
pain in another, “where the death instinct twists the erotic aim in its own sense 
and yet at the same time fully satisfies the erotic urge” (Freud, 1961, p. 76). It also 
leads, more broadly, to an individual finding narcissistic enjoyment in engaging in 
the destruction of another. Freud (1961) describes this version of sadism in saying 
that “even where [sadism] emerges without any sexual purpose, in the blindest 
fury of destructiveness,” there still exists a “satisfaction of the [sadistic] instinct” 
that “is accompanied by an extraordinarily high degree of narcissistic enjoyment, 
owing to its presenting the ego with a fulfilment (sic) of the latter’s old wishes for 
omnipotence” (p. 76). For Freud (1961), this “instinct of destruction” – even 
when it is “moderated and tamed, and…inhibited in its aim” – “must, when it is 
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directed towards objects, provide the ego with the satisfaction of its vital needs 
and with control over nature” (p. 76). In this version of sadism, then, we have 
“sadists indulging in positions of power and acts of mastery over others” 
(Grimwalde, 2011, p. 160), and receiving some sort of enjoyment from the 
experience, even though this enjoyment is not explicitly sexual in nature. 
 Fellow psychoanalyst and humanistic philosopher Erich Fromm (1941) 
expands on this Freudian account of sadism. Focusing on the non-sexual form of 
sadism, Fromm identifies three types of distinct, yet closely related sadistic 
tendencies. The first “is to make others dependent on oneself and to have absolute 
and unrestricted power over them, so as to make of them nothing but instruments, 
“clay in the potter’s hand”” (Fromm, 1941, p. 165). The second “consists of the 
impulse not only to rule over others in this absolute fashion, but to exploit them, 
to use them, to steal from them, to disembowel them, and, so to speak, to 
incorporate anything eatable in them” (Fromm, 1941, p. 165). According to 
Fromm, this impulse can be extended not only to material things, but also to 
immaterial ones, such as a person’s intellect or emotions. Finally, the “third kind 
of sadistic tendency is the wish to make others suffer or to see them suffer” 
(Fromm, 1941, p. 165). For Fromm (1941), “This suffering can be physical, but 
more often it is mental suffering [and i]ts aim is to hurt actively, to humiliate, 
embarrass others, or to see them in embarrassing and humiliating situations” (p. 
165). 
 We can easily see parallels between the first two types of sadistic 
tendencies and the previous two accounts of man commodifying. First, recall that 
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one defining feature of the attitude of commodifying man as manufacturer was 
that he or she views the product of manufacture as essentially having only 
instrumental or ‘use’ value. The object of commodification, the product, the 
individual subject to human enhancement intervention, is created to serve some 
purpose or perform some function; the value exists inherently in the latter, not the 
former (i.e. not with the product himself/herself/itself, but with how well the 
product fulfills the wishes of the former). Another related feature of the 
manufacturer’s attitude was that he or she saw the product of manufacture as 
being, for the most part, completely open to the poking, prodding, and 
modification of the manufacturer. These two features combined look very much 
like the attitude of a sadist viewing the object of sadism as a sort of exploitable 
“clay in the potter’s hand.” 
 What appears new or anomalous, then, is the third sadistic tendency, 
namely an impulse to cruelty. We will consider in greater detail later how this 
tendency comes about with the commodification attitude; but, even lacking this 
impulse to cause suffering, sadism is still present in the commodifying man’s 
controlling attitude of mastery (as seen in the previous section of this chapter). In 
fact, according to Fromm, this attitude of control and mastery is the defining 
essence of the sadistic attitude. On his account, every observable form of sadism 
comes down to a single “essential impulse” – “namely, to have complete mastery 
over another person, to make of him a helpless object of our will, to become the 
absolute ruler over him, to become his God, to do with him as one pleases” 
(Fromm, 1941, pp. 178-9; see also Fromm, 1964, p. 32). The means to this end 
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are frequently “[t]o humiliate him, to enslave him,” but “the most radical aim is to 
make him suffer, since there is no greater power over another person than that of 
inflicting pain on him, to force him to undergo suffering without his being able to 
defend himself” (Fromm, 1941, p. 179; see also Fromm, 1964, p. 32). In a later 
elaboration, Fromm (1964) extends this account of sadism, saying, “Another way 
of formulating the same thought is to say that the aim of sadism is to transform a 
man into a thing, something animate into something inanimate” (p. 32). Here, it 
seems, the most basic way we can understand sadism is that it is desire (and 
action) to treat a person like an object (e.g. a pot), and have a sort of ultimate 
control over them. 
 Another interesting aspect to Fromm’s (1964) later edition is that he 
describes the impulse to treat another like an object as being rooted in an 
understanding that “by complete and absolute control the living loses one 
essential quality of life – freedom” (p. 32). The reason it is interesting that Fromm 
reformulates the essence of sadism to be the act of denying – or perhaps even 
simply the desire to deny – another individual’s capacity for freedom, is because, 
if correct in its analysis, this would have sweeping effects in implicating many 
other forms of autonomy-denial – such as, e.g., denial of an individual’s right to 
an open future, invasion of another’s self, and so on – as being arguably, at their 
root, acts of sadism. This would then mean that the most basic characteristics of 
the commodified man, as discussed in chapter 4, suggest that the commodified 
man, in the end, is essentially an object of sadism. 
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 At the root of this drive to master, dominate and control is, for Fromm as 
it was for Freud, a form of the death instinct. We saw that according to Freud all 
life can be thought to consist of two forces: the life instinct (Eros) and the death 
instinct (Thanatos). Fromm refers to these forces as biophilia (love of life) and 
necrophilia (love of death), which he considers to be more like ‘orientations’ 
rather than instincts. On his analysis, then, the true sadist is essentially a 
necrophile (or, alternatively termed, necrophilous person). According to Fromm 
(1964), “While life is characterized by growth in a structured, functional manner, 
the necrophilous person loves all that does not grow, all that is mechanical” (p. 
41). In this regard, “The necrophilous person is driven by the desire to transform 
the organic into the inorganic, to approach life mechanically, as if all living 
persons were things” and also to transform “[a]ll living processes, feelings, and 
thoughts…into things” (Fromm, 1964, p. 41). As with Freud (1961), this 
necrophilous orientation still seeks to dissolve living things and “bring them back 
to their primaeval (sic), inorganic state” (p. 73) However, what is new with 
Fromm is that this drive to dissolve living matter is particularly represented as a 
mechanistic attitude, an inclination to see living things mechanically (as we saw 
earlier in this chapter on the section of commodifying man as master). 
 As a corollary to the sadist’s emphasis on control is the necrophile’s 
emphasis on force (Fromm, 1964, p. 40). For Fromm (1964), true force is, in the 
end, “the capacity to transform a man into a corpse” (p. 40). Thus, for the true 
sadist, “the greatest achievement of man is not to give life, but to destroy it; the 
use of force is not a transitory action forced upon him by circumstances – it is a 
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way of life” (Fromm, 1964, p. 40). However, it is not necessary for the sadistic 
attitude that an individual be the true sadistic, necrophilous person emphasizing 
this sort of force. Indeed, for Fromm this would represent the extreme, a 
consequence of having fully embraced the sadistic attitude and made it entirely a 
way of life (and, to my knowledge, Adolf Hitler is the only person Fromm 
describes as a truly necrophilous person; see e.g., Fromm, 1964); most sadists 
only display this tendency in a mitigated form. Thus, for our purposes, an 
individual engaging in commodification need not meet the extreme for him or her 
to be considered a sadist; it will be enough that he or she simply portrays the 
essence of a controlling attitude and sadistic orientation. 
 However, a more complete understanding of the extreme will be helpful 
for our projections in chapter 6, so we will now consider it more in depth. For 
understanding this extreme we will look to the man for whom the term ‘sadist’ is 
named: Marquis de Sade. In analyzing the attitude of the libertine – de Sade’s 
sadistic hero – philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1989) has determined that the primary 
goal of this hero is thinking about or engaging in negation (p.30). According to 
Deleuze (1989), in de Sade’s work there are two types,  or levels, of negation: 
“negation (the negative) as a partial process and pure negation as a totalizing 
Idea” (pp. 26-7). What the sadistic hero longs for, but cannot ever achieve, is this 
latter form of totalizing negation. This “pure negation” is able to “override all 
reigns and all laws, free even from the necessity to create, preserve or 
individuate”; it “needs no foundation and is beyond all foundation, a primal 
delirium, an original and timeless chaos solely composed of wild and lacerating 
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molecules” (Deleuze, 1989, p. 27), which French psychologist Francois Flahault 
refers to as “radical limitlessness” (Flahault, 2003, p. 40) – a kind of primeval 
Behemoth or Leviathan. 
 However, as Deleuze (1989) points out, “this original nature cannot be 
given: secondary nature alone makes up the world of experience, and negation is 
only ever given in the partial processes of the negative” (p. 27). As such, “original 
nature is necessarily the object of an Idea, and pure negation is a delusion” 
(Deleuze, 1989, p. 27). What this means is that the “original nature” of pure 
negation can only exist for us (mere experiential beings) as an “Idea.” So, in the 
end, the libertine is limited to the former form of negation as a partial process. 
Deleuze (1989) explains, “In practice, however, the libertine is confined to 
illustrating his total demonstration with partial inductive processes borrowed from 
secondary nature. He cannot do more than accelerate and condense the motions of 
partial violence” (p. 29). And the way he or she accelerates and condenses these 
“motions of partial violence” is “by multiplying and condensing the activities of 
component negative or destructive instincts” (Deleuze, 1989, p. 31), namely “by 
multiplying the number of his victims and their sufferings” (Deleuze, 1989, p. 
29). Thus, since the libertine can never achieve the absolute destruction of pure 
negation, which ultimately exists only as an Idea or ideal, he or she must instead 
resort to engaging in as many small acts of partial destruction as is possible, 
thereby coming as close as he or she can to the ideal of pure negation. 
 An interesting aspect of de Sade’s libertine and his or her sadistic attitude 
is a necessary component of coldness. As Deleuze (1989) explains, this 
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“condensation of violence” ends up implying “that violence must not be 
dissipated under the sway of inspiration or impulse, or even be governed by the 
pleasures it might afford, since those pleasures would still bind him to secondary 
nature”; instead, this violence “must be exercised in cold blood, and condensed by 
this very coldness, the coldness of demonstrative reason. Hence the well-known 
apathy of the libertine…”(p. 29). According to Deleuze, any emotion on the part 
of the libertine diminishes the purity of pure negation; hence there must be 
apathy. Moreover, this coldness is indeed similar to the coldness we saw with the 
commodifying man as manufacturer. Just as the manufacturer is emotionally 
detached from the product of manufacture, so too is the libertine sadist from the 
sadistic object. Thus, with sadism we have all four of the defining 
commodification attitudes presented earlier: perceived use value of the object; 
perceived openness of the object to commodification or control; coldness; and 
mastery.  
 Where these features become more confusing is with this commodifying 
attitude turned inwards as a form of masochism. As Erich Fromm (1941) has 
stated, “Sadism to many observers seemed less of a puzzle than masochism” (p. 
168). By contrast, “[m]asochistic strivings…tendencies directed against one’s 
own self, seem to be a riddle” (Fromm, 1941, p. 169). There is a sense in which 
“the phenomenon of masochism contradict[s] our whole picture of the human 
psyche as directed toward pleasure and self-preservation” and we are therefore 
unable to “explain that some men are attracted by and tend to incur what we all 
seem to go to such length to avoid”, namely, our own self’s destruction (Fromm, 
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1941, p. 169). In order to explain this phenomenon, Freud considers masochism to 
be a form of inverted sadism, the result of true sadism being thwarted. Basically, 
“If the aim of the sadist’s exaggerated aggressive drive – to conquer, master, and 
control the sexual object – cannot be achieved then he unconsciously replaces his 
sexual object with himself” and in this way he “becomes his own sexual object 
[and therefore] derives a sadistic pleasure from being dominated, tortured, and 
mastered by another person with whom he identifies” (Grimwalde, 2011, p. 158). 
Thus, in the case of masochism what we still have is a sadist, but instead of 
controlling and dominating an object outside himself or herself, he or she turns 
the sadistic impulse inwards, towards his or her own self. 
 Fromm (1964), likewise, considers masochism to be basically the death 
instinct turned inwards (p. 49). However, unlike Freud, he does not view 
masochism as simply an inverted, inferior form of sadism. For Fromm (1941), 
both sadism and masochism are simply two manifestations of the same goal – 
man’s desire to escape the aloneness of his individual self (p. 173). According to 
Fromm (1941), “Both the masochistic and sadistic strivings tend to help the 
individual to escape his unbearable feeling of aloneness and powerlessness” (p. 
173). He says, “The frightened individual seeks for somebody or something to tie 
his self to; he cannot bear to be his own individual self any longer, and he tries 
frantically to get rid of it and to feel security again by the elimination of this 
burden: the self” (Fromm, 1941, p. 173). Moreover, this security can occur both 
by dominating and controlling another person (as in with sadism), as well as by 
being dominated and controlled (as in with masochism). 
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 According to Fromm (1941), the masochist’s response to his or her felt 
aloneness is basically to “increase the original feeling of insignificance” (p. 174). 
The masochist “is driven by an unbearable feeling of aloneness and 
insignificance” and tries “to overcome it by getting rid of his self (as a 
psychological, not as a physiological entity); his way to achieve this is to belittle 
himself, to suffer, to make himself utterly insignificant” (Fromm, 1941, p. 176). 
However, the masochist’s goal is not belittlement or suffering, and so on; these 
things are simply “the price he pays for an aim which he compulsively tries to 
attain” (Fromm, 1941, p. 176). While overcoming feelings of aloneness and 
insignificance by increasing them may sound counter-intuitive, according to 
Fromm (1941) they are quite logical (at least in the masochistic person’s mind): 
“As long as I struggle between my desire to be independent and strong and my 
feeling of insignificance or powerlessness I am caught in a tormenting conflict”; 
however, “If I succeed in reducing my individual self to nothing, if I can 
overcome the awareness of my separateness as an individual, I may save myself 
from this conflict” (p. 174). For Fromm (1941), there are three ways towards this 
aim that are at the masochist’s disposal: first, “[t]o feel utterly small and 
helpless”; second, “to be overwhelmed by pain and agony”; and third, “to be 
overcome by the effects of intoxication” (p. 174). Thus, for the masochist the way 
to alleviate the felt aloneness of self is simply to do whatever is necessary to no 
longer feel this self, to remove all organic feeling and become as close as possible 
an inorganic, self-less being. 
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 However, destruction of the masochist’s sense of individual self is only 
part of his or her strivings. According to Fromm (1941), he or she also tries to 
surrender this self to “a bigger and more powerful whole outside of [himself or 
herself]”, and “[gain] a new security and a new pride in the participation in the 
power in which [he or she] submerges” (p. 177). Here, the original self is 
supplanted, and “determined by the greater whole into which the self has 
submerged” (Fromm, 1941, p. 178). The striving to eliminate the self by joining 
into a union with another is ultimately what drives both the masochist and the 
sadist. According to Fromm (1941), both sadists and masochists are driven toward 
the aim he calls “symbiosis,” which is “the union of one individual self with 
another self (or any other power outside of the own self) in such a way as to make 
each lose the integrity of its own self and to make them completely dependent on 
each other” (p. 180). He says, “The sadistic person needs his object just as much 
as the masochistic needs his [but] instead of seeking security by being swallowed, 
he gains it by swallowing somebody else” (Fromm, 1941, p. 180). However, with 
both cases – sadist and masochist – “the integrity of the individual self is lost” 
(Fromm, 1941, p. 180). For the former, “I enlarge myself by making another 
being part of myself and thereby I gain the strength I lack as an independent self”; 
for the latter, “I dissolve myself in an outside power [and] I lose myself” (Fromm, 
1941, p. 180). In the end, it is “the inability to stand the aloneness of one’s 
individual self that leads [both sadist and masochist] to the drive to enter into a 
symbiotic relationship with someone else” (Fromm, 1941, p. 180). Thus, we see 
some possible new features of the attitude of commodifying man, as both sadist 
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and as masochist: weakness; the inability to stand alone; and a sort of hatred of 
self. 
 
Conclusion: Commodifying Man as Potter 
 
At the end of this chapter we see an image emerge of the true nature of the 
commodifying man (i.e. the Potter). When applying his skills and will towards 
others, we see he is a manufacturer, a master, and a sadist. There is the impression 
that he views himself as over-and-above the ‘other’ (i.e. the pot), the arbiter of the 
latter’s existence. His relationship with the pot is most likely conditional, clinical, 
and cold. At his most kindly, he may (in a sense) “love” the pot; but there is 
always a sort of righteous authority and control (no doubt the “rod of iron” is 
never placed too far away), and the love itself smacks of a sort of self-serving 
self-gratitude. At his least kindly, the commodifying man seeks simply to reduce 
his subject (or rather object) of commodification to the purely inorganic, a state of 
near-nothing. And turning his energies inward does little to improve the matter, 
because the general attitude remains the same (manufacturer, master, controlling, 
etc.). While at its best this may be relatively benign (in a sort of Zarathustran, 
self-creating artist sense), at its worst it is an effort at self-destruction formed out 
of a deep self-loathing and a tragic inability to stand alone in freedom. In the end, 
we potential potters ought to take care that as we attempt to draw out Leviathan 
with a fishhook, we do not fall victim to Leviathan ourselves. 
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Chapter 6 
MAN COMMODIFIABLE AND HUMAN FLOURISHING 
 
Having already explored the matters of what happens to the individual who is 
being commodified, as well as the general attitudes of those individuals who are 
doing the commodifying, we will now turn to the issue of what happens to a 
society at large when it is dominated by broad commodification and 
commodification rhetoric as applied to human beings and human ‘goods’. It is my 
contention that our worries about the negative future effects of enhancement exist 
not only with those individuals actively ‘engaged’ in enhancement practices – 
whether in act or rhetoric, victim or aggressor – but moreover that the true horror 
is that the society at large where such practices are taking place will ultimately be 
affected and we will therefore all be made worse off. To explore this possibility, 
we will consider first the sort of mechanism whereby a so-called “bystander” 
might be so affected. 
 Arguments of this sort are what law professor Scott Altman (1991) calls 
“modified experience” arguments, which are based on the overall concern that 
“medical technologies [might] alter the sensibilities of observers” thereby making 
it such that even individuals “who merely learn about powerful technologies 
could come to think about people as they do objects and commodities” (p. 294). 
Specific to this dissertation, this translates into a concern about whether or not a 
society in which some (or many or most) of its members are utilizing 
commodifying, enhancing technologies – or, as per broad commodification, 
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simply engaging in enhancement rhetoric – will be able to affect those members 
who are not actively using or subject to said technologies or their corresponding 
rhetoric. 
A modified experience argument is perhaps best viewed as a variation of a 
sort of “slippery slope” argument,” wherein the power of association leads 
individuals not directly involved in human commodification (as was seen in 
chapters 4 and 5) to view themselves and/or others in commodified fashion 
simply because of that association. I will focus primarily on Altman (1991) and 
Shapiro (1990) in explaining this phenomenon. After laying out the basics of this 
“modified experience” mechanism, I will explain how, given our work from the 
previous chapters on how enhancement as a technology and as an attitude 
functions, we can expect that this alteration of societal sensibilities is a perfectly 
reasonable – if not indeed highly warranted – outcome. I will then present how 
we can expect this change in sensibilities, combined with active enhancement, 
will result in diminished human flourishing. 
 
Man Commodifiable 
 
In his analysis of modified experience arguments, Altman (1991), states that the 
term “commodification” can have many meanings, including reference to actions 
that: “violate a duty of respect for persons by treating the person as a thing that 
can be sold”; or “alter a person’s moral status so that the person becomes a thing 
without a will” (p. 295). However, when dealing with the matter of modified 
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experience, the more relevant (and interesting) forms of “commodification” 
include those actions that “alter the sensibilities of people directly involved in 
market transactions by causing them to regard each other as objects with prices 
rather than as persons”; or “alter the sensibilities of people who learn about or live 
in a society that permits the sale of persons but who do not participate in such 
transactions themselves” (Altman, 1991, pp. 295-6). Particular to this chapter, we 
are interested in the fourth variation: actions that can alter the sensibilities of mere 
commodification bystanders. 
 In looking at this possibility of a change in bystander sensibility, Altman 
says that there are at least two main types of modified-experience arguments that 
should be considered. First is the “norm-loss argument”, which he says is based 
on the view that some new technology is “violating an important norm, such as 
the infinite value of life, the equal worth of all people, the impropriety of treating 
others only as means, or the ideal of unconditional love or duty (Altman, 1991, p. 
298). By treating people in this way, the (new) technology runs the risk of 
creating a sort of cognitive dissonance in the viewer by placing two seemingly 
distinct categories – e.g. persons and objects – together. In response to this 
cognitive dissonance, the observer might then feel compelled to resolve this 
dissonance by modifying his or her views about the categories in question, such as 
by viewing the category of persons as normatively the same (or nearly the same) 
as the category of objects, or by modifying or simply abandoning this once-
cherished norm. Accordingly, Altman (1991) says, “If these norms play a central 
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role in maintaining important personal experiences, then technology could lead to 
the modified experience” (p. 299). 
 Using the prostitution example from chapter 3, a norm-loss argument 
would state that part of the problem with sex-selling is that it could lead even 
those individuals who neither practice prostitution nor purchase its services to 
have a diminished view of human sexuality because they live in a society where 
prostitution takes place; faced with the cognitive dissonance caused by seeing sex 
and commerce co-occurring, observers might choose to resolve the conflict by 
abandoning their previously held “cherished” norms about sex (Radin, 1987, 
champions such an argument). 
 Alternatively, the second type of modified-experience argument that 
Altman considers is the “attitude-change argument,” which is based on the 
concern that “[t]echnologies might alter attitudes or feelings without changing any 
particular beliefs” (Altman, 1991, p. 299). The idea here is that we can start with 
“someone [treating] a person (or something that resembles a person) in a way 
usually associated with treatment of things” (i.e. by selling, fragmenting, 
exchanging, etc), and then end up with that person viewing persons (or things 
resembling persons) as things instead (Altman, 1991, p. 299). According to 
Altman (1991), “Because people learn, remember, and feel through association of 
concepts in schemas” – that is, basically, bundles of beliefs and attitudes and 
feelings that are powerfully connected and act largely on the force of association 
– “observers might transfer attitudes from sales, products, or resources to 
persons” (p. 299). Thus, an initial instance of commodifying someone can in turn 
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to a complete change of person-orientation, whereby the person (or those around 
him or her) “might be unable to recover the attitudes or feelings formerly attached 
to persons because they have been displaced by feelings and attitudes toward 
things” (Altman, 1991, p. 299). 
 Returning to the example of prostitution, an attitude-change argument 
would not argue that the main concern with the effects of prostitution on 
observers is that they later might come to modify or abandon valued norms about 
sex; instead, such an argument would maintain that the true problem is that people 
will come to change their respective attitudes or beliefs about sex (or people) and 
consequently have a lesser view or attitude towards them. The idea here is that the 
observer might be able to maintain his or her norm, but simply alter his or her 
orientation towards the human(s) or human good(s) involved. 
While Altman considers the two argument types – norm-based arguments 
and attitude-change arguments – as separable, I believe that they are (arguably) 
intimately related. For example, it is hard to imagine that progressive changes in 
an individual’s attitudes towards other persons do not subsequently lead to a 
change in the norms that he or she applies to persons. For example, after 
repeatedly making changes in one’s attitude towards sex (or persons) because of 
the presence of prostitution, it seems likely that one’s valuation of that norm will 
end up being compromised. Likewise, it is hard to imagine that an individual can 
manage to change his or her norms about something or someone without a 
corresponding change in attitude. For example, it is difficult to think of someone 
abandoning his or her norm about sex without having a lesser attitude towards it, 
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or that someone might come to view other persons as normatively the same as 
objects, however he or she does not consequently treat persons the same as 
objects, applying the same sorts of attitudes and feelings. However, separable or 
not, both accounts of modified experience arguments provide good prefatory 
illustrations of how commodification is thought to affect observers who are not 
necessarily also participants. 
Regardless, this second variation is more similar to what is already present 
and popular in the commodification literature; so this is where we will focus. The 
greatest champion of this sort of “dissonance reduction and association” (Altman, 
1991, p. 298) argument is Michael Shapiro (although Margaret Radin herself has 
a similar view (1982)). For Shapiro (1990), the “dissonance reduction and 
association” comes about as a result of our experiential encounters with 
technologically-drive fragmentations and reassemblies. While we already looked 
at Shapiro’s argument on the relationship between commodification and 
fragmentation with respect to personal identity in chapter 4, here we are interested 
in the sort of broader fragmentation that occurs when we lose our ability to 
maintain perceptual and moral classification systems with respect to humans and 
human relationships. In the former, only the commodified and/or commodifying 
individual is affected; here, everyone is affected. 
In his paper on “Fragmenting and Reassembling the World,” Shapiro’s 
main argument – at least the part with which we are concerned – is roughly the 
following: First, Shapiro (1990) points out that various biotechnologies – e.g. 
surrogacy and those biotechnologies that are defined as ‘enhancement’ 
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technologies – end up fragmenting “certain natural processes, conditions, or 
relationships” (p. 333). These resulting fragments, he says, “may not be clearly 
addressed by our existing normative classification systems – systems of thought 
central to description, explanation, and justification” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 333).  In 
other words, these new fragments do not fit within our current classificatory 
systems on which we base how we see, organize, and relate to – especially 
morally – the world around us. Next, he notes that these fragments can in turn be 
reassembled in various ways, thereby “compounding the classification traumas: 
more entities not covered by our categories, and more new choices” (Shapiro, 
1990, p. 333). He also considers how the new fragments and reassemblies may 
require new moral and legal understanding, as well as a new understanding of our 
relationships and duties to them.  
Shapiro (1990) then worries that “[t]he set of "fragmentation, 
classification-challenge, and reassembly" events creates risks of human 
objectification and commodification by transferring our ideas about objects to 
persons”; thus: “[w]e may learn to view persons less as persons and more as 
objects,” which may in turn “transform our supposedly mandatory duties of care 
and respect for persons into contingent ones associated with the success of 
products” (p. 333). As mentioned in chapter 4, the “descent from person to 
object” is “the central nightmare of the new biology” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 354); 
these fragmentations and reassemblies compound our previous worries that this 
central nightmare might indeed be upon us. Shapiro (1990) concludes that “The 
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very existence of choice thus may make us normatively worse off in certain 
respects by risking the erosion of noncontingent bonds” (p. 333). 
According to Shapiro (1990), in our commonplace understanding of the 
universe, “[t]here is a givenness and unity about the world that commands our 
attention, influences our lives, and moves us to judge conduct and conditions in 
light of their consistency with this fixity” (p. 334). We see the world, by and 
large, as a collection of people and things that can be appropriately categorized, 
and, once categorized, we feel we have a general understanding of what our 
(moral) obligations are to those individuals within each of the categories: we 
respect and/or love persons, we manufacture products, we use tools, and so on. 
While our sense of “givenness” may in reality be an overgeneralization (Shapiro, 
1990, pp. 334-5) – i.e., our ability to clearly and simply categorize things may in 
fact not be so clear and simple as we often like to believe – insofar as this sense is 
not openly challenged, we are comfortable with the givenness as we perceive it, 
and we are comfortable with how it enables us to organize our world, and 
understand and make decisions in it. 
Moreover, it is our comfort with the givenness that makes the 
“perceptual/cognitive challenge” wrought by fragmenting and reassembling 
technologies such a source of discomfort for us. Shapiro (1990) explains that 
“much of distinctively human thought rests on classification and categorization, 
establishment of paradigms, and comparison of a problem at hand with the 
paradigms [and it] is the very stuff of understanding and decision-making” (p. 
343). While this classification and categorization “is rarely attended to 
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consciously”, it provides us with our basic “models for description, evaluation, 
and action-justification” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 343). Accordingly, those technologies 
that threaten to undermine our classification systems and thereby disable our 
“models” for thought are met with a heightened degree of resistance because in 
assaulting our sense of givenness they risk failure of thought.  
The way that these commodifying technologies risk failure of thought is 
by emphasizing fragmentation and reassemblies, which in turn undermine our 
current classification systems. According to Shapiro (1990), “fragmentation 
presupposes knowledge that life forms and processes are alterable, manipulable 
("to be is to be manipulable"), and predictable in ways that remind one of made 
rather than found or received entities (such as babies)” (p. 337); it is therefore 
seemingly inconsistent with our traditional conception of persons – which are 
“found or received entities”. This means that when considering human beings, 
this fragmentation in turn affects our classification systems because “[t]he fully 
understandable and predictable person is a classification anomaly, a monster: it 
straddles the borders between humanity and the domains of other life forms and 
of machines” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 338). Because of this straddling of borders and 
creation of anomalies, we cannot comfortably classify these fragmented humans 
with non-fragmented humans brought about by technologies into our pre-existing 
thought-patterns and relation to the world.  
Moreover, these fragments can also be reassembled, thereby creating 
additional problems for our classification systems. According to Shapiro (1990), 
“With fragmentation comes the possibility of reassembly [whereby w]e can 
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construct new unities, new wholes, and new classifications” (p. 346). This 
“fragmentation and reassembly of the world” ends up “challeng[ing] our 
classification systems and, therefore…the core of our descriptive and normative 
thinking [by creating entities] that simply do not fit our forms of thought and 
discourse” (Shapiro, 1990, pp. 338-9). As Donna Haraway would put it, they 
create a collection of ‘cyborgs’, each “a kind of disassembled and reassembled, 
postmodern collective and personal self” (Haraway, 1991, p. 163). These cyborgs 
represent “transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities” 
(Haraway, 1991, p. 154) and, in virtue of being “boundary creatures…literally, 
monsters”, have “a destabilizing place in the great Western evolutionary, 
technological, and biological narratives” (Haraway, 1991, p. 2). 
These boundary creatures in turn challenge our classificatory abilities in 
that, by existing as boundary creatures, they challenge the idea that there even are 
boundaries. According to Shapiro (1990), this is problematic because “[w]ith the 
boundaries of set eroded, we are in a continuum or hodgepodge of impressions – 
not a happy state for creatures needing markers and borders to control their 
conceptual agoraphobia” (p. 341). In reality, we human beings are the sort of 
creatures that need these clear boundaries in order to function; without them, we 
see the equivalent of “flying squirrels” (Shapiro, 1990, pp. 339-40): things not 
clearly bird or animal, things that defy normal classification.  
 The blurred boundary that is of main interest in the modified-experience 
argument is the blurring between ‘person’ and ‘object’. Using the example of 
surrogacy as our featured “flying squirrel”, we can see that surrogacy highlights 
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the association between ‘person’ and ‘object’, thereby blurring the proposed 
boundary between the two – in at least two ways. Reusing terminology from  
Shapiro in chapter 4, namely with respect to ‘bundling’ and ‘unbundling’, these 
two ways are basically the following: first, surrogacy does so by unbundling from 
the parent-child relationship the ideal of non-contingent bonds; second, surrogacy 
does so by bundling to the parent-child relationship the notion of ‘commerce’. 
Since the hallmark of a person-person relationship is, for Shapiro, non-contingent 
bonds, the apparent dissolution or absence of such bonds is often an indication of 
the lack of a person-person relationship. So with surrogacy, in response to the 
question, “[D]oes the revision of traditional reproduction and its replacement with 
surrogacy (standard or gestational) threaten the noncontingent bonds of affection 
we owe to our offspring?”, Shapiro (1990) answers, “Maybe. The surrogate is, 
after all, giving up the baby. It is an alarming picture – parents deliberately 
parting from their children for reasons that do not “track” within existing 
normative schemes” (p. 364). So, because in our understandings of human 
relationships contingent bonds are the sort that occurs with person-object 
relationships, not parent-child relationships or person-person relationships, the 
presence of such contingent bonds in surrogacy would seem to indicate a person-
object relationship. 
Second, surrogacy might present an association between ‘person’ and 
‘non-person’ by bundling into the parent-child relationship the idea of monetary 
compensation. As Shapiro (1990) points out, so long as there is payment, 
surrogacy leads to a highly problematic understanding of motherhood, family, 
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children, and so on, because “whatever else it is, paid surrogacy is a purchase of 
services” (p .363). He says that this “intersection of commerce with what is 
viewed as noncommercial” – that is, the tie between a child and money - produces 
“an anomalous child…and polluted families with mothers who are baby 
machines, fathers who are traders in human flesh, and children who are 
commodities” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 363). This view of human beings as “machines” 
and “commodities” does not track with our understood classification of persons – 
our “existing normative schemes” – but is instead the sort of attitude that we have 
towards objects. 
 Moving away from this example of how the fragmentation and reassembly 
caused by surrogacy threaten our classification systems and our corresponding 
separation of humans and things, let us now turn to the matter of human 
enhancement technologies and how they provide an equal – if not greater – threat. 
As with surrogacy, there are two manners according to Shapiro in which human 
enhancement technologies highlight an association between ‘person’ and ‘object’: 
by undermining non-contingent bonds (i.e. unbundling) and by taking a person 
and associating him or her with one or more features generally associated with 
objects (i.e. bundling). Focusing initially on the changes in our understanding of 
human relationships and non-contingent bonds that occur when parents enhance 
their children, Shapiro (1990) asks us to consider the example of “the ideal of the 
parent-child bond” (p. 348). According to Shapiro (1990), “in our finer moments” 
we tend to believe “that we are supposed to accept unconditionally whatever 
children we receive, whatever traits they have. Our compromises with this ideal – 
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adoption, abandonment, abuse, and infanticide – are at best suspect and at worst 
criminal” and we really only allow for the “severing of the bond and the 
termination of obligations…when it promotes the best interests of the child” (p. 
348). Once we start engaging in the ““reassembly” of persons (or persons-to-be) 
through trait specification,” however, the risk “is that our acceptance and fidelity 
will become contingent on the success of our augmentative plans, as measured 
ultimately by the success of the persons designed” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 348). 
Moreover, according to Shapiro (1990), “[t]his contingency-devaluation risk 
exists for any important trait we single out – physical or mental – including the 
child's sex” (p. 349). As discussed in chapter 5, both Kass (2003) and Sandel 
(2007, 2004) find that this risk carries with it the concern that parents view their 
children as mere products of manufacture. This in turn may cause us to “replace 
the (felt) absolute nature of our duties of care and respect for natural persons with 
the contingency of respect and care we generally accord to artifacts” (Shapiro, 
1990, p. 349). 
While Shapiro focuses on this sort of “contingency-devaluation risk” with 
respect to children, the ramifications are arguably much broader. In fact, it seems 
that whenever we emphasize discrete traits and their prospective changeability 
(e.g. their ability to be enhanced), we run the risk of seeing any individual – 
including ourselves – with these traits as thereby subject to the contingent bonds 
we owe only to objects. Reconsider chapter 5, where we discussed the attitude of 
an individual commodifying another individual as being essentially that of a 
manufacturer. As stated there, this attitude necessitates that the ‘manufacturer’ 
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perceive of the other as a potential product of manufacture – a mere object. Thus, 
the former individual cannot conceive of the latter in terms of non-contingent 
bonds; the product of manufacture is valued only in terms of its fulfilling the 
wishes of the manufacturer. This sort of attitude is not limited to the parent-child 
relationship (even if it is sometimes conceived to be so limited); instead, it may 
present itself any time that we view someone – whether ourselves or someone else 
– as fragmentable and open to broad commodification, thereby making the 
associated relationship contingent. Thus, the commodifying attitude is essentially 
one that blurs the person-object boundary in our classification system, because 
persons are being viewed as objects in a relevant sense. 
Additionally, while Shapiro views the unbundling of non-contingent 
bonds as a sort of separate identifier that the person-object divide has been 
breached, this sort of phenomenon may in fact be best viewed as the bundling of 
contingent bonds to ‘person’, where contingent bonds are more or less another 
feature of ‘object’ (such as fungible, exchangeable, and so on). Logically, insofar 
as continent and non-contingent are strict opposites, the bundling of the former 
and the unbundling of the latter is the same. However, I believe that it is easier to 
witness the true risk of the modified experience version of commodification when 
we think not in terms of ‘splitting from’ but rather ‘cleaving to’; the true risk is 
not that the ‘person’ becomes barren of non-contingent bonds but that it is 
debased and objectified. Moreover, the slippery slope association of ideas is more 
obvious when we point out the directionality in this fashion. 
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 It is this “slippery slope” to which we will now turn. Recall that part of our 
main reason for being concerned with the idea that fragmenting and reassembling 
human beings, blurring the boundary between human and non-human and 
undermining – if not destroying – the person-object division in our classification 
system, is the worry that “if human beings or human material are dealt with in 
ways associated with objects, the fear is that we will transfer the object status to 
humans generally” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 351). This worry is, as Shapiro points out 
(1990), “a slippery slope argument based on association of ideas” (p. 351): if we 
find ourselves associating humans and human goods with the sorts of things, 
states, functions, and so on, typically reserved for non-humans (namely, objects), 
we might thereby transfer these views of objects to our views of humans. From 
our earlier analysis in chapter 3, as well as the one so far in this chapter, this 
means that if we find ourselves associating humans and human goods with such 
‘object’ things as, e.g., fragmentability, reassembly, exchangeability, non-
contingent bonds, and so on, then we might begin to treat humans like objects as 
well. 
 This devolution and debasement happens because of the “association of 
ideas” that pushes us along the slippery slope from person to object, as resulting 
from available fragmentation and reassembly, is basically the following: since 
“[f]ragmentation and reassembly are processes ordinarily associated with the 
manufacture of products or the rendition of services for a price, and with the use 
of nonhuman life,” our innate “associative abilities” end up connecting things like 
““assembly,” “design,” and “construction” with what we build, use, eat, or 
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discard” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 352). Corresponding with what we saw in chapter 3, 
this means that since exchangeability and other forms of commodification are 
ordinarily associated with non-human objects, we associate these sorts of features 
only with non-human objects, to the exclusion of humans, which are brought 
about “by dimly seen and ill-understood natural processes” rather than 
“assembly” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 352). As such, “Even the perceived possibility of 
dividing and reconstituting [humans] may cause the association of persons with 
objects. There is thus some risk that we will come to view and treat persons as 
artifacts that are to be priced or tinkered with” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 352). 
The basic outline of this argument is the following: Some of the 
biotechnologies that we are currently being confronted with (e.g. reproductive 
technologies, enhancement technologies, and so on) function by fragmenting – 
and sometimes subsequently reassembling – various parts, aspects, functions, and 
so on, of human beings. These need not be limited to physical and mental 
attributes (e.g. Shapiro, 1990, p. 349), but can instead include all (or many) of 
those elements integral to personhood (see e.g. Radin, 1987, p. 1906; also chapter 
3). However, our understanding of fragmentation and reassembly is that these 
processes apply only to non-humans (primarily objects, but certainly also to plants 
and animals). Because these processes should (as per our accepted classification 
system) only apply to non-humans, but we see them being applied to humans also, 
this causes for us a sort of cognitive confusion. Our expected boundaries between 
humans and non-humans, persons and objects, are now blurred. As Shapiro 
(1990) puts it, “The “discontinuities”' between ourselves and the kingdoms of 
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things, animals, and plants thus wither away” and we begin to see ourselves rather 
like “strange beings that straddle personhood and thingness (or animalness or 
plantness)” (pp. 371-2). With this withering away comes a dilemma: How do we 
maintain the person-object paradigm, at least with respect to moral obligations?  
 Of course, neither Altman nor Shapiro actually considers this question to 
be particularly problematic (although Altman more so than Shapiro). According 
to Shapiro (1990), a given technology only becomes “morally intrusive when it 
eludes or straddles categories that guide the application of moral criteria” (p. 357). 
Because “[t]he idea of persons as fully manipulable physical systems is an 
anomaly” due to its generated “intersection between sets – objects and persons – 
that we normally (if unreflectively) view as disjoint” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 357), we 
therefore have cause for moral concern. This is why the fragmentation and 
reassembly of ‘persons’ is potentially more problematic than that of other things: 
we have more important moral obligations to persons. The worry, therefore, is 
that “[t]he very possibility of fragmentation and reassembly of life processes thus 
creates (in theory) the risk that we will slip toward viewing and treating persons 
as artifacts or products” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 373) – as mere objects. It is a general 
terror that with the dissolution of the person-object paradigm we might enter a 
moral freefall, ending with persons being conceived of as, morally, not much 
different from objects. 
Ultimately, the risk of a universal commodification in society at large 
(including those individuals not actively commodifying or commodified) will 
depend on precisely how we respond to the dissolution of our person-object 
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categorization. For one thing, as Shapiro (1990) points out, “The new forms of 
reassembly are not, after all, entirely one with commercial models of 
manufacture. Why, then, should we assume that human design always entails 
human thinghood?” (p. 353). What he means is that it is not the case that simply 
making traits or features of some person either exchangeable or commodifiable 
entails that he or she becomes exactly the same as an object, so it is not obvious 
that we need to be worried about a mass commodification attitude. According to 
Shapiro (1990), then, as long as “[t]here are major differences that accompany the 
major similarities” (p. 353), we should not hastily conclude that the similarities 
present will completely overshadow the differences and thereby lead us to 
conclude that the fragmentation and reassembly of human beings is functionally 
identical to the manufacture and commodification of human beings. 
Indeed, this is Altman’s primary concern with modified experience 
arguments as well. According to Altman, all of these arguments have a 
problematic underlying assumption: namely, they presuppose too fragile a view of 
reality. By contrast, he maintains that “[t]hough reality is socially constructed, it 
is somewhat resistant to either accidental or purposive revision” (Altman, 1991, p. 
297). As such, “Arguments for making important decisions based on concern for 
preserving sensibilities, especially observers’ sensibilities, should be greeted with 
great caution” (Altman, 1991, p. 297). After all, Altman (1991) says, “Why would 
knowing about sales transform attitudes so dramatically?” (p. 301). Consider, by 
contrast, the example of playing tennis, which he claims “does not lead people to 
conceive of their partners as tools for exercise. Much less does merely knowing 
  193 
about tennis playing have this effect” (Altman, 1991, p. 301). Accordingly, he 
wonders, “Why would pricing and selling overwhelm our thinking and feeling?” 
and concludes that “[s]omething very powerful is being attributed to selling and 
pricing” (Altman, 1991, p. 301). This means that in order to explain the difference 
in “observers’ sensibilities” we will need to explain how pricing is somehow 
meaningfully different from, say, playing partners’ tennis in terms of how we 
view the other person or persons involved. 
 The most powerful explanation, according to Altman, can be found in 
schema theory. According to schema theory, “[p]eople collect and retain 
information, as well as associated attitudes and feelings” (Altman, 1991, p. 301). 
Since “[t]hese schemas have strong associative tendencies…Someone who 
regards an object as falling under a schema automatically and unconsciously 
associates other aspects of the schema with the object, including beliefs and 
feelings” (Altman, 1991, pp. 301-2). According to this theory, then, it may be the 
case that “many people have a powerful market schema [and w]hen they perceive 
something as belonging in a market because someone sells it, attitudes and 
feelings associated with markets simply follow the object” (Altman, 1991, p. 
302). Thus, part of our explanation accounting for the above difference between 
pricing and playing tennis would be that people have stronger schemas for pricing 
than for playing tennis, thereby making it more like that “pricing and selling 
overwhelm our thinking and feeling”. 
In order to determine whether or not our given schema is somehow 
overwhelming, what we should do is consider the role that perception plays in that 
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schema as to whether we focus more on the similarities or on the differences. 
Shapiro offers as an example the case of in vitro fertilization (IVF), which “looks 
like a manufacturing process,” but for which “the idea that it drives our minds 
toward viewing the resulting children as manufactured objects, while worth 
considering, is not obviously correct” (Shapiro, 1990, pp. 353-4). He claims that 
“[t]here are other visions of IVF [that] focus on what follows it in a successful 
effort at reproduction – pregnancy and birth, which look like any other pregnancy 
and birth” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 354). Accordingly, when we focus on the technical 
aspects of IVF, its similarity to manufacture is what stands out; however, when 
we focus on the more “natural” or “human” aspects (i.e. pregnancy and birth), it is 
IVF’s difference from manufacture that stands out. This is why Shapiro (1990) 
emphasizes that “[e]lements of planning, assembling, and rearranging are not 
sufficient conditions for objectification” (p. 354). 
 In evaluating the potential impact of certain technologies on our ability to 
categorize humans and non-humans, Shapiro (1990) believes that it is important 
to keep in mind that “not all processes of decomposition and reconstitution are the 
same in structure or effect” and, accordingly, “[e]ach may create different risks of 
replacing noncontingent bonds with the weaker ones associated with objects” (p. 
353). As such, it may be that the perception of these risks is ultimately rather 
subjective, depending on whether one focuses – as in the IVF example – on the 
similarities to or differences from manufacture. According to Shapiro (1990), “It 
appears, then, that our very aptitudes at thinking by association create dangers, 
which are in turn compounded by our deficits in judging categories and drawing 
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distinctions” (pp. 352-3); when we associate the same processes (e.g. fragmenting 
and reassembling) with what we believe should be two distinct categories – 
namely humans and non-humans – it may be that our minds focus on this 
similarity, rather than noticing the presence of some relevant difference. 
 This is why Shapiro (1990) believes that “[t]he characteristics of the 
perceiving audience are crucial” (p. 354). He points out that “differences and 
similarities clear to some may not be apparent to others” and “[t]he fact that a 
perception of manufacturedness may move some minds to assimilate human 
reproduction to the production of widgets does not mean that the whole human 
audience will do so” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 354). This account of difference in human 
perception is similar to Radin’s (1987) description of the “imperfect practitioner” 
(p. 1878). According to her description, “The rhetoric of commodification might 
lead imperfect practitioners to wrong answers, even if the sophisticated 
practitioner would not be misled. In other words, commodification-talk creates a 
serious risk of error in certain cases” (Radin, 1987, p. 1878). By parallel, we 
might say that even if some (i.e. “sophisticated”) perceivers of the person-object 
association that corresponds with fragmenting and reassembling technologies are 
able to focus on the differences between this association and actual 
commodification, we may still find cause for concern if other (i.e. “imperfect”) 
perceivers are more inclined to focus on the similarities, thus heralding that 
“human devolution from person to object is well on its way” (Shapiro, 1990, p. 
354). 
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 But, I do not think that it is even necessary to resort to argument based on 
imperfect perceivers; on my account, even perfect perceivers will be driven to see 
commodified squirrels everywhere. It is here that our previous discussions of 
enhancement as a technology and commodities as socially-driven entities become 
most relevant. Given that enhancement technologies constitute “modern” and 
“Promethean” technologies (from chapter 2), we have very good reason to expect 
that they will declare themselves to become a transcendent end, thereby 
compelling the minds of men to cater to their every need (and perhaps whim). 
Similarly, given that these technologies are of a “commodifying” sort, we have 
very good reason to suspect that societal pressures will drive the technologies to 
be ever more central to our human action, discourse, and ideology (from chapter 
3). Hence, it is inherent in the nature of the type of technology with which we are 
confronted that it will command attention from everyone in a society, not merely 
“imperfect” persons who suffer from sort of misunderstanding; they understand 
all too well, and even if they did not, the technology would soon gladly teach 
them. 
 
Human Flourishing 
 
But now the question we have before us is: what kind of future does this really 
hold? If enhancement technologies are Promethean and commodifying, and if 
they lead to pots, potters, and pot(ter)s-by-association, what would be our final 
consequence for opening the initial Pandora’s box? To get a better picture of this 
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potential future, we will first consider the example of the super-Benthamites 
proposed by Hilary Putnam (1981), and then consider the parallel example 
pertaining to our super-Enhancers future. To allow for both due reference and 
reverence, I will include Putnam’s passage in its entirety, and hope that my dear 
reader will bear with me on this (as it is my only long quote). In laying out the 
example of the super-Benthamites, Putnam (1981) states the following: 
This time let us imagine that the continent of Australia is peopled by a 
culture which agrees with us on history, geography and exact science, but 
which disagrees with us in ethics. I don’t want to take the usual case of 
super-Nazis or something of that kind, but I want to take rather the more 
interesting case of super-Benthamites. Let us imagine that the continent of 
Australia is peopled with people who have some elaborate scientific 
measure of what they take to be ‘hedonic tone’, and who believe that one 
should always act so as to maximize hedonic tone (taking that to mean the 
greatest hedonic tone of the greatest number). I will assume that the super-
Benthamites are extremely sophisticated, aware of all the difficulties of 
predicting the future and exactly estimating the consequences of actions 
and so forth. I will also assume that they are extremely ruthless, and that 
while they would not cause someone suffering for the sake of the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number if there were reasonable doubt that in 
fact the consequence of their action would be to bring about the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number, that in cases where one knows with 
certainty what the consequences of the actions would be, they would be 
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willing to perform the most horrible actions – willing to torture small 
children or to condemn people for crimes which they did not commit – if 
the result of these actions would be to increase the general satisfaction 
level in the long run (after due allowance for the suffering of the innocent 
victim in each case) by any positive ε, however small. 
     I imagine that we would not feel very happy about this sort of super-
Benthamite morality. Most of us would condemn the super-Benthamites as 
having a sick system of values, as being bureaucratic, as being ruthless, 
etc. They are the ‘new man’ in his most horrible manifestation. And they 
would return our invective by saying that we are soft-headed, 
superstitious, prisoners of irrational tradition, etc. 
     The disagreement between us and the super-Benthamites is just the sort 
of disagreement that is ordinarily imagined in order to make the point that 
two groups of people might agree on all the facts and still disagree about 
the ‘values’. But let us look at the case more closely. Every super-
Benthamite is familiar with the fact that sometimes the greatest 
satisfaction of the greatest number (measured in ‘utils’) requires one to tell 
a lie. And it is not counted as being ‘dishonest’ in the pejorative sense to 
tell lies out of the motive of maximizing the general pleasure level. So 
after a while the use of the description ‘honest’ among the super-
Benthamites would be extremely different from the use of that same 
descriptive term among us. And the same will go for ‘considerate’, ‘good 
citizen’, etc. The vocabulary available to the super-Benthamites for the 
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description of people-to-people situations will be quite different from the 
vocabulary available to us. Not only will they lack, or have altered beyond 
recognition, many of our descriptive resources, but they will very likely 
invent new jargon of their own (for example, exact terms for describing 
hedonic tones) that are unavailable to us. The texture of the human world 
will begin to change. In the course of time the super-Benthamites and we 
will end up living in different human worlds. 
     In short, it will not be the case that we and the super-Benthamites 
‘agree on the facts and disagree about values’. In the case of almost all 
interpersonal situations, the description we give of the facts will be quite 
different from the description they give of the facts. Even if none of the 
statement they make about the situation are false, their description will not 
be one that we will count as adequate and perspicuous; and the description 
we give will not be one that they could count as adequate and perspicuous. 
In short, even if we put aside our ‘disagreement about the values’, we 
could not regard their total representation of the human world as fully 
rationally acceptable. And just as the Brain-in-a-Vatists’ inability to get 
the way the world is right is a direct result of their sick standards of 
rationality – their sick standards of theoretical rationality – so the inability 
of the super-Benthamites to get the way the human world is right is a 
direct result of their sick conception of human flourishing. (pp. 139-141) 
What we see in this example is an illustration of how an attitude or ideology, 
seemingly innocent on the surface, becomes a defining feature for a given culture 
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or society. Having accepted the “fact” that humans are manipulable, enhanceable, 
exchangeable, and so on, what follows are the “values” that they are precisely 
that. The human world is transformed into a world of, essentially, pots and 
potters; commodified and commodifiers; objects and sadists and masochists. 
Since we know (from chapter 2) that the only freedom of choice we can truly 
guarantee comes with our first choice of “yes” or “no” to our proposed new 
world, we must now ask ourselves whether or not we are truly ready to descend 
together into the dust, and whether or not the bars of Sheol await us. 
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